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How the Negotiations Ended



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The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on chemical weapons containing the draft Chemical Weapons Convention was adopted by the Conference on Disarmament late in the evening of 3 September 1992, to be transmitted to the 47th United Nations General Assembly.

The negotiations, however, had practically terminated much earlier. The Western members of the CD met in Rome (Italy being the coordinator of the Western Group for 1992) on 7-8 May to iron out differences between the continental European members and others of the group. The United States, Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom had earlier introduced a joint paper on challenge inspection, creating certain differences in the Western ranks. The results of the Rome meeting cannot be underestimated. As a practical step, it showed the Western resolve to conclude negotiations in 1992 and was regarded as a welcome gesture by many. However, some developing countries were afraid that the West had resolved its rifts at the cost of ignoring their concerns and apprehensions.

Another important development was the introduction by Australia of a model draft convention. The Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, had visited many countries to convince his counterparts that his model was a reasonable way to achieve a CW convention. On 19 March 1992, at the end of his visits, Senator Evans formally introduced his country's proposal at a plenary meeting of the CD. During the meeting, which was extended to the afternoon, more than twenty delegations expressed views on the Australian initiative. Senator Evans had wanted the Ad Hoc Committee chairman, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany, to take the Australian model as the chairman's paper and base further negotiations on it. Ambassador von Wagner had replied that the Australian paper, along with other proposals, could be studied by negotiators, and that as chairman he could not give preference to any national paper. Some delegations

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The Draft Chemical Weapons Convention



Statement to the CD on 3 September

by **Dr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner** of Germany,

Ambassador of Germany and Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons

Introduction. This year's report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contains in its Appendix the draft "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction". This Convention bears witness to a unique endeavor in the history of multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations. The commitment of the international community to rid the world of chemical weapons goes back many years. But until recently it had seemed as if the Conference on Disarmament was not able to translate this longstanding commitment into a treaty. Thus, the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly reflected a growing sense of impatience with our work as we could read in the relevant paragraphs of last year's consensus-resolution 46/35C.

"The General Assembly,

4. Strongly urges the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of the highest priority, to resolve in the forthcoming months outstanding issues so as to achieve a final agreement during its 1992 Session;

5. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session on the results of its negotiations."

Today, the task is accomplished. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons presents to the Conference on Disarmament the draft Convention, the fruit of years of

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hard work of many dedicated negotiators, that has been brought to maturity at last. The Conference on Disarmament, in turn, can finally meet the expectations of governments and peoples around the world and report the successful result of its negotiations to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York.

The result of our collective effort speaks for itself. There is no precedent for this global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral disarmament agreement. The draft Convention provides for a cooperative, non-discriminatory legal instrument to eliminate the specter of chemical warfare once and for all. The unique character of its contents is strengthened by the consistent application of two principles: overall balance and adaptability to future needs. Future States Parties are offered a balanced legal instrument providing clarity on the fundamental obligations and, at the same time, enough subtlety on matters of implementation so that, with the consent of States Parties, the respective provisions may still mature and evolve in the course of future practice.

The following six features of the draft Convention may be seen as the key components of its overall balance. They may be looked upon separately, but their real significance flows from their entirety. They represent only parts of one single body of provisions--the Convention:

- (1) The comprehensive scope of general obligations in Article I, which in an absolutely non-discriminatory way, bans all conceivable actions in contravention to the object and purpose of the treaty and stipulates the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities.
- (2) The built-in safeguards to deal with situations where the basic obligations had not been respected, in particular Articles X (Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons) and XII (Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, including Sanctions).
- (3) The very clear and unambiguous provisions on the de-

struction, including its verification, of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities as elaborated in Articles IV and V in conjunction with Parts IV and V of the Verification Annex.

- (4) The extremely delicate and equitable balance which has been established in Article VIII in the provisions on the Executive Council, its composition, procedure, decision-making powers and functions.
- (5) The general verification package beyond the specific provisions for verification of destruction, which consists of challenge inspections (Article IX and Part X of the Verification Annex) and routine verification in chemical industry (Article VI and Parts VII to IX of the Verification Annex). The political instrument of challenge inspections reconciles the diverging objectives of maximum assurance against non-compliance, protection of the inspected State Party's sovereign rights, and the prevention of abuse. Routine verification in industry balances the objectives of reliable confidence-building, simplicity of administration, and non-interference with perfectly legitimate activities in chemical industry.
- (6) The evolutionary concept for economic and technological development as contained in Article XI and highlighted in the Preamble, in conjunction with the equally evolving confidence-building regime of verification in chemical industry, opens the door to expanded international trade and economic cooperation in the chemical sector.

Having highlighted the key features of the draft Convention, I would like to guide you briefly through the main provisions of the treaty.

General Obligations and Definitions (Articles I and II). Article I incorporates the basic undertakings of the Convention, adding up to a total ban of chemical weapons and any activities aiming at or contributing to their use. The definitions in Article II make clear that this ban extends not only to chemical warfare agents as such, but also to

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the means of delivery and other devices specifically designed for the use of chemical weapons. Article II furthermore obliges States Parties to destroy all chemical weapons, including abandoned chemical weapons, and chemical weapons production facilities.

Due to compromises and concessions in summer 1991, the basic obligations regarding the ban of chemical weapons and their destruction as contained in the draft Convention are unreservedly comprehensive and absolutely non-discriminatory.

Article II, which defines all important terms used in the Articles of the Convention, is particularly important for the purpose of delineating precisely the scope of the basic obligations as contained in Article I.

Destruction and Verification of Chemical Weapons and Chemical Weapons Production Facilities (Articles IV and V). Articles IV and V, in conjunction with Parts IV and V of the Verification Annex, contain detailed and rigorous provisions governing the destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, including verification. Complete destruction is to be achieved within ten years. Should a State Party, in exceptional cases, for technological, financial, ecological or other reasons not be in a position to do so, the Convention allows for the possibility of extending this time frame by up to five more years. Furthermore, in exceptional cases of compelling need, Article V permits States Parties to convert, rather than destroy, chemical weapons production facilities, but only under strict conditions designed to prevent their possible re-conversion. In both instances, rigorous additional verification measures are foreseen to prevent circumvention of the basic obligations.

Routine Verification of Activities not Prohibited under the Convention (Article VI). Article VI, in conjunction with Parts VI to IX of the Verification Annex, sets forth a comprehensive and graduated routine regime for international monitoring, through declarations and on-site inspections, of "activities not prohibited under the Convention", in particular in the chemical industry. The basis of the regime are three "schedules" (lists), contained in the Annex on Chemicals, identifying toxic chemicals that either have been used as chemical weapons or are precursors to chemical weapons.

Government and civilian facilities producing small amounts of Schedule I chemicals, i.e. chemical warfare agents, for certain approved purposes such as protective or medical research, are subject to the most rigorous verification measures under the provisions of Article VI and Part VI of the Verification Annex.

Industrial facilities producing chemicals listed in Schedules 2 and 3 are subject to the progressively less rigorous measures elaborated in Parts VII and VIII of the Verification Annex. Finally, all other chemical production facilities deemed relevant to the Convention fall under the

limited reporting and conditional verification requirements of Part IX of the Verification Annex.

These provisions on verification in chemical industry, as they emerged after years of negotiations, reconcile various objectives: they are conducive to enhancing confidence and international cooperation, but not excessively ambitious in their verification goals; they can be administered with relative ease; and they are flexible and open to future adjustment in the light of practical experience gained.

Verification in chemical industry aims at steady and continuous confidence building, it does not provide for highly political action to answer concrete concerns about possible non-compliance. However, verification in chemical industry and the challenge inspection regime under Article IX are complementary: smooth and efficient implementation of verification measures under Article VI will greatly reduce the need for challenge inspections, which remain the ultimate safety net also to answer concrete concerns about possible non-compliance in industry.

Challenge Inspections (Article IX). Article IX provides for consultative clarification procedures and, in conjunction with Part X of the Verification Annex, for short-notice "challenge inspections". A State Party may request a challenge inspection of any facility or location in the territory of another State Party for the purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance. The request will then be "multilateralized" and the inspected State Party must permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct the inspection and is obliged to grant the Organization's inspection team access. However, there are a number of measures available to the inspected State Party to protect those activities and installations from undue intrusion which it considers unrelated to the inspection request.

The challenge inspection regime constitutes a novelty in the verification of a universally applicable arms control and disarmament treaty. Furthermore, it constitutes a politically sensitive concept which balances carefully the verification interests of a State Party and of the international community and the interest of the inspected State Party to protect sensitive information not related to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It also balances national sovereign rights and the rights of the community of States Parties as represented by the Executive Council and executed by the Technical Secretariat.

The verification system of the draft convention, in particular the unprecedented instrument of challenge inspections, could become a basis of reference for other multilateral disarmament agreements or for the strengthening of existing verification regimes.

Economic and Technological Development (Article XI). Article XI aims at promoting expanded international trade, technological development and economic cooperation in

the chemical sector. In this regard, negotiations focussed on the question of export controls among States Parties. The solution to the issue was found by adopting a flexible and dynamic approach which encourages the progressive removal of existing restrictions, evolving in parallel with the implementation of verification in chemical industry, thus taking into account the confidence generated by the Convention.

With regard to the pertinent provisions in Article XI, attention is also drawn to the following statement by the Australian representative in the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on August 6, 1992:

They [members of the "Australia Group"] undertake to review, in light of the implementation of the Convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Convention, with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States Parties to the Convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the Convention.

Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Weapons (Article X). Article X is one of the built-in safeguards of the Convention to protect States Parties against the eventuality of the hypothetically continuing risk of being threatened or attacked by chemical weapons. It provides, *inter alia*, for the establishment of a voluntary fund for assistance by the Conference of States Parties; for assistance through the Organization in case of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons against a State Party; and for immediate emergency assistance directly from other States Parties.

Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions (Article XII). Article XII is the principle safeguard of the Convention to protect States Parties against violations of the basic obligations by other States Parties. It provides the means to remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of the Convention. Under Article XII, the Organization may require a State Party deemed not to be in full compliance with the Convention to take remedial action and, in the event it fails to do so, apply a number of penalties including sanctions.

In recognition of the United Nations' Security Council's paramount responsibility for matters affecting international peace and security, cases of particular gravity are to be referred to the Security Council for any further, possibly mandatory, action under the United Nations Charter.

The Organization (Article VIII). To implement the Convention, an "Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" will be established in The Hague. It will comprise: a "Conference of States Parties", composed of all members states, which will be the principal organ of the Organization and will meet on an annual basis; an "Executive Council" where forty-one States Parties will be repre-

ented, which will have the day-to-day responsibility for supervising the activities of the Organization; and, headed by a "Director-General", a "Technical Secretariat", whose principal component will be the Inspectorate responsible for carrying out the Convention's verification activities.

Negotiations focussed in the last round on the question of the composition of the Executive Council. Very diverging or even contradicting interests had to be harmonized: the need for a relatively small and effective, but at the same time representative body; the interest of all future States Parties to have a fair chance for participation in the work of the Executive Council; political and security interests; the particular interests of future States Parties which, having large chemical industries, will be most affected by the implementation of the Convention.

The criteria for membership in the Executive Council, as they are specified in paragraph 23 of Article VIII, balance these interests. They ensure that the membership of the Executive Council is broadly representative of the membership of the treaty. Members of each regional group will decide among themselves on the designation of Executive Council members from their region, taking into account the criteria specified in the Convention. The regional groups shall also take into account regional factors in designating these members. By using a balanced approach, regional groups are given some flexibility in designating seats within the groups.

This, Mr. President, ends my official introduction of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I urge the Conference on Disarmament to adopt this report now and to incorporate it into its report to the 47th General Assembly of the United Nations. Only in doing so will the CD respond adequately to the request of the 46th General Assembly which I have quoted at the beginning of my introductory statement. Thus, the endeavors of many generations of active and determined colleagues in the CD will finally be crowned with success.

You and your predecessors have achieved what you have been aiming at during long years. The political result is at hand. Tribute has to be paid to all Chairmen of previous years, the Working Group Chairmen, the Friends of the Chair, the "Moderators", the "Advocates", the interpreters and translators, but also those in capitals who provided the necessary flexibility for negotiating delegations should be thanked. The Secretariat deserves particular gratitude for their untiring efforts to help and give advice. I therefore appeal to all of you:

Be proud of the Convention which you have achieved. Protect it, if necessary; promote it, wherever you can, convince others to adhere to the Convention and defend it against unjustified challenges. It is the result of your and your predecessors' endeavors through many years of hard work. Don't let anybody tell you that the result was not worth the effort; it *was* worth it and history will prove it. ■

What follows is taken from the Sussex-Harvard rolling CBW chronology. The intervals covered in successive Bulletins have a one-month overlap in order to accommodate late-received information. The basic chronology, which is continuously updated, is fuller and provides complete citations of sources. For access to it, apply to Julian Perry Robinson at the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9RF, England.

1 May On Russian television there is a report about the chemdemil program in which the reporter, seen outside a chemical depot in Saratov [see also 8 Apr], says: "Beyond these gates lies the central chemical depot of the CIS Joint Armed Forces where amongst other things 1200 tonnes of poisonous substances are stored". Shots of the buildings inside the compound appear on the screen and interior shots showing rows of barrels. "In these barrels there is mustard gas and lewisite which has been stored since the second world war." {Russian TV 1 May in BBC-SWB 4 May}

1 May The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducts a hearing on the CWC negotiations, taking evidence from the leader of the US CD delegation, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, and from a panel of nongovernmental witnesses {C&EN 11 May}. Ambassador Ledogar speaks of "sharp differences" on the key issues, some of which are "conceptual differences about the very nature of the international regime we are crafting". He continues: "Unfortunately, not all delegations are committed to the same objectives as the US, our allies and such countries as India and Brazil. Some appear simply not to care, while others are unwilling to sign a treaty that does not meet their rather extreme views." He outlines the key issues on which he says compromises are now urgently needed: challenge inspection; inspection of the chemical industry; "riot control agents"; export controls and trade restrictions ("a kind of system of export control policy coordination at present maintained by the 22 members of the Australia Group must continue"); and the Russian CW stocks. {Prepared testimony}

On "riot control agents" he testifies that, in contrast to the "offensive military purposes" which have been excluded from US weapons-employment policy since 1975, "there are quite legitimate uses for non-lethal chemicals for law enforcement, in defensive military modes and to save lives in a variety of circumstances. We are not prepared to rule out these uses under a CW convention". During the subsequent colloquy with the Committee Chairman he says: "My current instructions propose that riot control agents simply be defined out of the convention, not included. That position has not gained a lot of support. The majority position would take the opposite side and would have riot control agents defined in and therefore covered by all of the provisions.... Now, at present the United States is reviewing my instructions on riot control agents, I am told, to see whether some compromise between the two extremes that are on the table now in Geneva might be reached."

On the issue of chemical-industry controls, the Committee receives testimony from the Chemical Manufacturers Association that the chemical industry wants a swift "ironclad ban on chemical weapons -- now and for all time" and is told by the CMA representative, Will Carpenter of Monsanto [see 8 Feb] that the outstanding problems have to do mainly with

the scope of the verification regime that is to be applied to the "Schedule 3 and other relevant facilities". Dr Carpenter says that the reasons why the US Government has been pressing for a narrowly drawn 'Schedule 3 plus' regime have to do with "facilities related to national security", adding: "Don't believe for a minute that industrial interests are responsible"; the CMA and overseas counterparts favor a broad regime in which *all* chemical plants would be liable to inspection. {Prepared testimony}

3 May In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croat-Muslim forces have been using chemical weapons [see also 14 Apr] on Serbian positions in and around Sarajevo, according to a statement issued in Belgrade by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense. The statement does not detail the type of chemical weapon it alleges has been used. {Tanjug 3 May in BBC-SWB 5 May}

4 May The Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, according to the official Iranian news agency, warns of preparations by the Baghdad regime for using chemical weapons in the southern marshlands, stating that, according to military sources inside Iraq, the regime has been stockpiling chemical substances in depots near Basra, Amarah and Nasiriyah. The SAIRI announcement also says that, during the uprisings the previous year in both southern and northern Iraq, the regime had deployed chemical weapons on a "limited scale" [see 28 Mar 91] and that a "number of chemically afflicted residents were sent to the neighboring countries and England for treatment". {IRNA 5 May in BBC-SWB 5 May}

4-7 May In Rome there is a meeting of the [CD] Western Group at high official level to consider the outstanding CWC negotiating issues and to promote Western unity on their solution. The topics addressed include challenge inspection, disabling chemicals and the collective role of UN Security Council permanent members in developing CWC universality. The one contentious area in which agreement on a common negotiating position is both sought and reached is that of industry controls.

