



# Foreign Affairs Committee

## Select Committee Announcement

---

Foreign Affairs Committee  
House of Commons  
London SW1A 0AA

---

**PN 27 (Session 2008-09)**  
14 June 2009

### ***NEW FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT: "GLOBAL SECURITY: NON-PROLIFERATION"***

In its new Report, published today, the Foreign Affairs Committee provides an assessment of the current threat posed by nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional weapons and ballistic missiles, both from states and from terrorists, and current Government policy to mitigate these threats.

On **nuclear** disarmament and non-proliferation, Committee Chairman Mike Gapes MP said:

"The critical threats to international peace and stability posed by the recent actions of North Korea and Iran's continuing nuclear ambitions are some of the vital issues which must be addressed at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference next year. Although we think that the UK has the best record among them, my Committee concludes that the five recognised nuclear powers are often perceived as a group by the non-nuclear weapons states, and that, as such, the group is seen collectively to have failed to live up to its nuclear disarmament commitments. We further conclude that this undermines prospects for containing nuclear proliferation. We therefore believe that the renewed talks on nuclear disarmament which have been launched recently by Presidents Obama and Medvedev could greatly aid progress at the 2010 conference and hope that they come to speedy fruition. We call on all five of the recognised nuclear weapons states to commit to further progress on nuclear disarmament. We commend the steps that the Government has taken to scale down and de-escalate the UK's nuclear arsenal. We welcome the Prime Minister's announcement that the new Trident submarines are to carry fewer missiles than the current boats, and we recommend that the Government should do more to highlight this and other nuclear disarmament steps which it has taken.

The international nuclear non-proliferation system is also challenged because three states—India, Pakistan and Israel—have failed to sign up to the NPT and developed nuclear weapons outside it. We support the Government's aim of bringing them in, although we are sceptical about prospects for this. It will also

be crucial to maintain international support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including through proper funding.”

On **ballistic missile defence**, Mr Gapes said:

“We are unconvinced that the planned US ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland represent a net gain for European security, under current circumstances. We urge that BMD in Europe should be developed, if at all, as a joint system between the US, NATO and Russia. We repeat the call that we made in a report two years ago for the Government to schedule a full Parliamentary debate on ballistic missile defence.”

On **biological and chemical weapons**, Mr Gapes said:

“There is still work to do in the control of both biological and chemical weapons. In particular, the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the full destruction of existing chemical weapons stockpiles around the world are vital steps. More work is required to make sure that all states sign up to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and to find new mechanisms to strengthen the Convention, with the ultimate goal of agreeing a verification protocol.”

On **conventional weapons**, Mr Gapes said:

“We commend the Government’s work towards securing an international Arms Trade Treaty, and we argue that the strength of the future treaty should take priority over the breadth of its membership. The Government should continue its work in these areas and to provide international leadership, both individually and as part of the EU.”

The Foreign Affairs Committee will publish its report on “Global Security: Non-Proliferation” at **00.01hrs BST** (GMT + 1 hr) on **Sunday 14 June** (one minute past midnight on Sunday). This will be the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2008-09 (HC 222).

The Report’s complete conclusions and recommendations are attached below as an annex.

### **Media enquiries:**

Members of the press with enquiries should contact Alex Paterson, Select Committee Media Officer, on 020 7219 1589, or 07917 488488, or by email to [patersona@parliament.uk](mailto:patersona@parliament.uk)

### **Further Information:**

1. The Foreign Affairs Committee is responsible for scrutinising the “expenditure, administration and policy” of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated public bodies. The text of all Committee publications, including Reports, can be found on the Committee’s website at [www.parliament.uk/facom](http://www.parliament.uk/facom)
2. Committee meetings are open to the public. Access is via Cromwell Green Entrance for the House of Commons Committee Rooms and the main entrance on the Thames Embankment for Portcullis House Rooms. It is advisable to allow about 10 minutes to pass through security checks. There is no system for the prior reservation of seats in the Committee Rooms.