5 May Austria, in a submission to the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, describes its experiences with old chemical weapons remaining on its territory since World War II -- in particular, the remains of a large quantity of CW munitions that had been stored near Vienna, at the Wehrmacht Gross-Mittel munitions plant, and partly destroyed in an air raid. These munitions had been collected, sorted and provisionally buried during 1949-50; some 28,000 of them -- 75mm and 105mm artillery projectiles, the latter with a nitrogen-mustard fill, and 150mm artillery rockets, all of them unusable -- had been transferred to long-term storage during 1974-76. {CD/CW/WP.397} [See also 1 Apr 91]

8 May In the United States, the visiting Russian delegation headed by Lt-Gen Anatoliy Kuntsevich [see 27 Apr], chairman of the Committee on CBW Convention Problems established by President Yeltsin [see 19 Feb], receives, at Aberdeen Proving Ground, an updated status briefing on the US Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. It also tours the Chemical Demilitarization Training Facility there. The delegation had previously been meeting with government officials in Washington for talks on possible forms of US assistance for the Russian chemdemil program. {*Chemical Demilitarization Update* (US Army Chemical Material Destruction Agency) July 1992}

In an interview just broadcast on Radio Moscow World Service, General Kuntsevich had said that "Russia may need some 10-15 years" to destroy its chemical weapons and that it counted on receiving outside help. On the sort of assistance Russia needed, he had said: "No matter how reliable our technological programs may be, there are problems with the individual elements of such an undertaking. But what is most important is to get funds for solving the many social and other problems in the regions where these facilities for destroying poisonous chemical substances will be built and how to overcome the natural reluctance and suspicion surrounding them on the part of the local population. The United States might allocate to this end some \$100 million at present. In addition, it will be useful if European countries would take part in the process too." {Radio Moscow 2 May in BBC-SWB 4 May}

8 May In Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian artillery bombardment of the Azeri city of Shusha once again [see 28 April] includes shells filled with hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride, according to Azeri reports. {ITAR-TASS 10 May in FBIS-SOV 11 May; Russian TV network 4 May in FBIS-SOV 15 May}

A specialist on the General Staff of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, Colonel V Tarapat, is subsequently quoted by *Izvestiya* as saying that there have not been and are no CIS chemical weapons in the region [see also 27 Feb], and that all depots for the chemical weapons of the former Soviet Union - seven such installations, he says, all of them in Russia, according to the information which the USSR had declared to

the United States under the Wyoming agreement [see 29 Dec 91] - "are kept under special control". He adds: "I believe that overt disinformation is taking place... It is reported, for example, that the city of Shusha was shelled with 122mm shells packed with cyanide. But we simply do not have such ammunition in our arsenal. Another time there was talk of 120mm shells packed with needle-like fragments impregnated with cyanide. A specialist will at once determine that the CIS Joint Armed Forces do not have ammunition of that calibre with such contents either. The possibility that weapons manufactured on the spot have been used cannot be ruled out." {*Izvestiya* 9 May in JPRS-TAC 1 Jun}

8 May In the US House of Representatives, the Banking Committee holds a hearing on a bill, HR 4803, recently introduced by its chairman, Congressman Henry B Gonzalez, that would halt all US funding of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other multilateral development agencies unless all countries receiving aid from such institutions agreed to be bound by international nonproliferation agreements. The bill would also prevent the US Export-Import Bank from assisting countries which are producing weapons of mass destruction or which are seeking to do so (prepared statement). Administration witnesses before the committee strongly oppose the bill {Guar 11 May}.

8 May Director of US Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, testifying in Congress on "the proliferation problem" generally, says of Iraq: "The coalition severely damaged the chemical weapons production infrastructure, and it too will have to be rebuilt. Much of the hard-to-get production equipment was removed and hidden before bombing started, however, and would be available for reconstruction. If UN sanctions were relaxed, we believe Iraq could produce modest quantities of chemical agents almost immediately. It would take a year or more to recover the CW capability it previously enjoyed, however. Facilities belonging to the BW program were also damaged, but critical equipment was hidden during the war. Because the program does not require a large infrastructure, the Iraqis could be producing BW materials in a matter of weeks, if they were to decide to do so." {Prepared testimony}

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS FOR NEWS CHRONOLOGY

ACR	<i>Arms Control Reporter</i>	DTel	<i>Daily Telegraph</i> (London)	JDW	<i>Jane's Defence Weekly</i>
AD	<i>Aerospace Daily</i>	DW	<i>Defense Week</i>	JP	<i>Jerusalem Post</i>
AP	Associated Press	FAZ	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i>	JPRS	<i>Joint Publications Research Service</i>
BBC-SWB	<i>BBC-Summary of World Broadcasts</i>	FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington)	KZ	<i>Krasnaya Zvezda</i>
CBW	Chemical/biological warfare	FR	<i>Frankfurter Rundschau</i>	LAT	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>
CD	Conf. on Disarmament	FT	<i>Financial Times</i> (London)	NYT	<i>New York Times</i>
CD/	CD document	Guar	<i>Guardian</i> (London)	RG	<i>Rossiyskaya Gazeta</i>
C&EN	<i>Chemical & Eng. News</i>	HansC	<i>Hansard Commons</i>	S/	UN Security Council doc.
CN	<i>Current News Early Bird</i>	IHT	<i>Internat. Herald Tribune</i>	TL	<i>Times</i> (London)
CQ	<i>Congressional Quarterly</i>	Ind	<i>Independent</i> (London)	Tag	<i>Tageszeitung</i> (West Berlin)
CR	<i>Congressional Record</i>	ITAF	<i>Inside the Air Force</i>	WP	<i>Washington Post</i>
DN	<i>Defense News</i>	ITP	<i>Inside the Pentagon</i>	WT	<i>Washington Times</i>
				WSJ	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>

8-9 May In The Hague, the Netherlands Foreign Ministry convenes its international seminar on the first five years of the projected Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [see 12 Feb]. {IHT 11 May}

9 May In the Aral Sea, work has begun on abolishing the Vozrozhdeniye Island BW facility [see 11 Apr], as ordered by the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command. Reporting this, Russia's Radio adds: "This subdivision of the former USSR Ministry of Defense has been elaborating methods for combating the biological weapons of a probable opponent since 1952." {Russia's Radio 9 May in BBC-SWB 22 May}

11 May In Ashkhabad, during the meeting of state leaders of central Asia and Kazakhstan, President Niyazov of Turkmenistan and President Hashemi-Rafsanjani of Iran sign a declaration, Article 5 of which states: "The two sides confirmed that in order to strengthen and protect peace in the whole world they would make efforts to oppose the use or stockpiling of nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons of mass destruction." {Broadcast from Ashkhabad 13 May in BBC-SWB 15 Jun}

11 May In Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenians once again use chemical weapons, this time during an attack on Agdam, according to the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry {Interfax 12 May in BBC-SWB 14 May}. The report is later denied by the Nagorno-Karabakh Self Defense Committee {ITAR-TASS 14 May in BBC-SWB 16 May}. A subsequent international medical appeal by Azerbaijani doctors speaks of cyanide-filled shells having been used, as during the shelling of Shusha [see 8 May] {ITAR-TASS 2 Jun in BBC-SWB 4 Jun}.

11 May In Geneva the CD reconvenes for the second of the three sessions it has scheduled for the year. This session is due to end on 26 June.

11-14 May In Washington, the multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Middle East peace talks meets for the first time. Much of the session is occupied with briefings by leading figures from past arms-control negotiations, especially the bilateral US-Soviet ones, but there are also presentations of national position papers.

The imminence of the CWC is addressed in the Jordanian position paper, which is later described as follows by the leader of the Jordanian delegation, Dr Abdullah Tuqan, during an interview: "We asked for two basic requirements. One is that when we talk about regional security, i.e. the prospect of preserving peace and stability, this must be looked at in all dimensions - political, military and economic. Therefore all the other multilateral working groups - Environment, Water, Economic Development and Refugees, as well as Arms Control - should be linked, and there should be a linkage issue between them. Secondly, when we talk about weapons of mass destruction in the region, we have reached the point where it's become extremely dangerous: at one hand, you have Israel that has the nuclear capability; on the other, you have other states that have the chemical capability. What we are looking for and hoping for is that, based on the Bush initiatives of May 1991 [see 13 and 29 May 91] as well as UN resolutions, Security Council Resolution 687 - whereby in Paragraph 14 they state that this will be the first step in es-

tablising a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East [see 3 Apr 91] - the following steps could be taken: One is that all countries in the region could sign and ratify the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and will abide by the IAEA rules. Two: to sign the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. Three: to sign and abide by the upcoming chemical weapons treaty that...might be completed by this year. Four is to stop acquiring and producing and testing ballistic missiles and other surface-to-surface missiles.... And the fifth point is to stop the acquisition, production and all related research and development into fissionable materials and nuclear weapons development. And, finally, to maybe establish a regional agency to monitor and control and to do the implementation of the above." {BBC-SWB 2 Jun}

12 May The US Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee receives Defense Department testimony on the FY 1993 CBW program budget request. A total of \$1300 million is being sought for the year, 43 percent for chemical and biological defense, 49 percent for chemdemil and 8 percent for CWC-verification-related activities.

While explaining the request, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical Matters), Dr Billy Richardson, says that BW defense and the impact of BW upon US forces - potentially a "far greater" impact than that of CW agents - are now receiving more emphasis than in the past, and that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Secretary of Defense have designated BW defense as a "priority requirement". {Prepared testimony}

12 May The new US Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency [see 18 Feb] is expected to be formally established by 1 October 1992, so the Army testifies to the Congress, observing also that the new agency "will provide an organization poised to meet requirements of a multilateral chemical treaty". For start-up funding, \$3.6 million is allocated to USACMDA in the FY 1993 budget request.

The Army testimony also reports an 18-month slippage in the schedule for completing the disposal of the US CW stockpile, and a 22 percent growth in the estimated total costs: the completion date is now set at December 2000, and the revised life-cycle cost estimate is \$7900 million [see also 10 Feb]. {Prepared testimony of Susan Livingstone}

13 May At the CD in Geneva, the Western Group submits to the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons a proposal on the control of "CW capable" facilities [see 24-27 Jun 91] in the civil chemical industry [see 4-7 May]. {CD/CW/WP.398}

13 May In Germany the Mannheim state prosecutor brings charges against two former executives, alleging their illegal involvement in the Libyan chemical-weapons facility at Rabta [see 5 Apr] during 1984-88. One is a former manager of Salzgitter-Industriebau GmbH [see 23 Dec 91]; the other, a former manager of Imhausen-Chemie GmbH [see 1 Aug 91]. {FR & IHT 14 May}

14 May Invited by the Austrian Government [see 13 Feb], CD ambassadors are visiting Vienna to consider its candidacy as seat of the projected CWC international organization. {CD/PV.620}

15 May In Tashkent, at the summit meeting of the CIS Council, an agreement on chemical weapons [see 28-29 Apr] is adopted by all member states save Belarus and Ukraine. Entering into force immediately, the agreement requires its parties to "conduct a coordinated policy" so as, first, to conclude the CWC as soon as possible and, second, to control the export of dual-purpose chemicals and technologies for manufacturing them. Parties are to "stand by the decision announced by the former USSR in 1987 on halting the production of chemical weapons". As for existing stocks, Russia "will commit itself to destroying chemical weapons with consideration for its real capabilities and in accordance with international agreements"; other CIS states will cooperate in the chemdemil, their financial commitments to be "regulated by a separate agreement". Also in the agreement is a reaffirmation of CIS succession to the obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol of the former Soviet Union, Russia taking on the retaliatory-use reservations but the other CIS states undertaking to "consider the possibility of subscribing" without them. {RG 23 May in FBIS-SOV 26 May}

Explaining the Ukrainian dissent, military delegation leader Lt-Gen Ivan Bizhan later says: "Why must we finance their destruction if there are no chemical weapons on Ukrainian territory and none have ever been produced there?" {KZ 16 May in BBC-SWB 20 May}

15 May Moscow Radio reports an interview with Dr Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Committee on CBW Convention Problems [see 19 Feb], about his committee's work on implementing the BWC in Russia further to President Yeltsin's recent ukase on the subject [see 11 Apr]: "Dr Kuntsevich said that after the ratification of the international convention there were, legally speaking, violations of it in this country. Since there were no bans, research in this field continued. It continued even after 1975 when the USSR ratified the international convention. It was only in the mid-1980s that steps began to be taken to curtail these offensive programs.... Dr Kuntsevich confirmed that there are now no stockpiles of biological warfare agents in Russia. Indeed he explained that the agents that had been developed had a short storage life, which made stockpiling impossible. Actually there was laboratory research and the testing of the product of this research at the country's only proving ground for this purpose [see 9 May]. All work at that proving ground has now been halted and the special purpose structures erected there are to be dismantled within a couple of years.... Foreign experts have been invited to the recently top secret military facility." {Radio Moscow 15 May in FBIS-SOV 19 May}

Later, the *Washington Post* reports that the BWC-implementation ukase had been President Yeltsin's response to a confidential report received from Dr Kuntsevich stating that the military had illicitly developed aircraft bombs and rocket warheads to disseminate anthrax, tularemia and Q fever pathogens, and that this effort had been maintained at least through 1990 after being steadily scaled back during the six years of the Gorbachev presidency. Dr Kuntsevich had told the *Post* in an interview that most such development stopped once a weapon had reached the prototype stage. {WP 31 Aug}

16 May In Washington, the Comptroller of the Defense Department transmits to the Congress the report required by US public law on proposed obligations of Nunn-Lugar funds [see 24 Apr]. The proposed obligations thus far amount to \$145

million of the available \$400 million, all of them aimed at various aspects of former Soviet nuclear-weapons capabilities – except for a sum of up to \$10 million for the purpose of assessing the feasibility of other proposals and developing specific programs. In this connection the report notes that the United States has initiated discussions with the Russian Federation on the destruction of chemical weapons. {*Report on Proposed Obligations for Facilitating Destruction and Non-proliferation in the Former Soviet Union*}

18 May In the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the Chairman distributes a *Working Paper for the Final Phase of the Negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention*. The paper comprises an almost complete draft CWC, a 'Text on the establishment of a Preparatory Commission' and 'Material to be submitted to the Preparatory Commission'. The draft treaty contains neither bracketted alternative language on the still-contentious issues, nor dissenting or qualifying footnotes. Instead it includes sidelined passages, these being the "visions" for compromise solutions that had been called for by the Chairman during the first session from the various Friends of the Chair and other Bureau members [see 12 Mar]. The unmarked remainder of the draft "represents non-controversial material of the Rolling Text which has been restructured and edited by the Chairman in order to bring it closer to the form of a consistent legal instrument". The paper proposes that private and open-ended consultations now focus on the sidelined parts of the draft. {CD/CW /WP.400}

19 May In the US House of Representatives, the Armed Services Committee reports out on the 1993 Defense Authorization bill. On the statutory completion date for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program [see 13 Nov 91], it proposes that the existing law – section 1412(b) of PL 99-145 – be amended to provide more flexibility: "The Secretary of Defense shall carry out the destruction of the stockpile in accordance with a schedule adopted by the Secretary consistent with the diplomatic and treaty obligations of the United States".

On the CBW defense programs, the report, citing lessons from *Desert Storm*, is critical of the Army's management of its tri-service responsibilities and recommends that the Defense Department's focal-point office for CB defense assumes a more active oversight role. Further, it calls for an annual report from the Defense Secretary on stocks of protective equipment and on the state of anti-CBW training and readiness of US forces; and it directs the Defense Secretary to submit to the Congress, by 1 August each year, the Pentagon's annual Joint Service CB Defense Research, Development and Acquisition Plan. {CQ 30 May}

Chairman Les Aspin subsequently appoints a three-man inquiry group to report and make recommendations to the Committee's policy panel by the end of the year on CB defense preparedness issues. The inquiry is to be chaired by Representative Glen Browder, who is later reported as saying that comments from people at home or abroad would be welcome. {*Armed Forces Journal International* July 1992}

20 May In Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic (the disjunct part of Azerbaijan within Armenia that borders Iran and Turkey), Health Minister Farhad Dzhafarkuliyev states that Armenian forces, in the course of their bombardment of the

border town of Sadarak that had begun two days previously, were firing shells filled with cyanide [see also 8 and 11 May] and mustard gas, evidence of this having been found in samples of blood taken from casualties currently under treatment in a local hospital {ITAR-TASS 20 May in FBIS-SOV 20 May}. Next day, with reports of continuing CW shelling, he cites similar evidence of the use of phosgene-filled projectiles {Moscow Channel 1 TV 21 May in BBC-SWB 23 May; Azerbaijani Radio 21 May in BBC-SWB 23 May}. A subsequent Azerbaijani report speaks of shells filled with diphosgene, as well as phosgene-filled ones, having been fired into Sadarak {ITAR-TASS 2 Jun in BBC-SWB 4 Jun}. The UN Security Council is later informed by Azerbaijan of these reports {ITAR-TASS in BBC-SWB 9 Jun}.

21 May President Bush, as required by US public law, reports to Congress on activities and money spent under Executive Order 12735 declaring a state of national emergency and promulgating CBW counterproliferation measures [see 14 Nov 91]. Regarding activities of the Australia Group [see 10-12 Dec 91], he reports that "a draft list of biological organisms, toxins, and equipment to consider for export controls" had been further refined at an intersessional meeting of Australia Group experts in March and that it would be considered for adoption at the plenary meeting in June [see 13 Mar]. {CR 20 May}

21 May In Belgium, at the armed forces munition disposal storage site in Houthulst, a 15 cm mustard-gas shell bursts. The Defense Ministry states that there were neither casualties nor material damage {*De Standaard* 23 May}. In May 1986 four engineers had been killed when another mustard-gas munition had spontaneously exploded {*Het Laatste Nieuws*, 23 May}. Many such munitions, recovered from World War I battlefields, are awaiting destruction in the furnace that is to be built at Houthulst. Defense Minister Delcroix, who, when visiting Houthulst just before the latest incident, had spoken of the furnace becoming operable by the end of 1994, {*Het Laatste Nieuws* 16 May} now announces that he will try to speed up the construction, which will begin in March 1993 {*Het Laatste Nieuws* 25 & 27 May}. Cost estimates for the facility currently stand at about BFr 500 million {*Het Laatste Nieuws* 23 May}.

21 May Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi addresses the CD in Geneva. He states that the CWC negotiations "provide a source of great satisfaction", and that "it will be Algeria's honor and duty to be among the original signatories". Further: "Algeria is not developing and does not produce chemical weapons, and it is not seeking to acquire them." {CD/PV.621}

21 May In Geneva the CD plenary is addressed by the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of Germany, Dr Josef Holik. He speaks of the issues outstanding in the CWC negotiation and expresses his personal support for the new 'Chairman's draft' [see 18 May]. He says: "One of the very few instructions which [CW Ad Hoc Committee Chairman] Ambassador von Wagner has received from Bonn is to try his utmost to achieve a CW convention supported by all member states of the CD". {CD/PV.621}

21 May South Africa for the first time addresses the CD

plenary. Its representative expresses strong support for the CWC negotiation. {CD/PV.621}

22 May In Singapore, the Ministry of Defense Procurement Division issues requests for tenders for a CW-agent detector and alarm. It has recently been buying French respirators and protective clothing. {JDW 13 Jun}

22 May At the CD the number of participating non-member states has by now risen to 45 [see 19 Mar]. The three new observers are Mauritius, Philippines and Tanzania. {CD/INF.29}

22 May The Swiss technical weekly *Chemische Rundschau* carries an interview with Captain Heinz-Dieter Jopp, the German naval officer who led UNSCOM 26, the seventh UN chemical inspection of Iraq [see 5 Feb]. In regard to the defendants in the Darmstadt poison-gas trial [see 27 Apr], he says that, at least by the time the chemical equipment in question was being installed in Iraq, its function for chemical-weapons production should have become obvious {*Chemische Rundschau* 22 May}. Captain Jopp has not been permitted to give evidence at the trial {FAZ 4 Jun}.

23-27 May In Iran there are large-scale military manoeuvres, including anti-CW exercises, to which *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* makes detailed daily reference in its broadcasts. {BBC-SWB 27 & 29 May}

26 May Malta states to the CD that it is "unequivocally committed to the achievement of a total ban on chemical weapons, possesses no such weapons, nor has the means of producing them, nor the intention of acquiring them". It also declares its intention of becoming an original signatory of the CWC, the 45th country to do so at the CD [see 21 May and 26 Mar]. {CD/PV.622}

27 May In Moscow, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* publishes an interview conducted with President Yeltsin four days previously which includes the following exchange (ellipses as in the original):

"[*Komsomolskaya Pravda*] You knew about the development of bacteriological weapons in Sverdlovsk. But it was only recently that you first talked about it publicly. Why did you keep quiet all that time?

"[Yeltsin] First, nobody asked me about it. And, second, when I learned that these developments were under way, I visited Andropov....When there was an anthrax outbreak, the official conclusion stated that it was carried by some dog. Though later the KGB admitted that our military development was the cause.

"Andropov phoned Ustinov and ordered these production facilities to be completely scrapped. I believed that this had been done. It turned out that the laboratories were simply moved to another oblast and development of the weapons continued. And I told Bush [see 1 Feb], Major and Mitterrand this, that the program was under way...I signed a decree setting up a special committee and banning the program [see 11 Apr]. It was only after this that experts flew out specially and stopped the work." {*Komsomolskaya Pravda* 27 May in FBIS-SOV 28 May (as corrected)} [See also 12 Apr & 15 May]

27 May The UN Security Council, conducting the latest of its bimonthly reviews of the sanctions against Iraq, considers a report {S/23993} from UNSCOM Chairman Ekéus. The report states that Iraq has still not provided either the full, final and complete disclosure of its now-proscribed weapons programs [see 19 Mar] or formal acceptance of the UNSCOM plan for ongoing monitoring and verification [see 18 Mar]. The Council finds that Iraq is still not meeting its obligations under the Kuwait-War ceasefire resolutions and decides to retain economic sanctions. {DTel 28 May}

28 May In Armenia, the UN Secretary-General's special envoy heading the Security Council observation mission to Nagorno-Karabakh, Francesco Vendrell, tells reporters that he can neither deny nor confirm Azerbaijani statements that Armenians used chemical weapons in shelling Nakhichevan [see 20 May] {BBC-SWB 30 May}. And he denies Azerbaijani news-media reports of UN observers having confirmed the statements {RIA 28 May in BBC-SWB 30 May}.

The reports of Armenian chemical warfare continue. One gives an account of a capsule containing a "cyanide compound" having been removed by surgeons at Baku Central Military Hospital from the body of an Azeri fighter severely wounded in Shusha [see 8 May], the capsule being said to have originated in an exploding canister shell {KZ 29 May in FBIS-SOV 1 Jun}.

28-29 May In Washington, senior officials from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA – meet for the third time since the Kuwait War to discuss controls on the arms trade, particularly with the Middle East [see 8-9 Jul 91]; the previous such meeting had been in London in October. They agree to adopt a document, *Interim Guidelines Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction*, which declares that the five countries will "observe and consult" upon the guidelines it sets out.

Guideline no 4 is: "Not assist, directly or indirectly, in the development, acquisition, manufacture, testing, stockpiling, or deployment of chemical weapons by any recipient whatsoever". Guideline no 5 is: "Not export equipment, material, services, or technology which could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons except when satisfied, for example, by recipient country guarantees or confirmation by the recipient, that such exports would not contribute to the development or acquisition of chemical weapons". Guideline no 7 is an identical one for biological weapons. Guideline no 6 is on the BWC – compliance with its provisions, and support for efforts to enhance its effectiveness.

29 May In the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Switzerland and Sweden introduce a joint paper entitled *Anatomy of a Chemical Plant Site*. {CD/CW/WP.401}

31 May In the CWC negotiation there is now a strong expectation, at least among Western delegations, that a text will indeed be completed and agreed during the summer, possibly with a ministerial-level meeting of the CD for formal initialling of the text or, alternatively, for resolution of any particular issue that might be blocking final consensus.

The working schedule envisages the CD Ad Hoc Committee receiving a revised draft treaty by 22 June. Derived from the WP.400 'vision text' [see 18 May] and the intensified

negotiations – "forced marches" is how one delegation later describes the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee {CD/PV. 627} – it has been stimulating, this would still be a draft by the Chairman, Ambassador von Wagner, for which he would be wholly responsible. But he is referring to it as the 'final text', anticipating accepting changes to it only if they are by consensus of all parties.

Delegations would be receiving this 'final text' draft four days before the end of the second session of the CD. In their third session, beginning on 20 July, they would then have a little more than two weeks to agree on the text if sufficient time were to be left for the text to be translated into all official UN languages in order for it to be considered by the UN General Assembly at its 47th session beginning in September. {ACR 6-92 at p. 704.B.523-5}

1 June In Iraq, government forces have recently been employing chemical weapons against "opposition strongholds" in the southern marshlands [see 4 May], according to the official Iranian news agency. {IRNA 2 Jun in FBIS-NES 3 Jun}

1 June In Paris, during a two-day high-level meeting, the 17-nation [NATO less Iceland plus Australia and Japan] Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) agrees to invite former Eastern-bloc countries to join a multilateral cooperation council that would screen exports of sensitive technology, including dual-use chemical technology, to unstable or outlaw regimes. {FT 28 May; WP 3 Jun}

2 June The UK Defence Ministry makes the following written answer to a parliamentary question about "the number of countries currently involved in the development of biological weapons": "It is assessed that about ten countries possess or seek to acquire a biological warfare capability. It is difficult to gauge exactly the number of countries that are involved because biological weapons can be developed and produced at civilian facilities." {HansC 2 Jun}

2-4 June The Australia Group meets in Paris and agrees that exports of such chemical manufacturing equipments as certain types of reactor vessels, storage tanks, heat exchangers, distillation columns and degassing equipment and condensers should be controlled. Participating states agree, further, to place controls on exports of listed biological organisms, toxins and equipment [see 20 May]. They also decide to add four more chemicals to the precursor control list: sulphur monochloride, sulphur dichloride, 2-N,N-diisopropylaminoethyl chloride hydrochloride and triethanolamine hydrochloride {Chemical Industries Association conference on International Trade Controls, London, 25 Jun}. [Note: the first two of these precursors are listed in Schedule 3 of the latest draft CWC and the third in Schedule 2, but the fourth – like 19 others on the Australia-Group list – is in none of the schedules. And only the first two are contained in the control lists of the UNSCOM ongoing monitoring and verification plan for Iraq [see 2 Oct 91].] Further, the Group considers its future and how to process future applications for membership {Notes on Arms Control July 1992}.

3 June In the United States the Congress releases an unclassified edition of the Fiscal Year 1993 *Arms Control Impact Statements* submitted to it by the administration. Its statement on the 1993 chemical weapons programs records

that "munition procurement was terminated last year in anticipation of entry-into-force of the June 1, 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union".

As for weapons development, the statement indicates that the CW programs are now confined to exploratory studies (the fullscale development of binary nerve-gas munitions, for example, having now been terminated), with the exception of advanced development of the Advanced Riot Control Agent Device. ARCAD, the statement says, "will deliver a high safety ratio, immobilization compound against relatively close targets where safe immobilization is the prime concern".

For the first time an official figure is given for the total size of the US CW stockpile: 31,400 agent-tons of unitary nerve and blister agents [see also 30 Sep 91], of which 3400 agent tons "contained in artillery projectiles, spray tanks and bombs" are described as "useable". The size of the binary stockpile - confined to 155mm artillery rounds and canisters therefor - is not disclosed. The statement explains the holdings as follows: "It should be emphasized that the objective of the retaliatory element of the chemical program is to deter the use of CW against our forces and allies. The United States has forsworn the use of CW for any reason, including retaliation in kind with CW, effective when the CWC enters into force." The statement says that "NATO Allies, except for France, have chosen not to maintain their own CW retaliatory stockpiles" [but see 3 Mar].

Referring to the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding of September 1989 between the United States and the Soviet Union, the statement says that "planning is underway for the Phase II data exchange and CW inspections" provided for in the Memorandum. [Note: according to the agreement, Phase II data are to be exchanged "on an agreed date not less than four months prior to the initialing of the text" of the CWC.]

3-5 June In Washington a panel of the National Research Council commissioned by the US Army to report on the topic [see 13 Apr] holds a workshop on alternative technologies for destroying chemical weapons. {CR 4 Jun}

4 June From Washington it is reported that Ukraine, Canada, Sweden and the United States have initialled an agreement on establishing a science and technology center in Kiev [see 17 Feb] which, like the corresponding one in Moscow, is to be for assisting the switch to peaceful work of scientists and engineers formerly engaged in the nuclear or CBW weapons or ICBM programs of the former Soviet Union. {ITAR-TASS 4 Jun in BBC-SWB 12 Jun}

4-14 June In Russia, a team of scientists under private auspices led by Professor Matthew Meselson of Harvard University visits Ekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk) in order to meet with Russian officials, scientists and other local inhabitants for purposes of clarifying the nature of the 1979 outbreak of anthrax there [see 27 May]. The visit has been in preparation for several years {Public Interest Report Sep 88}. Reports on the findings are to be submitted to scientific journals.

4 June In the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, member states from the Group of 21 plus China table eight papers proposing amendments to the Chairman's 'vision text' for the draft CWC. Five of the papers are put forward by

Algeria, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zaire {CD/CW/WP.402; CD/CW/WP.406-409}. The other three are submitted by the same group of 12 less Indonesia {CD/CW/WP.403-405}.

Each of the draft CWC articles or issues on which discontent is thus given formal expression, the Chairman subsequently proposes from a special structure of work for a limited period of nine days (up to 17 Jun) in which two (or, for the Executive-Council Issue, for) nominated "main advocates" initiate a dialectic process overseen by a nominated moderator" who thereby effects negotiation on the particular article or issue. {CD/CW/WP.436}

4 June The new British CD ambassador, Sir Michael Weston, speaks as follows in the CD plenary about the provisions of the CWC for deterring misuse of civilian chemical plants and industrially important chemicals: "For deterrence to be effective, inspections must be widespread. To be cost-effective, they must also be well targeted. I believe that the compromise proposal put forward by Western Group delegations in WP.398 [see 13 May] offers a way of combining these two objectives in a simple, straightforward and non-discriminatory regime...[providing] a way out of the current dilemma on the issue of 'capability'." {CD/PV.623}

4 June At this week's plenary session of the CD in Geneva, more delegations state their preferences for the seat of the CWC international organization; Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, who is the Friend of the Chair on the issue, has recently presented a paper on the matter. Cuba and Czechoslovakia declare for Vienna. Australia, Mongolia, Poland and the United Kingdom, like Belgium, Canada and Japan before them [see 5 Mar], declare for The Hague {CD/PV.623}, as do Nigeria and Venezuela later {CD/PV.625}.

4 June The US House of Representatives adopts an amendment to its 1993 Defense Authorization bill that addresses the chemdemil program. Instead of the existing statutory completion date for the CW-stockpile elimination, the amended bill requires only that the destruction schedule be "consistent with diplomatic and treaty obligations" [see also 19 May]. The bill also establishes a Chemical Demilitarization Advisory Commission, to report by 1 January 1994; and it requires the Defense Department (a) to work on developing an alternative chemical weapons disposal program, (b) to submit to the Congress a revised chemical weapons disposal concept plan not later than 180 days after the Advisory Commission has reported, and (c) to establish an international chemdemil consultation and exchange program. {CR 4 Jun}

5 June In Baghdad, Iraqi authorities deliver to the UNSCOM office some 600 pages of data, mostly in Arabic, which they characterized as a comprehensive and complete account of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile activities {S/24108 & Corr.1}. It is not immediately clear whether this submission is the promised [see 19 Mar and see also 27 May] "full, final and complete disclosure" required under Security Council resolution 707 (1991). {TL, 6 Jun}

5 June Cuba introduces into the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons a paper on principles for funding the projected CWC international organization. {CD/CW/WP.411}

6 June From Nagorno-Karabakh, allegations of Azeri employment of chemical weapons are now also being heard [see also 11 and 20 May]. According to Interfax, the Karabakh news agency is reporting that capsules with 'Cyanide-005' had been discovered among fragments of missiles launched from Azeri bases in the Agdam district into the village of Mokhratag in the Mardakert district {Interfax 6 Jun in FBIS-SOV 9 Jun}. The Karabakh agency later reports that doctors who have gone into the region from Yerevan have confirmed the use of a toxic substance; it reports, also, that samples of the substance, which it says causes convulsions and wounds on the body that do not heal, have been delivered to experts in Yerevan {ITAR-TASS 10 Jun in BBC-SWB 12 Jun}.