The **membership of the Committee** is as follows: Mike Gapes (Chairman), *Labour*, Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell, *Liberal Democrats*, Mr Fabian Hamilton, *Labour*, Rt Hon David Heathcoat-Amory, *Conservative*, Mr John Horam, *Conservative*, Mr Eric Illsley, *Labour*, Mr Paul Keetch, *Liberal Democrats*, Andrew Mackinlay, *Labour*, Mr Malcolm Moss, *Conservative*, Sandra Osborne, *Labour*, Mr Greg Pope, *Labour*, Mr Ken Purchase, *Labour*, Rt Hon Sir John Stanley, *Conservative*, Ms Gisela Stuart, *Labour*

**Specific Committee Information:** Tel 020 7219 6394; email – [foraffcom@parliament.uk](mailto:foraffcom@parliament.uk)

**Media Enquiries:** Alex Paterson, Tel 020 7219 1589 or 07917 488 488; email - [patersona@parliament.uk](mailto:patersona@parliament.uk)

**Committee Website:** [www.parliament.uk/facom](http://www.parliament.uk/facom)

**Watch committees and parliamentary debates online:** [www.parliamentlive.tv](http://www.parliamentlive.tv)

**Publications/Reports/Reference Material:** Copies of all select committee reports are available from the Parliamentary Bookshop (12 Bridge St, Westminster, 020 7219 3890) or the Stationery Office (0845 7023474). Committee reports, press releases, evidence transcripts, Bills, research papers, a directory of MPs, plus Hansard (from 8 am daily) and much more, can be found on [www.parliament.uk](http://www.parliament.uk)

# Annex - Conclusions and Recommendations

---

## National Security Strategy

1. We note that it is proposed that the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee will be an *ex officio* member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy and that we will therefore have an input into its deliberations and activities. We wish to put on record our firm view that the existence of the Joint Committee, if the House approves the Government's proposals, will not in any way restrict or curtail the Foreign Affairs Committee's responsibility to examine aspects of national security insofar as they relate to the work of the FCO. We take our responsibilities in this regard very seriously and will continue to exercise them as an integral part of our work. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should confirm that it accepts our view of the Foreign Affairs Committee's continuing responsibilities as regards national security matters relating to the work of the FCO. (Paragraph 7)

## Restricting the resources required for proliferation

2. We conclude that the UK's failure so far to ratify the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation is regrettable, given the way in which the Protocol will strengthen the UK's ability to impede the trafficking by sea of WMD-related materials. We further conclude that the provisions of the planned Transport Security Bill which will facilitate UK ratification are to be welcomed, and look forward to their early passage. We recommend that the Government should work actively to secure ratifications of the Protocol by other states so that it may rapidly enter into force. (Paragraph 33)
3. We conclude that the Government is to be commended for introducing the Academic Technology Approval Scheme regarding security clearance for foreign students in sensitive fields, which is a significant improvement on the previous Voluntary Vetting Scheme. We recommend that the Government should take swift action to address any shortcomings in this relatively new scheme which are identified in its imminent review of the scheme's operation, of which we expect to receive a copy. We further recommend that the Government should set out in its response to this Report the progress made on oversight of science and codes of conduct for scientists as part of the current Inter-sessional Work Programme of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. (Paragraph 37)
4. We conclude that restricting the finance available to those intending to proliferate nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems is a potentially effective mechanism to achieve non-proliferation aims. We recommend that the Government should consider how this can be done as quickly as possible when proliferation risks are identified. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, or earlier if possible, the Government should send us a copy of the imminent report of the international Financial Action Task Force, with an accompanying

memorandum indicating whether, when and how it will implement its recommendations. (Paragraph 39)

### **Scope for rationalisation of the non-proliferation architecture**

5. We conclude that the sheer number of organisations and initiatives in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament may lead to a lack of focussed progress. We recommend that the Government should press for the rationalisation of international efforts in this area and set out in its response to this Report where it believes such rationalisation could occur. (Paragraph 44)