Azerbaijani use of ground-attack aircraft to drop toxic bombs on populated centers of Shaumyanoskiy Rayon a week later is reported by the Karabakh news agency {ITAR-TASS 13 Jun in BBC-SWB 15 Jun; Moscow Channel 1 TV 13 Jun in BBC-SWB 15 Jun} and denounced by the Armenian government {BBC-SWB 18 & 23 Jun}. Many civilian casualties from the chemical bombs are said to be at the rayon hospital {Armenian Radio 14 Jun in BBC-SWB 17 Jun}.

8-12 June In Stockholm, some 700 people from more than 30 countries attend the Fourth International Symposium on Protection Against Chemical Warfare Agents. {ASA Newsletter 12 Aug}

8 June In Stockholm, during the first day of the international CW protection symposium, there is an extracurricular meeting on Iraq's Chemical Arsenal chaired by the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. It is attended by some 350 people. Detailed papers are presented by UNSCOM inspectors and commissioners which extend substantially the information in the public domain about UN knowledge of Iraqi CW capabilities.

Commissioner John Gee of Australia describes the "process of interrogation" whereby Iraqi authorities - through declarations to the UN, through written responses to follow-up queries, and through meetings with UNSCOM officials - have disclosed an increasingly full picture of the country's former CW program. He gives particulars of the revisions to the original April 1991 declarations which Iraq submitted to the UN in mid-July and which, very largely, UNSCOM inspections subsequently verified. Items listed in that July submission were as follows: 20,000 CS mortar bombs; 12,634 mustard 155mm artillery shell; 1100 mustard LD-250 aircraft bombs; 675 mustard AALD-500 bombs; 6120 sarin 122mm rockets; 2500 other sarin 122mm rockets (at Al Muthanna); 2160 yet other sarin 122mm rockets (at Khamsiyah); 200 sarin-filled aircraft bombs; 16 sarin *Al Hussein* missile warheads; 14 alcohol-loaded binary *Al Hussein* warheads; 336 alcohol-loaded binary R-400 bombs; 280 tonnes of bulk mustard; 75 tonnes of bulk sarin; 3302 tonnes of bulk precursors (150 t of dimethylphosphoramidyl dichloride, 184 t of thiodiglycol, 6 t of sulphur chloride, 2100 t of phosphorus trichloride, 273 t of thionyl chloride, 500 t of phosphoryl chloride, 12 t of diisopropylamine, 25 t of dimethylammonium chloride and 52 t of 2-chlorobenzaldehyde); and 78,675 unfilled munitions. [See also 30 Jul 91, 25 Oct 91 and 4 Dec 91]

Commissioner Gee also describes the main features of the list of items which, in its letter to UNSCOM of 19 March 1992 [q.v.], Iraq said it had destroyed during the previous

summer: 125 CS 250-gauge aircraft bombs; 19,000 122mm rockets; 45 alcohol-loaded binary *Al Hussein* missile warheads; 800 alcohol-loaded binary R-400 bombs; 200 tonnes of phosphorus pentasulphide; 3000 litres of methylphosphonyl difluoride; and 2000 unfilled 250-gauge bombs.

In a second presentation, Commissioner Gee describes the former Iraqi production capacity for CW-agent precursors. He says that Iraq had informed UNSCOM that over the period 1980-88 it had purchased from abroad 1500 tonnes of thiodiglycol and 200 tonnes of 2-chloroethanol, as well as various other precursors. These had been processed at Al-Muthanna, which had been built as a dedicated CW-weapons production facility, and where there was also some production of precursors. Around 1984 a decision had been taken to expand the Al-Muthanna State Establishment. Three production facilities for precursors were subsequently built 45 km away in the vicinity of Al Fallujah and Habbaniyah [see 15-22 Aug 91]. He describes them in some detail, saying that they had suffered heavy bomb damage but that reconstruction work has since been making progress.

Inspectors Peter Dunn of Australia and Marius van Zelm of The Netherlands speak of their inspections of the Al-Muthanna establishment, the former's an initial reconnaissance [see 14 Jun 91], the latter's a detailed survey [see 9 Nov 91]. Inspector van Zelm says that the purity of the nerve-gas his team had examined was low, 0.2-2.5 percent for the GB and 0.6-7.0 percent for the GF. Inspector Dunn's team had learnt that the GB was stored as undistilled reaction product, stabilized with triethylamine.

Inspector Johan Santesson of Sweden gives a presentation on the main types of Iraqi CW weapon {UNSCOM presentation, Stockholm 8 Jun in report 6 Jul}. The CW warheads for the *Al Hussein* missile were made of aluminium, weighed 335 kg empty, and could hold upto 152 litres of chemical. The payloads of the mustard 250-gauge and 500-gauge aircraft bombs were 64 and 150 litres respectively; that of the 155mm artillery shell, 3.5 litres. The 122mm sarin rockets held between 6.4 and 9 litres of agent. The DB-2 bomb could hold 326 litres of sarin.

Commissioner Bryan Barrass of the UK describes the methods that are being readied or applied for destroying Iraqi CW agents and munitions.

9 June In New Delhi, the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry of Austria, Heinrich Gleissner, concludes a 5-day visit during which he had called on the Minister of State for External Affairs of India, Eduardo Faliero, to seek Indian support for locating the seat of the projected CWC international organization [see 4 Jun] in Vienna. {All-India Radio 9 Jun in BBC-SWB 13 Jun}

9 June In Geneva, the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons accepts its chairman's proposal, with nominees, for a moderator/advocates framework of negotiation [see 4 Jun]. {CD/CW/WP.436}

10 June In Moscow, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* publishes a long interview-based article on the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax [see 4-14 Jun]. Nobody from Military Base No 19, it says, died of the anthrax. It says, too, that, during the initial investigation conducted by USSR Chief State Health Physician P Burgasov, anthrax agent had been found in smear samples from a household rug and a wall mailbox. The article dwells

on the apparent absence today of official records on the epidemic, this being attributed to actions by the KGB, but with mention also of papers having been confiscated by the Military Procurator's office. Quoting a source in the office of Russian State Advisor on Ecology and Health Care Aleksey Yablokov, the article says that secret documents from Sverdlovsk were held in KGB archives until 4 December 1990, when a decree issued by the USSR Council of Ministers, *On the Work on Special Projects*, ordered their destruction. {*Komosomolskaya Pravda* 10 Jun in JPRS-TAC 13 July}

10 June At the CD in Geneva, during the week's rescheduled plenary session, a spokesman for the Western Group reaffirms its "support for the initiative of President Mubarak [see 8 May] to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction". {CD/PV.624*}

11 June Norway transmits to the CD the eleventh annual installment of its *Research Report on Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention*. This part addresses operating procedures for sampling and sample-handling during verification either of use-allegations or of nonproduction at chemical facilities. {CD/1153}

12 June In Moscow, *Izvestiya* publishes an account of a visit to the Russian Ministry of Defense Microbiology Research Institute in Kirov [see 11 Apr], the first time journalists from Moscow had been allowed in. The head of the institute, Colonel Yevgeniy Pimenov, is quoted thus: "We have not produced any bacteriological weapons in the past and we are not doing so now. Our main purpose is to provide means of protection against dangerous bacteriological pathogens." One third of the institute's employees have recently departed because of a lack of resources. {*Izvestiya* 12 Jun in FBIS-SOV 16 Jun}

12 June President Yeltsin issues a ukase, *On Priority Measures for Implementing Russia's Obligations in Destroying Chemical Weapons Stockpiles* [see 27 Apr]. The directive makes the Committee on CBW Convention Problems [see 8 May] responsible for organizing the country's chemdemil effort, and gives it two months to submit detailed proposals to the government for the phased creation of a system of chemdemil facilities. The proposals are to be developed in consultation with the pertinent ministries and departments, and must be agreed with "local organs of power", to which end the ukase makes provision for a range of local benefits and safeguards. {Interfax via Kyodo 16 Jun in FBIS-SOV 17 Jun; ITP 6 Aug}

The range is later described in the following terms by *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*: "This includes establishing privileges and advantages as regards working conditions, remuneration and pension provision for workers engaged in the destruction of weapons. Individual houses and health camps for children are to be built in a 15-km zone around the [chemdemil] facilities. Diagnostic centers are to be set up at medical institutions serving workers at the facilities. Ecological monitoring systems and information points are to be set up in all inhabited localities in the zones. Compulsory state personal insurance and insurance of citizens' property is to be organized" {RG 20 Jun in FBIS-SOV 23 Jun}. Such provision for welfare benefits seems to indicate that the the main obstacle to Russian chemdemil is not technological or even financial; the

difficulty seems rather to be one of finding local communities willing to accept chemdemil facilities into their midst [see 26 Nov].

The reference in the ukase to a "phased" system apparently reflects the concept, later explained by the committee's chairman, General Kuntsevich, in a press interview, of minimizing the burden on the Russian economy by proceeding in stages. The first stage is to be the conversion of several chemical-weapons factories to production of agent-detoxification products, which, rather than being incinerated, will, in later stages, be converted or adapted to useful purposes (antiseptic, anticorrosion and fireproofing purposes are spoken of). Late 1993 or early 1994 is being seen as the earliest time by which the first tonnes of CW agents can be processed {KZ 10 Jul in FBIS-SOV 17 Jul}.

12 June The UN Secretary-General reports to the Security Council on his investigation of the allegations of chemical warfare in Mozambique [see 27 Mar] {S/24065}. He had appointed a team of three experts in CBW defense to conduct the investigation: Sven'ke Persson of Sweden, Heiner Staub of Switzerland and JP Thompson of the UK. They had been in Mozambique during 23-27 March. Both Dr Persson and Dr Thompson had previously investigated the allegations for the Mozambican government independently of one another. Their reports, plus those of the Mozambican and South African governments [see 15 Feb], were made available. Samples taken by the team had been analyzed at the British, Swedish and Swiss CBW defense laboratories, the CW agents searched for comprising eight nerve gases (DFP, GA, FGA, GB, GD, GF, MeGF and VX), five vesicants (H, HN1, HN2, HN3 and T), six irritants (PS, CS, CR, CN, BBC and KSK) and two psychochemicals (BZ and cyclopentyl-BZ) as well as atropine. The conclusion was as follows: "The effect on the troops was consistent with the use of an atropine-like chemical warfare agent and also with severe heat stress. In the current absence of analytical data, we cannot conclude that a chemical warfare agent was used in the attack. A considerable delay occurred between the attack and the investigation being mounted. For this reason it may not be possible to detect traces of agent if a chemical warfare agent had been used in the attack."

13 June In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croat-Muslim forces use nerve gas on the Derventa battlefield according to a statement released by the information service of the (Serbian) 1st Krajina Corps reported in Belgrade newspapers {Tanjug 14 Jun in FBIS-EEU 16 Jun}. A later Serbian report speaks of poison gases having been used by the Croatian Air Force to bomb barracks in Derventa and Serbian villages near SlavonSKI Brod. {Tanjug 13 Jun in BBC-SWB 16 Jun} [See 3 May]

14 June In Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian use of chemical weapons is again being alleged [see 28 May], the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry claiming that the weapons have come from the arsenal of the 366th regiment {Russian TV 14 Jun in BBC-SWB 16 Jun}. Further use the following night is reported by the Ministry, the report citing "an expert examination...conducted in Fizulinskiy Rayon during which confirmation was obtained of the use of cyanides and toxic chemical substances in the missiles". {Radio Rossii 17 Jun in FBIS-SOV 17 Jun}

15 June In Iraq, the milk-powder factory near Baghdad which was bombed during the Kuwait War as a suspected BW-weapons site [see 23 Mar 91] is being rebuilt and is expected to reopen in October a Baghdad newspaper reports. {FR 17 Jun}

15 June The Russian Foreign Ministry issues a statement on the move towards liberalization of export restrictions agreed at the recent CoCom meeting in Paris [see 1 Jun]. As reported by ITAR-TASS, the statement includes the following: "We understand that the removal of CoCom restrictions is closely connected with how effective will be the control over exports of weapons, materials and technologies used for weapons production, and also those of dual purpose, a control which is being set up in Russia and CIS countries. Russia is ready to give corresponding guarantees not to use Western technologies that are being received for military developments and to exclude the handover of them to third countries, particularly to those that are striving to possess nuclear, chemical, biological and missile weaponry." The statement also says: "We are ready for close cooperation [with CoCom], going as far as participation in that organization". {ITAR-TAS 15 Jun in BBC-SWB 17 Jun}

16 June The UN Secretary-General transmits to the Security Council the latest 6-monthly report from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. {S/24108}

16 June In the US House of Representatives, a Government Operations subcommittee holds hearings on the Defense Department's chemdemil program. It receives testimony from the General Accounting Office that is critical of past management of the program {GAO/T-NSIAD-92-43}, and it hears from the current manager that total costs could grow a billion dollars or more beyond the current estimate of nearly \$8 billion {Fort Worth Star-Telegram 17 Jun}. Citizens from communities near projected chemdemil facilities in Kentucky and Maryland express their opposition to current plans {Prepared testimony of Craig E Williams and John E Nunn}.

16 June The presidents of Russia and the United States meet for a two-day summit in Washington. During this first day, President Yeltsin raises the matter of the old chemical weapons dumped in the Baltic Sea [see 13 Mar]. So says his press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov at a subsequent news briefing, adding: "The essence of the matter is that Yeltsin has invited Bush to work out a joint program for raising and destroying these containers.... Some kind of working group will evidently be set up." {BBC-SWB 18 Jun}

17 June At the close of their Washington summit, the presidents of Russia and the United States sign ten agreements, two of which bear on CBW {CD/1162}.

One is a *Joint Statement on Chemical Weapons*: "President Bush and President Yeltsin stressed their continuing commitment to the global elimination of chemical weapons. They expressed their conviction that the Geneva negotiations on a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons can be concluded by the end of August. They agreed to instruct their representatives accordingly, and called on all participants in the negotiations to do their utmost to achieve this goal. They expressed the hope that a ministerial meeting could be convened in that timeframe to approve the conven-

tion.

"The two leaders underscored their support for the 1989 Wyoming Joint Memorandum on phased confidence-building measures in the area of chemical weapons destruction, and agreed to implement the new, cooperative provisions for detailed data exchanges and inspections included in the Joint Memorandum as soon as arrangements can be completed. They also agreed that the June 1990 bilateral chemical weapons Destruction Agreement would be updated and brought into force promptly."

The presidents also sign an *Agreement on the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation* in which they undertake to "cooperate in order to assist the Russian Federation in achieving the following objectives: (a) the destruction of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; (b) the safe and secure transportation and storage of such weapons in connection with their destruction; and (c) the establishment of additional verifiable measures against the proliferation of such weapons that pose a risk of proliferation". The agreement allows the parties to enter into implementing agreements (which are currently being formalized) to accomplish these objectives. It thus provides a legal framework for the transfer of Nunn-Lugar funds [see 16 May].

The implementing agreement on chemical weapons is to specify that the United States will provide financial assistance for detailed planning and resource management, and will assist Russia in obtaining appropriate US contractor support to expedite chemdemil activities {White House news release, 17 Jun}. *Inside the Pentagon* later reports that this \$25 million deal, the details of which it outlines, is being developed by the US Defense Department and the Russian presidential Committee on CBW Convention Problems {ITP 25 Jun}.

17 June President Yeltsin of Russia addresses a joint session of the two houses of the US Congress. Half way through his speech he says: "We are firmly resolved not to lie any more, either to our negotiating partners, or to the Russian or American or any other people. There will be no more lies - ever. The same applies to biological weapons experiments and the facts that have been revealed about American prisoners of war, the KAL 007 flight and many other things." {CQ 20 Jun}

In regard to BW a senior Russian official had earlier drawn the attention of the US press to the interview that President Yeltsin had given to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* about the 1979 anthrax epidemic in Sverdlovsk [see 27 May and 10 Jun] {IHT 17 Jun}. During the summit meeting itself, so it is later reported, the issue of clandestine Soviet BW work arose when the Russian side produced a redraft of its projected, and now overdue, declaration to the UN of information about past BW-weapons programs in accordance with the newly extended [see 27 Sep 91] BWC confidence-building measures. The initial draft of this declaration had been shown to Western officials during the previous month and criticized by them as incomplete; so was the redraft. The US side at the summit reportedly said that if Russia were to submit the redraft in its present form to the UN, "we would have to publicly attack it as seriously inaccurate" {WT 24 Jul}.

Meanwhile the Russian Supreme Soviet is considering the projected legislation on domestic implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention [see 11 Apr] reported to it by

State Counsellor Yablokov. He is today quoted on Moscow radio as saying that the proposed law is the only possible measure to combat the violation of the rules on biological weapons because it was proving impossible to check where they were being produced and whether they were being produced at all. {Mayak Radio (Moscow) 17 Jun in BBC-SWB 19 Jun}

18 June The Iranian Foreign Minister, Dr Ali Akbar Velayati, during an address to the plenary session of the CD in Geneva, cautions against "excessive" verification of chemical industry such as might have "counter-productive confidence-degrading results" instead of serving the confidence-building (as opposed to suspicion-resolving) function that should be the purpose of CWC Article VI. He adds "There is no doubt...that the costs of verification of industry will be shifted onto prices and, therefore, affect the whole national economies of the developing countries which are the end-users of these [dual-use] chemicals. The indirect costs including security costs, regulation costs and red-tape costs will also be borne mainly by the developing countries." He observes, further, that the "trouble-free implementation of the CWC should not be taken for granted", and concludes: "In this context, a viable, cost-effective and non-discriminatory verification system turns out to be a determining factor for the future implementation of the CWC. The proposals tabled by 11 developing countries and China [see 4 Jun, Group of 12] are aimed at securing this objective. This, along with other proposals by the 12 indeed [see 4 Jun, British] present a compromise solution for most important issues that had remained unresolved. I hope to see that this initiative will continue to be studied seriously and considered constructively." {CD/PV.625}

18 June Spain reports to the CD on a practice challenge inspection it had performed at a large multipurpose military base (an unidentified naval base) in accordance with the provisions for the conduct of such inspections contained in the current Rolling Text, CD/1116 of 20 January 1992. {CD/PV.625; CD/1152}

18 June Morocco reaffirms to the CD its chemical-weapons nonpossession declaration and states that it "intends to become an original party" to the future CWC [see also 26 May]. {CD/PV.625}

18 June In Geneva, the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons meets for the chairman to receive reports from each of the moderators [see 9 Jun]. Most are able to report no more than a narrowing of differences.

19 June Finland transmits to the CD the latest volume, the seventeenth, in its Blue Book series of reports from the Finnish Research Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament {CD/1155}. The report describes the third international round-robin trial of sample-analysis technique. Finland had coordinated the interlaboratory comparison test earlier in the year; 15 countries had participated {CD/PV.626}.

19 June At the CD in Geneva, in its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, agreement is reached that The Hague should become the seat of the Organization for the Prohibi-

tion of Chemical Weapons which the CWC is to establish [see 4 Jun]. {Atlantic News 23 Jun}

20 June In Baku, the head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry, Leyla Yunusova, tells a news conference that Russian CIS troops in Azerbaijan have been alerted by the Russian chief of staff's office against possible Armenian chemical warfare, adding that they have proof that the Armenians have, for a long time, been using chemical weapons in Shusha, Agdam, Terter and Fizuli [see 14 Jun]. {Bayrak Radio 20 Jun in FBIS-SOV 22 Jun}

20 June General Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Russian Presidential Committee on CBW Convention Problems (and therefore head of the Russian chemdemil program [see 12 Jun]), says in an interview with the Washington weekly *Inside the Pentagon* that the whole project of destroying the chemical weapons of the former USSR could cost \$10 billion. He proposes that an "international fund for chemical disarmament" be set up with both governmental and nongovernmental contributions - a fund that would finance chemdemil research and other activities and be accessible to other countries besides Russia. Enjoying "privileged channels" with the Russian Government, the fund he says could reward its benefactors with disarmament business and other attractive military conversion work. His proposal has yet to be discussed fully with US officials and industry.

He welcomes the imminent agreement on the transfer of \$25 million Nunn-Lugar funds [see 17 Jun, summit], describing it as "a powerful additional impetus to our chemical demilitarization program". But, referring to a reportedly contentious matter, he says that Russia should have a strong voice in determining exactly which US contractor is to be selected to provide the contractor support specified in the agreement. {ITP 25 Jun}

21-23 June In Sydney, the Australian Government hosts a further seminar in its Chemical Weapons Regional Initiative series [see 26-30 Aug 91, 12-13 Nov 90 and 2-4 Aug 89] in which there is participation - or, in the case of Nauru, subsequent endorsement of the final statement - from all independent states of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia save Cambodia: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Indonesia, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam and Western Samoa. The final statement, subscribed to by all participants, calls for speedy conclusion of the CWC and affirms that the global and regional effectiveness of the treaty "would be considerably enhanced by early action by all states of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific to adhere as original States Parties". Further, the statement endorses the proposal, advanced in the Australian Senate by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans three days before the seminar, that governments in the region mutually exchange statements of nonpossession, nonproduction and nondevelopment of chemical weapons such as would be required under the CWC when it eventually enters into force. {CD/1157}

21 June In Iraq, UNSCOM initiates a program of aerial surveillance directed at proscribed activities concerning weapons of mass destruction. Two or three helicopter flights are to be

flown each week, with five or six sites covered by each flight. President Bush lets it be known that he "strongly favors this aggressive approach by UNSCOM, which will broaden UNSCOM's ability to find suspect sites as well as conduct long-term monitoring". {US Department of State Dispatch 2 Jul}

22 June In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian bombardments of Sarajevo are including the use of poison gas, according to a surgeon in Dobrinja medical center quoted on Radio Croatia about the nature of the wounds being sustained {Radio Croatia 23 Jun in FBIS-EEU 24 Jun}. Three days later Radio Croatia reports that Serbs are "suspected of using poisonous gases" near Modran {Croatian Radio 25 Jun in BBC-SWB 27 Jun}. [See also 29 April]

22 June In the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, after an intense period of consultation, assessment of the moderators' reports [see 18 Jun] and drafting, Chairman von Wagner of Germany submits his 'final text' - the promised [see 31 May] revised version of his draft for the CWC plus associated texts on the establishment of a Preparatory Commission {CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1*}. The draft comprises a 50-page text for the 24 articles of the treaty together with a 125-page text for its three annexes, the first annex being on *Chemicals*, the second on *Implementation and Verification* and the third on *Protection of Confidential Information*.

23 June In Iraq, a new UNSCOM team led by Garth Whitty of the UK has arrived as an advance party, pending later arrival of the main team, to oversee the plans for destruction of the chemicals that have been concentrated at Muthanna and other sites {Jordan Times 24 Jun}. UNSCOM's regional representative in Baghdad, Alastair Livingston, says later that the Whitty team is to be reinforced in July when destruction operations at Muthanna are scheduled to begin. Operations there are expected to run well into next year: the UN teams will be rotated every three months {Jordan Times 27 Jun}.

24-26 June In the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Chairman von Wagner explains in detail the contents and balance of his draft CWC [see 22 Jun]. He later makes his remarks available in written form, as a 36-page *Explanatory Note*.

The Group of 12 [see 4 Jun] then tables a paper stating that many of its original proposals, some of which it now reiterates, are not reflected in the *new Chairman's Draft*. {CD/CW/WP.414}

24 June In the United States, it is announced that Hercules Aerospace Company and Fluor Daniel have teamed to offer US and foreign governments disposal services for CW munitions. {AD 25 Jun} [See also 30 Jan]

24 June The US Administration submits to the Congress its statutory annual report on *Adherence to and Compliance with [Arms Control] Agreements* [see 18 Nov 91]. In regard to the 1925 Geneva Protocol the report says: "Although there have been reports that Yugoslavia used chemical agents against Croatian rebels, the US has not substantiated these reports. There have also been reports, also not substantiated by the

US, that chemical agents were used recently in Mozambique, and along the Burma-Thai border."

25 June Chile, as represented by its Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr Edmundo Vargas, informs the CD plenary that, once the CWC negotiation has been completed, it "will be pleased to offer to host a regional seminar to provide information about the salient features of this agreement, particularly its verification and inspection machinery, so that countries are in a better position to implement this important convention". {CD/PV.626}

25 June In London, the Chemical Industries Association hosts its International Trade Controls Conference, a substantial part of which focusses on the now-imminent CWC and its expected impacts on chemical industry. Several of the participants had been involved in the CWC negotiations, either as industry advisers to national delegations or as members of them. The conference hears an official estimate that about 300 sites in the UK will have to be declared to the projected Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and that about 20 British sites are likely to be inspected by the Organization each year. {Chemistry in Britain Aug 92}

25 June In the US House of Representatives, the Fisheries and Wildlife Subcommittee of the Merchant Marine Committee approves by voice vote a bill, HR 1435, to turn Rocky Mountain Arsenal - formerly a major US Army chemical-weapons production facility - into a wildlife refuge. {CQ 27 Jun}

26 June In Baghdad, a 16-member UNSCOM team headed by Major Karen Jansen of the US Army Chemical Corps arrives on what is expected to be a 10-day mission to conduct the second combined chemical and biological inspection {US Department of State Dispatch 20 July}. It will supervise the destruction at Al-Muthanna of 60 pieces of equipment used to manufacture CW bomb casings and inspect undeclared sites in Iraq for hidden equipment. {FAZ & FT 26 Jun; Jordan Times 27 Jun; IHT 27-28 Jun}

26 June From Azerbaijan, Khabar news agency reports that a team of UN experts is travelling to Nagorno-Karabakh to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons [see 6 and 20 Jun]. {RIA news agency 26 Jun in BBC-SWB}

26 June In Geneva, the CD concludes the second of its three 1992 sessions. The start of the third session is scheduled for 20 July. The expectation is that there will be intensive attention to the draft CWC in national capitals during the intersessional period [see 31 May].

29 June In Germany, the government declines to release to the poison-gas-trial court in Darmstadt [see 27 Apr] an UNSCOM document which the court had requested from the Ministry of Justice. Trial judge Alfred Pani had the previous month declined to accept a copy of the document, said to include a confidential report of the UNSCOM special mission to Baghdad in January [see 27 Jan], offered by a journalist {FR & FAZ 30 Jun}. Earlier, judges of the Darmstadt court had publicly criticized the Ministry of Justice for its lack of cooperation, especially its unwillingness to disclose information which the Federal Government had received from UN-

SCOM [see 15 Oct 91] about the West-German sources of supply of the Iraqi CW weapons program [see also 22 May]. {FAZ & FR 16 Jun; *Tageszeitung* 23 Jun; *Chemische Rundschau* 26 Jun}

29 June The UK Defence Ministry, responding to a parliamentary question, states its refusal to release documents relating to the Cabinet Defence Committee decision in July 1956 to abandon British CW weapons. It declines to explain this odd secrecy, saying only that the "documents in question continue to be properly withheld under the established criteria of the Public Records Act". {HansC 29 Jun}

29 June In the US Congress, the Office of Technology Assessment releases a report on the US chemdemil program and on technologies other than incineration that could conceivably contribute to its future, notably chemical neutralization, supercritical water oxidation, steam gasification and plasma-arc pyrolysis (OTA-BP-O-95). The report had been requested by Senator Wendell Ford of Kentucky, whose state seems to be on the verge of banning incinerator technologies altogether and therefore making it impossible for the Army to obtain the permits it needs in order to proceed with its projected chemdemil operations at Lexington-Bluegrass ammunition depot {ITA 6 Jul}.

29 June - 2 July In Oslo, the Norwegian government hosts and chairs a plenary meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The meeting is attended by four new members of the regime -- Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Switzerland -- whose participation makes the membership identical to that of the Australia Group. The meeting agrees to amend the *MTCR Guidelines* to extend the scope of the regime to missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical as well as nuclear weapons. {Norway, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press release 119/92}

3 July At the UK Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Director-General Graham Pearson signs a management agreement with English Nature for 'sites of special scientific interest' located in the Establishment's ranges on Porton Down, a broad stretch of chalk grassland closed to the public which will now join a national network of environmental study sites. {Guar 2 Jul; DTel 4 Jul; *Chemistry in Britain* August 1992}

3 July The *Los Angeles Times* reports that US Government agencies are following up an April 1992 report by the Defense Intelligence Agency that germ-warfare and other experiments had been conducted in China on US servicemen captured during the Korean War. The experiments are said to have taken place at an installation in Harbin with participation by USSR military medical corps personnel. The newspaper quotes an unidentified "knowledgeable government official" calling the DIA report "extremely preliminary" and noting that "it was based almost exclusively on the uncorroborated claims of a single East European military source, believed to be from Czechoslovakia" {LAT 3 Jul in IHT 4-5 Jul}.

The *Morning News Tribune* of Tacoma, Washington, carries a somewhat similar story six weeks later, but with the BW experiments being said to have taken place at a facility in North Korea. The newspaper, quoting Joseph Douglass Jr, attributes the information to Jan Sejna, a Czechoslovak gen-

eral who had defected to the United States in 1968. {WT & *Boston Globe* 15 Aug}

4 July In Laos, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes a statement rejecting Thai military reports that Laotian soldiers are being trained to use chemical weapons. The statement continues: "The Lao Government strongly affirms that Lao soldiers have never used chemical weapons and have neither the capacity to have such weapons in their possession nor invited military experts from any country to conduct a military training in this field in Laos." {KPL 4 Jul in FBIS-EAS 6 Jul}

4 July In Islamabad, Foreign Affairs Secretary General Akram Zaki meets with the visiting Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of Germany, Dr Josef Holik, for talks on the text of the draft CWC. He is later reported by Radio Pakistan as having said to Dr Holik that Pakistan wants an early settlement on the convention, and that Pakistan does not possess chemical weapons, nor is it producing them. Radio Pakistan also says that, during these talks on the CWC, he "apprised the visitor of the regional situation, as well as Pakistan's nuclear policy and its efforts for keeping South Asia free from nuclear weapons, especially in line with the prime minister's proposal for a 5-nation meeting on this issue" {Radio Pakistan 5 Jul in FBIS-NES 8 Jul}.

Ambassador Holik subsequently travels to Delhi for talks at the Indian External Affairs Ministry {All India Radio in FBIS-NES 10 Jul}. After that he is in Iran, Israel and Egypt {*Ha'aretz* 16 Jul in FBIS-NES 16 Jul}.

4 July The *Washington Times* publishes an article indicating why the draft Russian declaration of past BW programs is being so strongly criticized -- privately, thus far -- by the US and British officials to whom it has been shown [see 17 Jun, Yeltsin]. The newspaper says that the declaration "listed only four BW production sites", which was at variance with what Western intelligence knew about "Moscow's offensive biological weapons program" which it described thus: "But the weapons program involves as many as 20 production and storage sites and was directed by a general assigned to a special unit of the Defense Ministry. The heavily guarded facilities are under military control and grow small quantities of micro-organisms that can be used for rapid, large-scale production of biological warfare agents prior to their use." This intelligence had, according to the *Washington Times*, been considerably advanced by the defection to Britain in late 1990 of a Russian scientist who had "worked inside a clandestine BW program known by the cover name 'Biopreparat', ostensibly an association of non-military biological research institutes". The newspaper quotes unidentified "US intelligence sources" as saying that information obtained from the biologist "caused Western intelligence to more than double its estimate of Soviet, and later Russian, biological weapons production capabilities and the number of BW storage facilities run by the military".

The *Washington Times* report continues: "Information from the defector was so compelling that President Bush, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and current Prime Minister John Major used it to pressure former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and current Russian President Boris Yeltsin into revealing the full scope of Moscow's BW program. At one point British authorities threatened the Gorbachev government with the prospect of putting the defector

on international television as a way of getting Soviet officials to disclose the bacteriological arms program." {WT 4 Jul}

The *Washington Post* adds more detail some two months later {WP 31 Aug}. It describes the defector as a biochemist who had worked near the top of the Soviet medical research establishment. It reports the defector as having said that Moscow engaged in systematic deception on BW issues throughout the 1980s. It also reports that USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in late 1990, after receiving the high-level US and British complaints about the Soviet BW program, invited British and American experts to inspect the program as long as they did so without publicity. After negotiations to and fro, such experts were duly dispatched to spend two weeks in early 1991 at four ostensibly civilian research facilities in Russia. They came away, it is now reported, with evidence of extensive military connections to the civilian facilities and of "production capabilities clearly in excess of any legitimate work".

Similar observations, the *Post* says, were made in early 1992 by a team of scientists from Merck & Co Inc who were visiting civilian and military biological research facilities in Russia, looking for investment opportunities.