### **The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**

6. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as being under severe strain. We further conclude that the Government is correct to identify the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as critical for the future of that regime. We further conclude that the Government's proposal for a "Road to 2010 Plan" is to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should keep Parliament fully informed and engaged as it develops the Plan by summer 2009 and pursues it in the run-up to the Review Conference. We further recommend that the Government should make a full report to Parliament on the results of the Conference. (Paragraph 57)
7. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify the universalisation of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol, to all States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to be an important means of strengthening verification of the NPT, and thus also to be a vital nuclear non-proliferation objective. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the institutional mechanisms by which it envisages that universalisation may be achieved. We further recommend that the Government should update us on its efforts in this direction, in particular with respect to its work through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and as part of the preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. (Paragraph 69)
8. We conclude that the United States' failure to pass to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—if necessary in confidence—the information it had about Syria's al-Kibar facility, before the facility was destroyed in September 2007, undermined the Agency's credibility as the verification agency for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We recommend that the Government should press both Israel and Syria to provide the IAEA with the information it requires about the al-Kibar site, and update us on its progress in this respect in its response to this Report. (Paragraph 72)
9. We conclude that the UK provides significant financial and other resources to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We welcome in particular the Prime Minister's announcement of a doubling in the Government's voluntary contribution to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund. However, we further conclude that it is incongruous for the Government to wish to see an expansion of IAEA verification work while ruling out an increase in UK

funding for the Agency's regular budget. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should update us on the IAEA Budget Committee discussions which were due to commence in February 2009. We further recommend that the Government should set out how it expects the IAEA to meet the increased demand for its verification work given the anticipated scale of its resources. (Paragraph 81)

10. We conclude that the UK is making a valuable contribution in kind to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency through the provision of inspectors and of training for them. We welcome this, and recommend that the Government should seek every opportunity to contribute further in this way. (Paragraph 82)
11. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify a need to strengthen generic enforcement mechanisms for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in the face of states which violate and/or withdraw from it. However, we note that the Minister told us that this objective was unachievable at present. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the specific legal and institutional mechanisms for strengthened NPT enforcement which it will be advocating at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In particular, we recommend that the Government should outline how it envisages that pre-announced penalties for NPT withdrawal might be strengthened. (Paragraph 89)
12. We conclude that the issue of Israel's nuclear weapons could become an obstacle to the achievement of Government goals at the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should consider whether encouraging greater transparency and nuclear disarmament measures by Israel, in public or in private, might improve the regional security situation, and begin to move Israel towards the Government's stated goals of Israeli accession to the NPT and the establishment of a WMD-free Middle East. We further recommend that the Government should update us on steps taken within the EU's Union for the Mediterranean towards a WMD-free Middle East and set out the ways in which it sees this new vehicle contributing towards that objective. (Paragraph 94)
13. We welcome India's granting of greater international access to its civilian nuclear facilities. However, we reiterate our 2006 conclusion that the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement undermines one of the central bargains of the international non-proliferation regime, namely that access to nuclear power for civil purposes is due only to states which do not develop nuclear weapons and place all their declared nuclear facilities under international safeguards. We conclude that, given its stated commitment to the international non-proliferation regime, the Government's support for the US-India deal is thus regrettable. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out how it foresees the US-India agreement being used to secure further disarmament and non-proliferation steps by India, such as ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. (Paragraph 99)

## Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

14. We conclude that the five recognised nuclear weapons states have widely varying records as regards nuclear disarmament and arms control over the last decade. We welcome the fact that of the five the record of the UK has been the best. However, we also conclude that, owing to the way in which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enshrines a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons States Parties, the five recognised nuclear powers are often perceived as a group by the non-nuclear weapons states, and that, as such, the group is seen collectively to have failed to live up to the nuclear disarmament commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. As a result, we further conclude that without decisive movement by the five recognised nuclear weapons states as a whole on nuclear disarmament measures, there is a risk that the 2010 Review Conference will fail, like its 2005 predecessor—during a critical period for dealing with North Korea and attempting to constrain Iran’s nuclear programme. We therefore commend the Government on its public recognition of the link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify a vital need to reinvigorate multilateral nuclear disarmament, ideally before and certainly at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. (Paragraph 114)
15. We conclude that there is a relatively well-defined agenda of nuclear disarmament steps around which there is a considerable degree of international consensus, such as entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and measures to scale down, de-alert and make more transparent existing nuclear arsenals. We recommend that the Government should aim to come away from the 2010 NPT Review Conference with agreement on a concrete plan to take the multilateral nuclear disarmament process forward, with target dates for specific steps, and with the political commitment from all nuclear and non-nuclear weapons States Parties to ensure implementation. (Paragraph 115)
16. We conclude that the strengthened commitment of the US and Russia, under Presidents Obama and Medvedev, to negotiate a legally-binding nuclear arms reduction treaty to succeed START I, by the end of 2009, as part of a deeper process of nuclear arms cuts, will contribute significantly to the fulfilment of their disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and is thus greatly to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should offer every assistance to facilitate a speedy and productive conclusion to the negotiations. (Paragraph 121)
17. We conclude that reductions in the operational readiness of the world’s nuclear arsenals could make a significant contribution to enhancing international security. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the steps which it is taking to encourage international action in this area, and explain its stance regarding the UN General Assembly resolution on this issue. (Paragraph 124)
18. We conclude that the decision to renew the UK’s Trident system is perceived by some foreign states and some among the British public as appearing to contradict the Government’s declared commitment to strengthening the

international nuclear non-proliferation regime. We recommend that the Government should intensify its public diplomacy work better to explain the reasons for the Trident renewal decision and to give greater prominence to its work for multilateral nuclear disarmament and arms control. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should update us on the progress of the timetable for renewal of the Trident submarines. We recommend that the Government should not take any decision at the Initial Gate stage until Parliament has had the chance to scrutinise the matter in a debate. (Paragraph 133)

19. We conclude that the steps which the Government has taken to scale down and de-escalate the UK's nuclear arsenal are to be commended. We welcome in particular the Prime Minister's announcement that the new Trident submarines are to carry fewer missiles than the current boats. We recommend that the Government should do more to highlight these steps, internationally and at home. However, we note that it is difficult to assess the Government's claim that it retains only a minimum nuclear deterrent in the absence of further information about the process by which it judges this minimum. We therefore recommend that the Government should accede to the Defence Committee's call for it to explain in greater detail the process by which it determines that the current scale and operational arrangements of the Trident force constitute the UK's minimum nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph 136)
20. We conclude that the Government's confirmation of its willingness to include the UK's nuclear force in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations is to be welcomed, as likely to strengthen its non-proliferation efforts. We recommend that the Government should give greater prominence to this commitment in its public diplomacy. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should specify—in the light of international disarmament developments by that time—the state of a multilateral nuclear disarmament process that would trigger UK participation. We further recommend that the Government should specify whether there are circumstances under which the UK would be prepared to suspend the Trident renewal programme. (Paragraph 138)
21. We conclude that the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is gathering more serious international political support than at any time since the end of the Cold War. We conclude that the Government's leadership on this issue is to be commended. In particular, we conclude that the Government is correct to recognise the scale of the technical and confidence-building work that will be required for the goal to be realisable, and in particular the importance of verification. We recommend that the Government should continue and expand its work in this area. (Paragraph 145)
22. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO should set out its attitude to a possible Nuclear Weapons Convention banning such weapons, including the relationship which it sees between such a Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its stated goal of the elimination of all nuclear weapons. (Paragraph 147)
23. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify the speedy entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a key early step



towards reviving multilateral nuclear disarmament. We recommend that the Government should do everything possible to facilitate US ratification, and to maximise prospects that this will be followed by other especially politically important ratifications, such as those of China, India, Israel and Pakistan, even if these are still too few to bring the Treaty into force. (Paragraph 152)

24. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify the start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as a step which would significantly strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process. In that context, we strongly welcome the agreement reached at the UN Conference on Disarmament in May 2009 on a Programme of Work which includes the negotiation of a FMCT. We recommend that the Government should do all it can to ensure that the negotiations get underway in a speedy and productive fashion and to maximise the prospects that they will result in the coming into force of a verified FMCT. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out its view of the most serious difficulties that are likely to arise in the negotiations, the most likely timetable for the conclusion of the talks, the most likely coverage of the proposed FMCT in terms of signatories and non-signatories, and any implications of the proposed FMCT for the UK. (Paragraph 157)
25. We conclude that the agreement reached in May 2009 on a Programme of Work for the UN Conference on Disarmament, after over twelve years of deadlock, is an important signal of the renewed prospects for multilateral arms control which appear to have followed the election of President Obama and, as such, is greatly to be welcomed. (Paragraph 158)

### **Internationalising the nuclear fuel cycle**

26. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify a need to ensure access for non-nuclear weapons states to civil nuclear power under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, notwithstanding the existence of a heightened proliferation risk arising from the spread of civil nuclear power. We further conclude that, unless pursued with political sensitivity, the effort to limit non-nuclear weapons states' access to the full nuclear fuel cycle risks reproducing the discrimination which it is claimed exists in relation to the possession of nuclear weapons. As such, this aim risks undermining other elements of the nuclear non-proliferation effort. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide further details as to the steps it is taking to mitigate this risk. (Paragraph 165)

### **The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)**

27. We conclude that the fact that the UK has no chemical weapons, and that the process of destroying its past stocks of such weapons was completed in 2007, is to be welcomed. (Paragraph 181)
28. We conclude that the Government has correctly identified further progress towards universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention as a priority, given that a number of key states of concern remain outside the Convention, some of which are thought to possess chemical weapons. We recommend that the Government should set out in its response to this Report what it believes to

be the obstacles to the accession of each of these states and how it assesses the likelihood of overcoming these obstacles. (Paragraph 182)

29. We conclude that the relatively small number of States Parties which have comprehensively implemented the Chemical Weapons Convention is a matter of concern. We recommend that the Government should continue to put pressure on those states which have not implemented the Convention in full to do so. We further recommend that the Government should take positive steps to promote the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform's National Authority Advisory Committee as an example of good practice that might usefully be adopted by other countries, and that it should maintain its current programmes of bilateral assistance. (Paragraph 186)
30. We conclude that the likely failure to meet the global 2012 deadline for destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles could erode the credibility of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and undermine progress towards elimination of chemical weapons. We further conclude that the Government is to be commended for the measures it has taken to assist other states, such as Russia and Libya, with their destruction of chemical weapons. We recommend that the Government should step up its assistance activities in this area, and that it should encourage the US and Russia in particular to devote greater resources to the task of destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles. We further recommend that the Government should set out in its response to this Report what its position will be at the next Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Conference in relation to the failure of any state to destroy its stocks of chemical weapons and in relation to the future priorities for the CWC once stockpiles have been eradicated. (Paragraph 190)
31. We conclude that the enforcement mechanisms of the Chemical Weapons Convention are yet to be fully tested. We recommend that the Government should continue to make representations to the new US Administration to rescind the Presidential veto over challenge inspections. We further recommend that the Government should commit to press for a new convention criminalising chemical and biological weapons at the individual level. (Paragraph 194)

### **The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)**

32. We recommend that the Government should set out in its response to this Report what efforts it is making to persuade other states to join the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and outline what it believes to be the obstacles to universality. We further recommend that the Government should seek to persuade those members of the Commonwealth who are yet to sign or ratify the Convention to do so. (Paragraph 199)
33. We conclude that securing a verification protocol for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should remain a key objective for the Government. We recommend that the Government should work to persuade the new US Administration that such a protocol for the Convention is essential. We further recommend that the Government should, in conjunction with other States Parties, explore ways in which the Convention can be strengthened by

other means until such time as a verification protocol can be achieved. (Paragraph 205)