5 July In Baghdad the UNSCOM team led by Karen Jansen of the United States [see 26 Jun], which has completed its task of destroying the 60 pieces of chemical-bomb-casing machinery at Al-Muthanna as well as visiting four 'undeclared sites' designated by UNSCOM for surprise inspection {*Jordan Times* 5 Jul}, is denied access to the building that houses the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation {WT 7 Jul}. (Much later, an unidentified "senior member" of UNSCOM reportedly says that the team had not at first realized that the building housed a government ministry {NYT & WP 30 Jul}.) A Foreign Ministry official says to reporters: "The inspection of well-known buildings has got nothing to do with Iraq's commitments to Security Council Resolution 687"; permitting the inspectors to enter would insult the sovereignty of the country. The team, operating in shifts, keeps the building under observation from its cars while continuing its program of surprise inspections at other sites {Ind & IHT 6 Jul; *Jordan Times* 8 Jul}.

The UN Security Council meets next day to discuss the situation, and a statement issued by its president says that Iraq's action is a "material and unacceptable" breach of the ceasefire agreement, and demands access {NYT 7 Jul}. Iraq rejects this demand, but UNSCOM sets a deadline of 9 July for compliance and orders its inspectors to remain in place {IHT & WT 8 Jul; Ind 10 Jul}. Iraqi women arrive in four buses to throw fruit and vegetables at the inspectors; the UN sends in a special envoy {IHT 9 Jul}.

7 July In Britain, the Ministry of Defence releases its annual defence White Paper. On the subject of future security threats it says: "A number of states are seeking chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. About ten countries are assessed as having biological weapon programs. Almost twice that number have, or are aiming to acquire, chemical weapons."

In the section on the Kuwait War the White Paper says: "Despite the very different climatic conditions from western Europe, our physical preparedness to fight in a CBW environ-

ment compared very favourably with that of allies with whom close collaboration was maintained"; and it goes on to speak of the US Marine Corps having purchased substantial quantities of the British Mark IV NBC suit and S10 respirator. {*Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992*}

8 July In Moscow, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopts a resolution requiring the government to submit by 15 September "draft comprehensive programs for the phased destruction of chemical weapons [see 20 Jun] and the utilization of the specialized biotechnological potential to organize the development and production of medical preparations". The draft programs are to be developed in conjunction with two committees of the Soviet: the Committee on Industry and Power Generation, and the Committee on Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources. {RG 24 Jul in FBIS-SOV 27 Jul}

9 July In Baghdad, as the UNSCOM deadline [see 5 Jul] passes, Agriculture Minister Abdel Wahab Mahmood al-Sabagh says that Iraq, as a matter of principle, will not authorize the search of his ministry, and that the United States is using UN inspectors to wage a war against Iraqi farmers. Unidentified diplomats reportedly say that UNSCOM believes the ministry building to contain data on Iraqi ballistic missiles and details of Iraq's foreign suppliers {Ind & IHT 10 Jul; IHT 11-12 Jul}. (If true, this suggests that the team, in addition to its CBW objectives, has also been assigned targets otherwise allocated to the 12th UNSCOM ballistic missile team, due in Iraq during 9-17 July {*US Department of State Dispatch*, 20 Jul}. Later, however, an UNSCOM official confirms reports that the team had intelligence information that the building also contained records on nuclear and CBW weapons {WSJ 23 Jul}). The vigil of the inspectors outside the building continues {WP 12 Jul; NYT 14 Jul; IHT 16 Jul}.

10 July In Helsinki, the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe adopts the *Helsinki CSCE Document 1992: The Challenges of Change*. By paragraph 11 of the document, the assembled heads of state or government of the now-51 participating countries affirm or reaffirm their commitment to become original signatories of the forthcoming Chemical Weapons Convention.

10 July The US Army signs a \$449,000 contract with EAI Corporation of Abingdon, Maryland, for chemical treaty field exercise support. They sign a \$369,000 contract a fortnight later for CWC inspector training program. {*ASA Newsletter* 12 Aug}

11 July Russian President Yeltsin, having just concluded talks with Finnish President Koivisto, says at a press conference that the talks had included discussion of the dangers presented by the old chemical weapons on the floor of the Baltic [see 16 Jun]. He says: "A study of these containers by our ships has shown that they are in a fairly critical state. At least within two, three or four years, a tragedy exceeding that of Chernobyl could come. We have agreed for a special international commission to draw up a program to raise and destroy them." {ITAR-TASS 11 Jul in BBC-SWB 14 Jul}

13 July President Bush issues a statement announcing a new "non-proliferation initiative": he has "set forth a set of principles to guide our non-proliferation efforts in the years ahead, and directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts" {CDI/1158}. A factsheet on the initiative includes the following among its listed 'regional efforts': "Consideration of requests for assistance in dismantling or destroying Russian biological weapons facilities or in converting these facilities to production of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products, provided Russia is in full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention" [see 4 Jul] {Factsheet on President Bush's Nonproliferation Initiative}

16 July In Germany, in the case of a soldier claiming damage from CS, the Federal Social Court hands down a decision requiring the Bundeswehr to give explanations about possible dangers from any handling of chemical agents. {FR 17 Jul}

16 July In Brussels, the European Commission issues its long-awaited draft regulation aimed at tightening controls on dual-use exports crossing the Community's external frontier, this then allowing EC states to dispense with internal-border export controls incompatible with the Single European Market that is due to take effect from 1 January 1993. {FR 16 Jul; FT 17 Jul}

The proposed regulation, which now passes to the Council for action and which has been drafted in close liaison with national administrations, sets out a framework for an export-control regime based on reinforced licensing procedures and external-border controls. Remaining to be worked out are the rules of application. These will include the list of dual-use commodities to which the regulation is to apply, a list of countries to which less stringent export controls may be applied, and a set of assessment criteria to ensure that all member states judge export-licence applications in the same fashion {Atlantic News 21 Jul}.

16 July In Britain, the Defence Secretary informs Parliament of the annual "key performance targets" that have been set for the chief executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment. One of the targets is to "increase the overall efficiency of CBDE by more than 2.5 percent over the financial year 1992-93 with emphasis on improving output efficiency". Another target is to "improve the means of assessing the quality of the scientific and technical outputs by March 1993 and to apply this to the outputs for MoD and other key customers by March 1994". {HansC 16 Jul}

The Establishment has just completed its first year as a Defense Support Agency [see 9 Apr 91], a status that has given it a new degree of autonomy within the British defense community. For the first time in its 76-year history, it publishes for public release an annual report and set of accounts. The accounts show a net cost to the taxpayer during the 1991-92 financial year of £32.8 million.

The annual report states: "The past year has seen a redirection of the [CBDE's] program in the light of lessons learnt from the Gulf conflict of early 1991 leading to a change of emphasis in parts of the program but largely confirming its main thrusts." Among those lessons learnt, it notes: "It became very apparent to us that the acceptability of innovative applied research was wholly dependent upon having a

concept of use that was militarily acceptable and was practicable for the particular deployment of the Armed Forces."

Elsewhere the report says: "it is worth noting that CW have always been used against unprotected troops (World War I, Italy/ Abyssinia, SE Asia, Afghanistan and Iraq/Iran)".

16 July In the United States, a team of government arms-control officials has just been visiting the Animal Disease Laboratory on Plum Island off Long Island, New York, to explore BWC-verification problems in preparation for the next session of the international Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on the subject [see 10 Apr], so a local newspaper reports {Newsday 16 Jul}.

16 July President Bush transmits to the US Congress a new status report on the compliance of Iraq with UN Security Council resolutions {US Department of State Dispatch, 20 Jul}. His report records that Iraq has recently submitted what it says are both the 'full, final and complete disclosure' required under SCR 707 [see 5 Jun] and the 'compliance and monitoring report' required under SCR 715; UNSCOM is still assessing these submissions.

17 July UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekéus arrives in Baghdad seeking to break the 12-day deadlock over the attempted inspection of the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture [see 9 Jul] {FT & Ind 17 Jul}. Two days previously the US Department of State had publicly warned: "By continuing this type of violation, the Iraqi government thus is putting at risk the ceasefire that concluded Operation Desert Storm" {IHT 16 Jul}. But the Iraqi government had continued to deny access to the UN inspectors, its newspaper at one point referring to them as "stray dogs" {DTel 16 Jul; Obs 19 Jul}, and, as the UNSCOM chairman arrives, Saddam Hussein is delivering a public speech indicating that his regime will continue its obstruction {Guar 18 July}. Ambassador Ekéus leaves two days later to report to the Security Council, telling reporters that "fundamentally, there is no change". {IHT 20 Jul}

20 July In Geneva, the CD reconvenes after its three-week recess [see 26 Jun]. In the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the chairman asks that any proposal for amending his draft CWC, WP.400/Rev.1 [see 24-26 Jun], be a consensus proposal [see also 31 May] and that it be presented in written form.

22 July In Baghdad the UNSCOM team that for the past 17 days has been seeking to enter the Ministry of Agriculture [see 17 Jul] pulls back from the building in the face of increasingly violent street demonstrations against its presence {NYT 23 Jul}. In the United States, UNSCOM spokesman Nikita Smidovich says that the decision to withdraw had been taken by the team-leader (Mark Silver of the United States, since 11 July {WP 12 Jul}) who is now talking with the Iraqis about an alternative way to monitor the building {Boston Globe 23 Jul}.

Four days later, after increasingly overt American, British and French threats of renewed military action, Iraq agrees to allow a new UNSCOM team into the ministry building {DTel, FT & NYT 27 Jul; NYT 28 Jul}. The six Finnish, German, Russian, Swedish and Swiss members of the team had been

nominated by UNSCOM, five of them over Iraqi objections [WP 6 Aug]. The United States orders a third aircraft carrier to the Middle East [IHT 28 Jul].

22 July Major-General Professor Igor Yevstafeyev, deputy chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Chemical Troops, in an interview published today in a Moscow newspaper, comments on the proposal agreed during the recent visit of President Yeltsin to Helsinki, that an international commission should draw up a program for raising and destroying the CW munitions that had been dumped in the Baltic after World War II [see 11 Jul]. Professor Yevstafeyev cautions against exaggerating the current and future dangers of the dumps and over-hasty action that may result. He continues: "And it will be very expensive. If a decision is made to rid the floor of the Baltic of military chemicals, then the combination of cryogenic technology with technology for burning toxicants while, naturally, purifying the waste gases, will look very attractive. Most probably, installations would have to be set up on mobile floating platforms, since transporting munitions raised from the seabed will be highly problematic." "Those in the know", he says, reckon that the costs of a "complete clean-up" would be some \$22 billion [RG 22 Jul in FBIS-SOV 24 Jul].

22 July Cuba submits to the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons a paper on the staffing of the projected CWC international organization. Among its detailed proposals are that the Technical Secretariat should not have a permanent staff and that one of its main departments should be a "unit for the promotion of the transfer of technology and development in areas not prohibited under the Convention". [CD/WP/WP.416]

23 July The Foreign Minister of Mozambique, Pascoal Mocumbi, speaking to reporters in Maputo, says that the reports of Renamo use of chemical weapons in January [see 22 Jan] had now been confirmed in two scientific reports, one by a British team and one by UN experts [see 12 Jun], and that the government intends to investigate the source of the weapons [PANA/KNA 24 Jul in BBC-SWB 25 Jul]. The British report referred to is presumably the one which the Maputo daily newsheet *Mediafax* had quoted from two days previously. [Radio Mozambique 21 Jul in FBIS-AFR 21 Jul; Mozambique Information Office news review 23 Jul]

23 July In Geneva, at the first plenary meeting of the final CD session of the year, Mexico proposes several amendments to the draft CWC [see 20 Jul]. The US delegation, in contrast, announces its acceptance of the draft. So does the Swedish, "provided [the draft] is not changed in a manner that would further undermine the verification regime". The South Korean observer delegation, though saying that a "fully satisfactory convention cannot be a realistic aim in this world of diverse national interests", states that it can accept the present text, adding that, with its large chemical industry, it wishes to "play an active role" in the implementation of the CWC.

Sweden also raises the possibility of BWC verification becoming a future agenda item of the CD. [CD/PV.627]

23 July The United States, in its CD delegation's statement of acceptance of the current draft CWC [see 23 Jul, Geneva], says that the text "reflects a fragile and painfully achieved balance among many different positions and many different issues", and that, for that reason, "we fully endorse Ambassador von Wagner's position [see 20 Jul] that changes to the draft can only be made by consensus". The statement says, further: "While we would prefer different provisions in many areas of the text, we have decided after close study that a certain sacrifice on our part is necessary to achieve broad-based agreement, and that the remaining balance adequately protects our security interests". [CD/PV.627]

Aspects of that assessment are clarified in subsequent Administration responses-for-the-record to questions submitted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, most notably in regard to "riot control agents". These the US CD delegation had long been seeking to have defined out of the treaty altogether [see 1 May], a position not reflected in the new draft. The responses state that "the US has accepted the ban on the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare with the following understandings: domestic riot control is a permitted activity; riot control agents may be used in defensive military modes to save lives; and the use of chemicals for law enforcement activities is permitted". Regarding the second of these "understandings", the responses observe: "The CW Ad Hoc Committee Chairman recently stated to the press that this text permits the use of riot control agents to 'rescue downed pilots and to stop rioting prisoners of war'. He took these examples directly from Executive Order 11850 [which restricts US use of riot control agents during war to 'defensive military modes to save lives']. These examples are clearly not methods of warfare and therefore are not prohibited by the CWC." Further: "We understand the language *law enforcement including domestic riot control* to mean that domestic riot control is a subset of law enforcement activities. We understand other law enforcement activities to include: controlling rioting prisoners of war; rescuing hostages; counterterrorist operations; drug enforcement operations; and noncombatant evacuation." And, in regard to the new Article 3 provisions on riot control agents: "The US is concerned that declarations of all chemicals intended to be used for law enforcement would reveal sensitive information, such as how to defeat the chemical's effects or how to create the same chemicals for illegal use. The Chairman's text addresses this problem by requiring only declaration of chemicals held for riot control purposes."

23 July In Canada, Operation Swiftsure comes to an end with the inspection by a group of local citizens of the site at Canadian Forces Base Suffield, Alberta, where residual stocks of CW agents and contaminated scrap had been destroyed. Some 15 tons of mustard gas and a third of a ton of assorted nerve gases had been burnt in portable incinerators during the operation. [DN 27 Jul]

23-24 July The second summit meeting of Ibero-American heads of state and government takes place in Madrid. The *Document of Conclusions* issued from it states, in paragraph 7: "The Ibero-American summit deems it very advisable for Ibero-American countries to become charter members of the convention on chemical weapons that is being negotiated in

Geneva". {*Prensa Latina* 26 Jul in BBC-SWB 31 Jul}

24 July The Burmese Army is said to have been using chemical weapons in a recent offensive against the Kachin Independence Army in northwestern Kachin state, near the border with India, so the Bangkok *Nation* reports, quoting the chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization quoting the testimony of captured Burmese soldiers. {*The Nation* 24 Jul in FBIS-EAS 24 Jul}

24 July In the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, a group of 14 CD member states submits a joint paper proposing numerous amendments to the chairman's draft CWC [see 22 Jun]. The group comprises Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zaire. The paper reiterates or modifies many of the positions set out in the amendments to the chairman's previous draft proposed by the Group of 12 (the present group less Cuba and Ethiopia) [see 4 & 24-26 Jun] {CD/CW/WP.417}. An additional amendment is proposed three days later by the same group of states less India {CD/CW/WP.418}.

26 July In Washington, at a White House news conference, President Bush speaks both of Saddam Hussein's obstruction of UNSCOM inspections [see 22 Jul] and of his continued military operations against Shi'ite rebels in the marshlands of southern Iraq [see 1 Jun] in violation of UN Security Council resolution 688 (1991) {NYT 27 Jul}, an aspect of Iraqi affairs thus far largely ignored in the United States and other Western countries. The Iraqi government had reportedly begun a new offensive in the marshlands earlier in the month {IHT 25-26 Jul}, including deliberate pollution of the marshes with containerized sewage {FT 22 Jul} and, four days prior to President Bush's announcement, the use of fixed-wing strike aircraft in violation of the Kuwait-War ceasefire {NYT 24 Jul}. White House officials reportedly say that Iraqi government forces have been razing villages, damming waterways that feed the marshes and may have used biological and chemical toxins to poison water {FT 29 Jul}. Pressure starts to build for action by the UN Security Council {FT 30 Jul}.

27 July In the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, further amendments to the chairman's draft CWC [see 24 Jul] are proposed by Russia {CD/CW/WP.419}, Cuba {CD/CW/WP.420} and Peru {CD/CW/WP.421}.