34. We conclude that strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should be a priority for the Government in the absence of a verification protocol. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should comment on the specific suggestions aimed at achieving this end, set out in previous paragraphs, and outline what measures it intends to pursue further at the Seventh Review Conference in 2011. The suggested measures include an Accountability Framework, Action Plan for Comprehensive Implementation, better collective scrutiny of developments in technology, an expansion of the role and staff of the Implementation Support Unit, formal annual meetings, work to refine and improve the Confidence-Building Measures, a consolidation agenda of politically-binding commitments agreed at earlier Review Conferences and criminalisation of biological weapons activities at the individual level. (Paragraph 211)

### **The BTWC and CWC and new technologies**

35. We conclude that whilst general purpose criteria provide the means by which the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention can keep pace with advances in technology, this is still an area which requires close attention. We recommend that the Government should set out its proposals for ensuring that the Conventions are able to keep pace adequately with future technologies, particularly in areas of overlap. (Paragraph 217)
36. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should set out its view on non-lethal agents such as herbicides, defoliants and incapacitating biochemical weapons and the status of such agents under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention. We conclude that there is a case for certain biological and chemical agents which are non-lethal or which target plants, including crops and vegetation, to be prohibited from use as weapons for the purposes of these Conventions. We further recommend that the Government should press for negotiations on an unambiguous prohibition of their use as weapons to commence at the next Review Conferences. (Paragraph 218)

### **Action against ballistic missile proliferation**

37. We conclude that the proliferation of ballistic missile technology is a significant security concern. We further conclude that the Government is correct to acknowledge that stronger action is required to curb the international transfer of ballistic missile technology. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out specific steps which it plans to take to this end. (Paragraph 228)

### **Ballistic missile defence (BMD)**

38. We are not convinced that, as they are currently envisaged and under current circumstances, the United States' planned ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland represent a net gain for

European security. We conclude that if the deployments are carried out in the face of opposition from Russia, this could be highly detrimental to NATO's overall security interests. We reaffirm our 2007 recommendation that BMD in Europe should be developed, if at all, as a joint system between the US, NATO and Russia. Given the Government's stated commitment to a rules-based international system, we further conclude that its early agreement to the inclusion of RAF Fylingdales and Menwith Hill in the US BMD system was regrettable, given that the United States' development of its system involved its abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should update us on the NATO element of European BMD developments, in the light of the April 2009 NATO summit. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should state whether any changes made to the planned US BMD deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland would affect RAF Fylingdales or Menwith Hill. We further conclude that the uncertainty surrounding prospects for the US European BMD system has made a Parliamentary debate on this issue all the more necessary, and we recommend that the Government should schedule one before the end of this Parliament. (Paragraph 241)

### **The threat posed by terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)**

39. We conclude that, although it would appear to be difficult for terrorists acting independently of state agencies to build a nuclear bomb, there is a genuine risk that terrorists could acquire nuclear or radiological material, which might be used as an instrument of terror in various ways. We further conclude that, in addition to inadequate levels of physical security which might allow terrorists to seize nuclear or radiological material directly, 'rogue' individuals or groups in states possessing nuclear weapons or material represent an important but particularly hard-to-address means by which terrorists might acquire such material. We recommend that the Government should press its counterparts in countries that are potential sources of nuclear and radiological materials to treat this issue with the highest priority. We further recommend that the Government in its response to this Report should set out what action it is taking overseas to minimise the 'dirty bomb' threat to the UK. (Paragraph 252)
40. We conclude that the Government is correct in its claim that the UK faces a significant threat arising from terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons, and to argue that at present this threat is greater than the threat that such weapons might be used against the UK by hostile states. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should set out what action it is taking to mitigate this threat. (Paragraph 261)

### **Initiatives against terrorist acquisition of WMD**

41. We conclude that the G8 Global Partnership, and the UK's contribution to it through the Global Threat Reduction Programme, are continuing to deliver important results in reducing the risks of a security breach occurring in relation to WMD. We recommend that, despite the current strains on its budgetary position, the Government should maintain its strong political and financial support for the Global Partnership, including the programme's

geographical expansion and continuation beyond 2012. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide an update on plans for the Global Partnership beyond 2012, following the July 2009 G8 summit in Italy. (Paragraph 269)

42. We conclude that UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is a vital part of the international non-proliferation regime. We commend the work that the British Government has done in support of UNSCR 1540. We recommend that the Government should work actively to ensure that the Resolution is implemented successfully by all UN Member States, providing practical assistance and resources where required. (Paragraph 273)
43. We recommend that the UK should ratify the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible. We look forward to the Government taking the steps necessary to allow this to happen in line with its anticipated September 2009 timeframe, and we recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should update us on this process. (Paragraph 278)

### **Physical security**

44. We conclude that the physical security of nuclear and radiological materials around the world is far from assured, and should remain a prime Government concern. We recommend that the Government should continue to give a high priority to ensuring the security of nuclear and radiological materials, at academic, industrial and military locations in the UK, and to encourage its international partners to do likewise. (Paragraph 286)
45. We conclude that the legally-binding Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is an important and helpful measure, even though it covers only civil nuclear material. We look forward to the Government taking the steps necessary for UK ratification of the 2005 amendment strengthening the Convention. We recommend that the Government should actively promote the negotiation of legally-binding international instruments covering the physical security of nuclear and radiological materials not currently covered by the Convention. (Paragraph 290)
46. We conclude that the funding provided for international work on the physical security of nuclear material through mechanisms such as the International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) is vital. We welcome the Prime Minister's announcement of a doubling of the UK's contribution to the NSF, and we recommend that the UK should continue to provide strong financial and practical support for this work. (Paragraph 293)
47. We conclude that, given the real risk that terrorists may acquire and use chemical or biological weapons, the security of biological and chemical materials is of paramount concern. We therefore recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the action that it is taking in this area, including its efforts to secure international co-operation, particularly to reduce biological and chemical security risks. (Paragraph 297)

## **Impact on global security**

48. We conclude that, while it may not be straightforward to define what a conventional weapon is, more effective efforts to counter their proliferation would have a significant positive impact on global security. Accordingly, we conclude that the Government is to be commended for taking the view that countering the proliferation of conventional weapons is one of its top foreign policy goals, and for seeking to pursue this goal through the promotion of bans on certain kinds of weapon and, as a longer-term aspiration, through the establishment of global rules and standards for the regulation of the conventional arms trade. (Paragraph 300)

## **Success outside the UN framework: cluster munitions and landmines**

49. We conclude that the Government is to be commended for the role it played in helping to bring the negotiations on a Convention on Cluster Munitions to a successful conclusion. We recommend that the Government should continue to do everything it can to persuade other states, especially all EU Member States, to sign and ratify the Convention without delay. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out what steps it is taking to achieve this. (Paragraph 304)
50. We conclude that the negotiation of a Protocol on cluster munitions under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons might not be an appropriate foreign policy objective for the UK. We recommend that, if it decides to continue arguing for such a Protocol, the Government should ensure that any such Protocol is as strong in its provisions as the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It should withdraw its support for such a Protocol if it appears that this will not be the case. (Paragraph 306)
51. We conclude that the Government has been correct to identify as a priority the clearance of mines worldwide which threaten human life. We conclude that there are understandable reasons for the failure to clear landmines on the Falkland Islands over the last decade. However, the failure to de-mine the Falklands risks damaging the UK's reputation and credibility in this area. We therefore conclude that the Government's intention to move ahead with de-mining in three areas to fulfil its international obligations is a positive step forward, and recommend that this should proceed provided this can be achieved without risk to human life. (Paragraph 310)

## **The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)**

52. We conclude that the Government is to be commended for the energy and commitment which it has displayed in seeking to achieve a comprehensive and effective international Arms Trade Treaty. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should provide an update on the status of the negotiations on the Treaty. (Paragraph 315)
53. We conclude that whilst there are inherent dangers in adopting a lowest common denominator approach to an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a treaty that is both inclusive and credible can be achieved. We further conclude, however, that if in the future, the Government is forced to choose between giving priority to the strength of the treaty or achieving the widest possible

ratification, it should give priority to securing the strongest possible treaty. (Paragraph 319)