28 July In Baghdad the UNSCOM inspection of the Ministry of Agriculture building finally begins [see 22 Jul] {NYT 29 Jul}. It ends the following day, the team then leaving the country with UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekéus who had accompanied it to Baghdad. The Chief Inspector, Achim Biermann of Germany, tells reporters: "We didn't find any 687-directly-related material". The team had, in addition, looked for evidence of materials having been removed from the building prior to the inspection {NYT & WP 30 Jul}.

28 July UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, releasing a report he had recently put before the Security Council on the mission he had sent to Azerbaijan to investigate reports of Armenian chemical warfare [see 26 Jun], says that

no evidence had been found for the use of chemical weapons. The investigating team, which comprised Jan Willems of Belgium, Johan Santesson of Sweden and Heiner Staub of Switzerland plus two UN officials, had visited Azerbaijan during 4-8 July {AP in CN 29 Jul; FAZ 30 Jul}. The team had interpreted the Azerbaijani finding of cyanide in soil and other samples from combat areas, not as traces of CW agent, but as degradation/combustion products from conventional weapons {*ASA Newsletter* 12 Aug}.

The conclusion of the team's report is as follows: "A number of events were presented to the team as being suggestive of the involvement of use of chemical weapons. However, all these events could also readily be explained by reasons other than chemical weapons; furthermore, none of the events as described to the team agreed with any pattern that would be expected from an attack involving chemical weapons. In sum, no evidence of use of chemical weapons was presented to the team" {S/24344}.

29 July Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, interviewed in Tehran for the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, says: "I categorically reject the allegation that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.... We also take a negative stand towards chemical and biological weapons" {FAZ 31 Jul in FBIS-NES 5 Aug}. Iranian UN ambassador Kamal Kharrazi is later quoted elsewhere as saying that Iran does not need nor has any program to produce chemical weapons, and that its interest in nuclear technology is non-military {IRNA 5 Aug in FBIS-NES 5 Aug}.

30 July In Tel Aviv, *Ha'aretz* reports that, on the question of whether Israel should join the CWC, the recommendation currently being formulated by experts from various government ministries is that Israel should become an original signatory but "put off resolving the political dispute surrounding the treaty to the final endorsement stage, which will last about two years" {*Ha'aretz* 30 Jul in FBIS-NES 31 Jul}.

Two weeks previously, during the visit of the German Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Dr Josef Holik [see 4 Jul], senior Israeli officials had expressed concern about several features of the draft CWC, especially the potential for abuse of the provisions for challenge inspection. Another major concern of theirs reportedly was that the provisions for representation on the Executive Council would in practice be biased against Israel {*Ha'aretz* 16 Jul in FBIS-NES 16 Jul}.

30 July In Geneva, at the weekly plenary session of the CD, the states whose delegations have stated before the full conference their acceptance of the current draft CWC [see 23 Jul] are joined by Italy, Argentina, the Netherlands, Bulgaria and Poland. Most express regret at the weakening of the verification provisions. {CD/PV.628}

Viet Nam, deploring especially the relegation of herbicides to the preamble, expresses support for the amendments proposed by the Group of 14 [see 24 Jul]. Cuba and Iran both portray those amendments as a possible route to a consensus which does not yet exist. {CD/PV.628}

30 July In Washington, the US Defense Department and the Russian President's Committee on CBW Convention

Problems sign the implementation agreement in regard to chemical weapons [see 20 Jun] provided for in the bilateral Weapons Destruction and Non-Proliferation Agreement [see 17 Jun, summit] {CD/1161}. The \$25 million in US assistance which is the subject of the agreement will go to the US firm that wins the tender for the work specified. The chairman of the President's Committee, General Kuntsevich, describes this work as assessing the possibilities for converting to detoxification a former CW-agent production plant, and also conducting expert analysis of the largest CW-agent stocks, those of mustard gas and lewisite {Izvestiya 31 Jul in FBIS-SOV 5 Aug}.

31 July In Delhi, a government spokesman issues a statement affirming Indian willingness to sign the proposed CWC but with the proviso that "access to chemical equipment and technology for purposes not prohibited by the convention should not be subject to additional restraints such as those existing in the form of ad hoc export control regimes". {ISI Diplomatic Information Service 3 Aug in FBIS-NES 4 Aug}

31 July Armenian chemical warfare is once again being reported [see 28 Jul] by the Azeri Defense Ministry, which says that poison-gas artillery shells have been fired into the town of Terter. {Interfax 31 Jul in BBC-SWB 3 Aug}

31 July The US Department of Veterans Affairs amends its adjudication regulations to make it easier for those individuals injured by mustard gas during secret World War II trials [see 11 Jun 91], or their survivors, to establish entitlement to benefits {FR 31 Jul}. Reportedly, as many as 60,000 veterans may have been exposed {Atlanta Constitution 26 Aug}.

3 August US Army Dugway Proving Ground publishes in draft, for comments within 30 days, an environmental assessment of its Baker Test Facility. This action satisfies part of the settlement agreed between the Defense Department and the Foundation on Economic Trends after the foundation had sued the department for violating environmental laws in its Biological Defense Research Program [see 19 Nov 91]. In the environmental assessment, it is stated that Baker Test Facility had been built in 1952 [see also 9 May] "as a model structure for biological warfare testing", its mission being limited in 1969 to the testing of biological defense equipment, whereafter a "low level of activity ensued until a renewed interest in the biological threat occurred in the early 1980s".

3 August In Los Angeles, California, the Simon Wiesenthal Center releases a long report, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya*, describing Iran and Syria as independent producers of chemical weapons. {FR 3 Aug; Jordan Times 5 Aug}

4 August In the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Iran distributes a detailed paper on ethanolamines which argues against their inclusion in the draft CWC control schedules {CD/CW/WP.424}, as had been proposed in the last Rolling Text and as had now happened in the Chairman's draft. Iran also distributes a paper on the definition of chemical weapons which again proposes an amendment to the

draft CWC {CD/CW/WP.425}.

5 August In the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Nassen of Iran makes a statement on behalf of the Group of 14 [see 24 Jul] complaining that "the negotiations over the past few days have not succeeded in moving the process forward to any noticeable degree" but expressing readiness to "continue negotiations in an effort to arrive at the necessary consensus".

5 August The US Air Force announces, in *Commerce Business Daily*, that it will shortly be issuing a request for proposals for development and demonstration of warhead technology to defeat an adversary's CBW weapons, a 5-7 man-year effort being envisaged. An earlier notice from the Air Force laboratory concerned had announced that it was seeking Agent Defeating Warhead Technology sources "to develop and demonstrate technology to destroy, disable or deny an adversary his chemical weapons, biological weapons, bulk agents and associated equipment located at fixed ground targets with minimal collateral casualties (minimal agent dispersal)". {AD 6 Aug; ITAF 28 Aug}

6 August In Geneva, at the weekly plenary session of the CD, further expressions [see 30 Jul] of acceptance of the current draft CWC are made by the delegations of Chile, Canada, Romania, the UK, Finland, Japan, Australia and, provisionally, Ukraine, generally with complaints about one or another aspect of the draft {CD/PV.629}. The UK statement, by Ambassador Michael Weston, observes that the draft is "very far from the sort of dish which would have been produced had it been pre-cooked, as some have suggested, by a German chef with various Western helpers in an Italian kitchen" [see 4-7 May]. The Australian statement, by Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, quotes a recent letter from Foreign Minister Gareth Evans [see 19 Mar] to his counterparts in other countries: "We all know that if we are to achieve a convention that is capable of offering to all States a more secure environment and to provide to all States a more confident environment for trade in chemicals, all of us will have to compromise on our national preferences. We believe, as do many others, that the text in WP.400/Rev.1 does that in an equitable and fair manner."

6 August The Australia Group makes a formal statement at today's plenary session of the CD. In the statement, the 22 member states "undertake to be original signatories" of the CWC and "fully to comply" with Article XI which, they say, "aims at facilitating the fullest possible exchanges in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the convention so as to promote the harmonious economic or technological development of all States parties". Further: "They undertake to review, in the light of the implementation of the convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the convention, with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States parties to the convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the convention. They intend thus to contribute actively to an increase in commercial and technological exchanges between States and to the universal and full implementation

of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons." {CD/1164}

6 August Indian CD Ambassador Prakash Shah responds at the CD to the Australia-Group statement in the following terms: "While this statement of intention is indicative of the recognition of our concerns [see 31 Jul] and goes some way towards addressing our apprehensions regarding the Australia Group, it is the belief of my delegation that the intent behind this statement should be reflected adequately in article XI of the convention, as and when the present negotiations on WP.400/Rev.1 conclude." {CD/PV.629}

7 August In Baghdad, a 22-person UNSCOM team led by Nikita Smidovich of Russia arrives {IHT 8-9 Aug} to conduct inspections at locations where, as UNSCOM chairman Rolf Ekéus had put it three days previously, "we have reason to suspect that prohibited material is stored or hidden" {FT 5 Aug}. The day before the team's arrival, the Iraqi government had announced that it would not allow UN inspectors to enter any ministry building, whereupon President Bush, on his election-campaign trail, said that the United States would help guarantee the right of the UN to enter any building it might wish to inspect {IHT 7 Aug}.

7 August In Geneva, for today's crucial meeting [see 31 May] of the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, its chairman has distributed a paper setting out amendments to his earlier draft CWC {CD/CW/WP.427}. His changes partly reflect the proposals by the Group of 14 [see 24 Jul], Russia, Cuba and Peru [see 27 Jul]. He has grouped them into six clusters: (1) herbicides and riot control agents; (2) destruction matters; (3) Executive Council - composition; (4) designation of inspectors and inspection assistants; (5) assistance and protection; and (6) economic and technological development, and transfers of scheduled chemicals.

The committee, it seems, indicates a sufficient degree of acceptance of these revisions for an unidentified US negotiator to tell a reporter "This is the end of the substantive talks; now it's a question of procedure", and for the chairman's draft to be reported in the Western press as an agreed one, albeit alongside a report that some Third World countries remained unhappy with it {IHT 8-9 Aug}. In fact, a number of delegations had expressed reservations to the amendments proposed in the Chairman's paper, including the Russian delegation, so that a complete and unambiguous consensus has not yet been achieved {CD/PV.631}.

Also distributed by the Chairman is a report from the Editing and Drafting Group [see 23 Jan] setting out agreed textual revisions.

9 August The German Foreign Ministry announces that authorities in Cyprus had recently stopped a German freighter en route to Syria, ordering it to return its cargo to India; the cargo included 25 containers of the nerve-gas precursor trimethyl phosphite, for which the German shippers had not obtained an export licence {DPA in FBIS-WEU 10 Aug; FR & IHT 10 Aug}. The private Bombay company, United Phosphorus Ltd, which had made the chemical later says it had been exported to Syria "only after due verification and there is no possibility of misuse of the material". An earlier consign-

ment of 45 tons, the first half of the order, had reached Damascus on 30 May {AP in CN 17 Aug; JP 22 Aug}.

10 August In Suva, the South Pacific Forum secretariat releases a report on the US chemdemil facility on Johnston Atoll [see 31 Mar] that had been prepared by a Forum scientific mission which had visited the place during November last. The team comprised two scientists from Australia and one each from New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. The report says that there is no significant regional environmental threat from JACADS, but sea air might have some effect on the facility later. Operations at JACADS are scheduled to finish in 1995, at which time, the report observes, the installation would represent a "functioning proven destruction facility". The report says: "There will be a degree of pressure, founded on some logic, to continue the use of Johnston Island facility to carry out a further chemical weapons destruction programs". It sees no technical reasons why work should not continue beyond 1995, but recommends a further Forum inspection before that happens. {AFP 10 Aug in FBIS-EAS 10 Aug}

10 August In Geneva, addressing a press conference, the Chairman of the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons says that the CW negotiations have now ended and that, in regard to the new treaty text, "we are quite confident we will have universal adherence, minus a very few". {Reuter in CN 12 Aug}

12 August From Beijing, the Japanese news agency Kyodo reports an historical study, *Chemical War History*, published in June 1991 by the Engineering Academy of the Chinese Army Chemical Defence Command. The 581-page study had addressed the use of chemical weapons from World War I to the 1980s Gulf War, more than half of the study being concerned with the 1937-45 Sino-Japanese War. Using new archive and other information, it had documented at least 1668 occasions on which forces of the Imperial Japanese Army had used chemical weapons in China, causing more than 47,000 casualties with 6000 dead. {Kyodo 12 Aug in FBIS-CHI 13 Aug}

13 August President Bush announces strong US support for the draft CWC and reaffirms US commitment to becoming an "original party". {US ACDA fact sheet, "Chemical weapons negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament"}

13-16 August In Beijing, government officials meet with visiting US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency Director Ronald Lehman for talks on a range of arms-control topics including chemical weapons. The officials, including Foreign Minister Qian Quichen, reportedly complain that the projected CWC inspection regime would place an undue burden on Chinese chemical industry as the country struggles to modernize. {DN 24 Aug}

13 August Austria introduces into the CD plenary two technical studies on the question of 'capable' facilities. {CD/PV .631}

13 August The United Kingdom transmits to the CD a paper

addressing the requirements for safety during on-site inspections under the CWC, a topic believed relevant to the future work of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CD/1168). The paper appears to have been adapted from guidance written for UNSCOM inspectors in Iraq.

17 August The US Defense Department is evaluating possible contributions it might make to counterproliferation efforts, whether in the nuclear, missile or CBW fields, according to a senior Pentagon official in an interview which *Defense Week* publishes today. The official, James Locher, Assistant Defense Secretary for special operations and low intensity conflict, had said: "There may be some options that special operations forces can provide to the national, command authority as they look at various strategies." He had had in mind "direct action or special reconnaissance kinds of activities". {DW 17 Aug}

18 August In Iraq, the UNSCOM team led by Nikita Smidovich of Russia [see 7 Aug] completes its inspection without incident. An UNSCOM official in New York says the team, which had visited several sites, had "found significant additional information concerning the ballistic missiles program" {IHT 18 Aug}. The team leader speaks of having been given some information about Iraq's chemical, nuclear and biological weapons manufacturing {WP 19 Aug}.

19 August In New Delhi, three days of ministerial-level talks between India and Pakistan come to an end. The foreign secretaries of the two countries sign two agreements, one of them a *Joint Declaration on Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons* [see 28 Nov 91] {All-India Radio 19 Aug in BBC-SWB 20 Aug; IHT 20 Aug}. The two sides had also agreed to consider issuing a joint declaration on biological weapons {Press Trust of India 19 Aug in BBC-SWB 20 Jul}.

The CD in Geneva is informed next day about the bilateral CW agreement. Under it, both India and Pakistan had "reiterated their resolve to become original States Parties to the proposed convention." They also had reaffirmed "their respective unilateral declaration on non-possession of chemical weapons". {CD/PV.633}

19 August In Geneva, the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons meets to consider an early draft of its report to the CD, principally the question of how it should present the revised version of its chairman's draft CWC {CD/CW/WP .400/Rev.2}, now available as clean text, albeit only in English. Ambassador von Wagner urges that his draft CWC be looked at as a whole in order for its overall balance of rights and obligations, of benefits and costs, to be properly evaluated {CD/1170}.

19 August Iraq did not produce a practical delivery system for biological weapons, says former UNSCOM chief inspector Major Karen Jansen [see 5 Jul] of the US Army Chemical Corps at a news briefing convened in Washington under non-governmental auspices. The Iraqi BW program did not appear to have come close to weaponizing pathogens. {WT 20 Aug, DW 24 Aug} [See also 17 Nov 91]

21 August In Geneva, the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons continues its consideration of the new draft CWC in the context of its report to the Conference [see 19 Aug]. Several delegations present critical comments, both on the draft and on the process by which it was reached, some insisting that their comments appear in the report.

21 August The Defense Department has now initiated the formal process whereby a US contractor will be selected for the \$25 million aid package that the United States has thus far agreed for Russian chemdemil [see 30 Jul]: *Commerce Business Daily* today publishes a request for proposals from interested US companies. {DN 31 Aug}

A target of October for selecting the contractor had been mentioned during an interview three weeks previously in Washington by the head of the Russian program, General Kuntsevich, who is required to submit his overall chemdemil plan to the Russian Supreme Soviet by 15 September [see 8 Jul]. He had said, too, that under his plan three chemdemil facilities will be built near CW production and storage sites in central Russia {DN 10 Aug}. He is deliberately withholding the names of the locations under consideration for fear of exciting local opposition before the compensation packages [see 12 Jun] are more fully developed {ITP 6 Aug}.