54. We conclude that effective enforcement will be crucial to the credibility and effectiveness of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and we recommend that the Government does all it can to make this issue a high priority in future negotiations. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government should set out its current position with regard to the ways in which an ATT would ideally be enforceable. (Paragraph 321)
55. We recommend basing an Arms Trade Treaty on a detailed list of the weapons to be covered rather than on a set of simple generic descriptions of the categories of arms covered. We conclude that the Government should take this position in future negotiations. We further recommend that a broad range of activities and/or transactions should be brought within the scope of the treaty, including dual-use items, brokering and trans-shipment. (Paragraph 326)
56. We recommend that an Arms Trade Treaty should fully incorporate the protections provided by international human rights law and international humanitarian law. We conclude that the inclusion within its ambit of human rights protections should be viewed as a key test of the likely credibility and effectiveness of such a treaty. (Paragraph 329)
57. We conclude that it is to be welcomed that negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty are proceeding on an 'overwhelming majority' basis rather than by consensus, and we recommend that this continues. We further recommend, however, that in order to secure a treaty that is as widely supported as possible, all the parties to the negotiations should seek to keep them within the UN framework. We conclude that much depends on how effectively the Open Ended Working Group advances negotiations during 2009. (Paragraph 332)
58. We conclude that securing the support of the new US Administration for an Arms Trade Treaty should be a priority for the Government. We recommend that the Government should intensify its efforts to persuade those states that are as yet not persuaded of the merits of a treaty to change their mind. (Paragraph 337)
59. We conclude that the co-operation between the Government and key NGOs involved in the campaign for a credible and effective Arms Trade Treaty, which has included providing official funding for NGO activities on transfer control issues, has been productive. We recommend that the Government should continue to foster these productive relationships. (Paragraph 339)
60. We conclude that the wholehearted support of the defence industry for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will help significantly in pursuit of an effective treaty and in its successful implementation. We recommend that the Government should swiftly draw up plans for greater co-operation with the UK Export Group for Aerospace and Defence on lobbying and outreach over the coming period, particularly with the aim of persuading the US defence industry of the merits of an ATT. (Paragraph 343)

61. We conclude that it is desirable that the new US Administration takes a more positive attitude to the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. We recommend that the Government should encourage such a shift. We further recommend that due care be taken by all stakeholders to ensure that the Arms Trade Treaty process and the UN Programme of Action remain complementary and mutually reinforcing. (Paragraph 348)
62. We conclude that, while the Wassenaar Arrangement may in due course be superseded wholly or in part by an Arms Trade Treaty, the positive gains made under the Arrangement should, as far as is possible, be incorporated into the Arms Trade Treaty and built upon. (Paragraph 350)

### **The rules-based approach**

63. We conclude that the rules-based approach to counter-proliferation taken by the Government has been moderately successful thus far and has greater prospects of being so than any alternative approach. However, we further conclude that more priority must be given to the enforcement of rules-based regimes. We recommend that the Government should continue to press for national implementation of treaty obligations, and strongly support verification mechanisms. We further recommend that the Government should advocate the inclusion in future international agreements of a defined set of 'disagreeable consequences' that would act as a deterrent to states flouting their commitments or withdrawing. (Paragraph 358)

### **The treatment of different weapons types**

64. We conclude that the term 'weapons of mass destruction' will continue to be used, as it is written into multilateral treaties and is an accepted international term. However, we further conclude that whilst nuclear, biological and chemical weapons cannot be considered entirely in isolation, particularly in regions such as the Middle East where the linkages are clear, the three weapons types pose very different threats which require specific solutions. They can and should not be tackled in the same way. We therefore recommend that whilst the Government may use the term 'weapons of mass destruction' as a useful shorthand in documents such as the National Security Strategy, it should devote greater attention to outlining the different approaches which it takes to the three weapons types. (Paragraph 363)

### **A holistic approach to disarmament and non-proliferation**

65. We conclude that there is a balance to be struck between addressing the specific threats posed by individual categories of weapons, and considering general disarmament in a more holistic fashion. We recommend that the Government should consider whether it can better build such considerations into its policies. (Paragraph 365)