Several US companies are reportedly interested. One consortium is said to involve the Battelle Memorial Institute, Bechtel and Westinghouse Electric. Another includes Lockheed, Babcock & Wilcox, Olin and Burns & Roe [see also 30 Jan]. But there is scepticism, for economic rather than technical reasons, about the Russian concept of recycling the CW agents into worthwhile products [see 12 Jun]. {WSJ 2 Sep}

23 August From Abkhazia, there are reports that the Georgian National Guard is using chemical weapons in fighting around Sukhumi {ITAR-TASS 23 Aug in BBC-SWB 24 Aug}. The commandant of Sukhumi denies the reports, characterizing them as disinformation by the press service of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet {ITAR-TASS 23 Aug in BBC-SWB 25 Aug}.

24 August In the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the Russian delegation states that the draft CWC contains two features "unacceptable in principle, which makes it impossible for the Government of the Russian Federation to agree to the text of the draft". One has to do with the apportionment of destruction-verification costs; the other, with the question of converting rather than destroying former chemical weapons production facilities. {CD/1170}

24 August Norway transmits to the CD a technical paper on the air-transportation of CWC verification samples, another contribution from its long-running research effort in this area [see 11 Jun]. {CD/1169}

25 August In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian aircraft are said by Croatian Radio to have discharged poisonous gases over Mount Igman near Sarajevo {Croatian Radio 25 Aug in BBC-SWB 27 Aug}. There have been several such reports from the region in recent weeks, none of them independently verified.

26 August In Jerusalem, Israeli government officials announce that all gas masks distributed during the Kuwait War are to be replaced in a \$200 million operation beginning in October. {DTel 27 Aug}

26 August In Geneva, the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons formally adopts its report to the full conference, to which is appended its negotiated text for the projected CWC, now no longer merely a Chairman's draft. {FT 28 Aug; DN 31 Aug}

A new draft of the report had been submitted by the Chairman two days previously and had contained several statements by delegations critical of the text [see 21 Aug] or entering "national understandings" {CD/CW/WP.436}. Prior to adoption of the draft report, several more national statements had been inserted, including a statement by the UK that it "did not accept that such statements had any authoritative status at the level of interpretation or otherwise" (a position the report says is shared by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Hungary, Nigeria, Peru, Sweden and Venezuela). Also inserted was a long statement by the delegation of France that laid stress on the benefits of the treaty, a statement with which some 20 other delegations asked for their concurrence to be recorded. Inserted, too, were some paragraphs by the Chairman setting out his understanding of certain contentious provisions. {CD/1170}

With adoption of the report, the Ad Hoc Committee concludes its formal business. An informal meeting is scheduled for 2 September for an exchange of views on the projected CWC Preparatory Committee. {CD/PV.634}

31 August The US government wants Russia to "take concrete steps to demonstrate that the former Soviet offensive BW program has been terminated" says State Department spokesman Richard Boucher. He continues: "Russian acknowledgement of the full size, scope and maturity of the former Soviet Union's program in its declaration to the UN [due in April last, under the expanded BWC confidence building measures] would contribute to this objective." {NYT 1 Sep}

Spokesman Boucher is reacting to a long article in today's *Washington Post* about how and why the US and British governments are worried that the Russian government may not have fulfilled its promise earlier in the year [see 1 Feb] to shut down any illicit Soviet BW programs that may have survived. These worries, says the *Post*, have been stimulated by Russia's failure thus far to make that declaration to the UN [see 17 Jun, Yeltsin], a failure which has excited suspicion that the "highly secret former Soviet program is not yet fully under Yeltsin's control and that elements of it have been hidden by military officials who want to keep parts of the program intact". The *Post* reports that Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger had, during the previous week, complained about Moscow's foot-dragging when he met with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in London. A third draft for the Russian declaration to the UN had been seen in late July by British and US officials; their principal criticism of the earlier versions was that they did not give, as the *Post* puts it, "an adequate account of the Soviet Union's long-standing use of an ostensibly civilian pharmaceutical and medical complex known as Biopreparat as a cover for illicit

military work". The *Post* article includes, without attribution, new information about Biopreparat and the defector from whom it is said to have originated [see 4 Jul]. {WP 31 Aug}

The British Embassy in Washington confirms the concern of the British government at Russia's failure to make the declaration to the UN. {DTel & TL 1 Sep}

The Russian Defense Ministry Directorate for Bacteriological, Radiation and Chemical Defense, as reported by *Izvestiya* today, denies that there is still an active germ-weapons program: "All this is absolute lies". {NYT 1 Sep}

31 August The United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs has by now received declarations of information and data from 33 of the 120-plus States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in accordance with the extended confidence-building measures agreed at the Third Review Conference [see 27 Sep 91]. The declaring countries (and the dates of declaration) are as follows: Argentina (27 Aug), Australia (15 Apr), Austria (14 Apr), Belarus (14 May), Belgium (8 Jul), Bulgaria (26 May), Canada (14 Apr), China (1 Aug), Cyprus (28 Apr), Czechoslovakia (7 Apr), Denmark (30 Jun), Finland (1 Jun), France (15 Jun), Germany (8 Apr), Hungary (30 Apr), Japan (28 Apr), Jordan (14 Aug), Malta (30 Apr), Mongolia (15 Apr), Netherlands (22 May), New Zealand (15 Apr), Norway (21 Apr), Russia (3 Jul), South Korea (1 May), Tunisia (7 May), Ukraine (15 Jun), United Kingdom (14 Apr), United States (15 Apr), and Yugoslavia (8 Apr).

The CBM-F declarations by Canada, France, Russia, the UK and the USA included information on past offensive BW programs.

1-6 September In Jakarta, Indonesia, the Non-Aligned Countries hold their tenth summit conference. The Final Document states that the assembled heads of state and government; "welcomed the Global Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and called for its speedy entry into force as a meaningful step forward towards the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in all regions and towards the shared objective of general and complete disarmament. They called upon all developed countries to adopt measures promoting universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention, through transfer of technology, materials and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and removing all existing unilateral discriminatory and ad hoc restrictions which ran counter to this undertaking." {CD/NAC10/Doc.1/Rev.1}

3 September In Geneva, during a meeting which lasts into the night, the Conference on Disarmament finally achieves consensus on including in its end-of-session report to the UN General Assembly the text for the projected CWC which had been adopted by its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons [see 26 Aug]. Iran, expressing concern about the provisions of the text for the Executive Council, had been the last to join the consensus {FT, IHT & WP 4 Sep}. France confirms its invitation to host a signature conference in Paris "at the beginning of 1993" {CD/CW/WP.436}.

Original Signatories?

The following 73 countries appear, from the documentation cited, to have expressed their intention of becoming original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention:

Albania	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Algeria	CD/PV.621, 21 May 92
Argentina	Mendoza Commitment, 5 Sep 91
Armenia	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Australia	Australia Group statement, CD/PV.629, 6 Aug 92
Austria	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Azerbaijan	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Belarus	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Belgium	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Bolivia	Cartagena Declaration, 4 Dec 91
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Brazil	Mendoza Commitment, 5 Sep 91
Bulgaria	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Canada	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Chile	Mendoza Commitment, 5 Sep 91
Colombia	Cartagena Declaration, 4 Dec 91
Croatia	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Cyprus	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Czechoslovakia	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Denmark	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Ecuador	Cartagena Declaration, 4 Dec 91
Estonia	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Finland	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
France	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Georgia	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Germany	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Greece	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Holy See	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Hungary	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Iceland	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
India	Joint India/Pakistan declaration, New Delhi, 19 Aug 92
Ireland	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Italy	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Japan	Australia Group statement, CD/PV.629, 6 Aug 92
Kazakhstan	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Kenya	CD/PV.499, 30 Mar 89
Korea, South	CD/PV.619, 26 Mar 92
Kyrgyzstan	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Latvia	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Liechtenstein	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Lithuania	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Luxembourg	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Malta	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Moldova	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Monaco	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Mongolia	CD/PV.623, 4 Jun 92

Morocco	CD/PV.625, 18 Jun 92
Netherlands	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
New Zealand	Australia Group statement 1992, CD/PV.629, 6 Aug 92
Nigeria	CD/PV.635, 3 Sep 92
Norway	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Pakistan	Joint India/Pakistan declaration, New Delhi, 19 Aug 92
Paraguay	Accession to the Mendoza Commitment of 5 Sep 91
Peru	Cartagena Declaration, 4 Dec 91
Poland	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Portugal	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Romania	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Russian Federation	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
San Marino	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Slovenia	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Spain	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Sweden	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Switzerland	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Tajikistan	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Turkey	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Turkmenistan	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Ukraine	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
United Kingdom	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
United States	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Uruguay	Accession to the Mendoza Commitment of 5 Sep 91
Uzbekistan	Helsinki CSCE Document 1992, 10 Jul 92
Venezuela	Cartagena Declaration, 4 Dec 91
Yugoslavia	CD/PV.567, 24 Jul 90

Forthcoming Events

- On 6 October in Washington, DC, the Center for Strategic and International Studies will hold a half-day long discussion on "Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention."
- In New York at the United Nations, the First Committee will take up the CWC sometime between 12 October and 14 November.

- In Moline, Illinois, on 26-29 October, the Army Armament, Munitions & Chemical Command will hold a planning briefing for industry on "Opportunities During Downsizing," which will include sessions on defenses against biological and chemical weapons.
- In Geneva from 23 November to 4 December, the Ad Hoc

Group of Governmental Experts of States Parties to the BWC will hold its second meeting to explore possible verification measures for the BWC.

- The French government is expected to host an international ministerial-level conference in Paris during January 1993 for signature of the CWC.

(continued from p. 1)

were skeptical that the Australian model was a purely national paper, believing it to have been much influenced by Washington. In any event, it is clear that the Australian paper, supported by most of the Western countries, later formed the backbone of what turned out to be the final draft of the Convention.

Ambassador von Wagner duly produced a chairman's text with none of the footnotes and bracketed language that reflected national positions in the existing negotiated text, CD/1116. In preparing this nearly complete draft convention, contained in CD/CW/WP.400 dated 18 May, he used the Australian text, those parts of CD/1116 that had earlier commanded a consensus, the "vision" papers produced by the chairman of the working group and the friends of the chair as a middle ground between divergent positions, and his own rulings and decisions.

Ambassador von Wagner conceived of WP.400 as having two parts: the controversial and the so-called non-controversial, taking the latter from CD/1116, with certain changes. These changes he based upon four considerations: (i) to put the text into a more legal form; (ii) to provide for more consistency; (iii) to eliminate some redundancies; and (iv) to clarify certain phrases in CD/1116. He emphasized that he did not wish to open negotiations on the "non-controversial" part, adding that "if in this part, there are provisions not in line with your position and if they are of high priority and of vital national significance, address them bilaterally to me". There were some delegations from developing countries who did not agree with the chairman in this regard. They asked: what happens if changes of non-controversial parts are considered by some delegations to be outside the four parameters set by the chairman; what is the dividing line between non-controversial and controversial; who will decide whether changes are within this framework or without; and if questions about the changes are approached bilaterally, how will they be reflected in the text?

Although significant changes had been made in "non-controversial" parts, and some delegations referred to them, no serious measure was taken to address them. Debate on them was overwhelmed by discussion of the so-called controversial parts. In a meeting following the introduction of WP.400, the United States termed the text "a very important contribution to generate consensus". In contrast, the reaction of China was "WP.400 is not balanced and needs further revisions. This is not the result of common endeavour. There are unfamiliar concepts. Our concerns are reflected in CD/1116 but in WP.400 there are very few reflections".

Following the introduction of WP.400, a group of developing countries held private consultations to work out a common strategy for putting their views and positions across to the Ad Hoc Committee. Making a major concession by accepting WP.400 as a basis, 12 members of the CD (Algeria, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya,

Mexico, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Zaire) on 4 June 1992 presented a series of joint working papers (CD/CW.WP.402, 406-409 and CD/CW.WP.403-405 without Indonesia), putting forth proposed amendments to WP-400.

On 9 June, pursuant to the formal introduction of these papers, Ambassador von Wagner called for an emergency meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee. While welcoming the 12-nation initiative, he called for intensified negotiations "to fulfil the commitment to put forward a draft by the second round", scheduled to end on 26 June. He underlined that "the task is facilitated, the compromise line is detected by the fact that now all positions are on the table". The chairman called for the abandonment of all working group meetings and the setting up instead of sub-groups on key issues. Each sub-group would have two advocates representing differing views and a moderator. After approval of this procedure by the Ad Hoc Committee, the sub-groups began to meet on 10 June. In most of the sub-groups, one advocate was from the 12-nation group and the other was from the Western group, with other members of the CD also able to take part.

From the beginning of the new form of negotiations, it was clear that in certain areas the West was not prepared to move and that only minor changes could be expected. Regarding challenge inspection (Article IX), for example, the West prevented any substantial progress, saying that the present position already represented a Franco-American compromise. The tactic was to introduce new ideas - such as active and passive quotas for challenge inspection or "tickets" for taking turns in making challenges - in order to consume the time devoted to discussion of this subject. Ambassador Michael Weston of the United Kingdom, as the moderator of this sub-group, reported back to the Ad Hoc Committee on 18 June that "on major issues substantial differences remain", citing the following key issues: (i) the role of the Executive Council before and after a challenge inspection; (ii) the amount of time to be allowed for various phases in the execution of an inspection; (iii) aerial access; (iv) the role of the observer; and (v) active or passive quotas.

Some progress was registered, however, on Article I (acceptance of the proposal to prohibit military preparations to use chemical weapons), Article II (regarding the 12-nation proposal defining the key component of binary or multicomponent chemical weapons and on verification of chemical industry).

On June 22, four days before the end of the second CD session, chairman von Wagner introduced his new draft convention, WP.400/Rev.1. Commending the text as non-discriminatory, he stated that in those areas in which consensus had not been achieved, he had developed solutions by applying two principles: overall balance of divergent positions and adaptability of the Convention to future needs. He then asked delegations to forward the text to their capitals for appropriate decision.

On June 26, the last working day of the Ad Hoc Committee before the three-week recess of the CD, the 12-nation group presented CD/CW/WP.415, giving preliminary comments on WP.400/Rev.1 and expressing the view that many of the suggestions made by them, and to which they attach high importance, had not been reflected in the chairman's draft. After referring to some of these issues, the paper concluded "the Group of Developing Countries will be ready to make its further contribution at the third part of the 1992 session of the Conference on Disarmament in order to advance and conclude the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention".

During the recess, there was vigorous diplomatic activity aimed at securing acceptance of the draft convention. The German Foreign Minister wrote to his CD counterparts arguing that the draft was the best possible compromise. German emissaries travelled to various capitals. Other Western countries, particularly the US, Australia and the Netherlands, were similarly active. Articles in the press, sometimes naming names, put pressure on negotiators with legitimate concerns to give up their positions. As a result, the Ad Hoc Committee resumed its session on 20 July in a changed atmosphere. The tone of the statements of the chairman had also changed. While there had been no consensus on certain parts of WP.400/Rev.1, Ambassador von Wagner said that if any delegation wished to change any part of the text, it should get the consensus of others. But from the first meeting it was clear that there were delegations instructed not to accept any change. Negotiations had already come to an end. Other delegations argued that some work was still needed. China said 400/Rev.1 was not yet a consensus. India and Indonesia referred to the need for further work on Article XI on technological development. On July 24, the 12-nation group plus Cuba and Ethiopia introduced a series of proposed amendments (CD/CW/WP.417), but this time no subsidiary group was charged with dealing with their proposals. Instead, the proposals were discussed at the Ad Hoc Committee itself. The next day, the chairman reiterated his previous statement that delegations should try to get consensus for their proposals. Now the onus was on the delegations to get consensus to replace a text that did not enjoy a consensus. A member had only to say "totally unacceptable to me" in order to end discussion of a proposed amendment.

At the meeting of 27 July, a group of 13 developing nations presented CD/CW/WP.418, proposing that the definition of munitions, devices and equipment prohibited under Article II be further developed by the Preparatory Commission. The reason was that although there is a clear definition of what is prohibited as regards toxic chemicals and their precursors, there is no comparably clear definition of the munitions, devices and equipment that are also to be regarded as chemical weapons. The Russian Federation in CD/CW/WP.419 of the same day strongly objected to the provisions of Articles IV and V regarding the cost of verifying the destruction of CW production facilities, arguing that the cost should be shared

among all States Parties. At the Ad Hoc Committee meeting of 3 August, additional proposals of WP.417 were discussed but rejected by the opposition of one or another delegation.

On behalf of the 14 sponsors of WP.417, Ambassador Siros Nasser of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 5 August made a statement noting that the negotiations over the preceding few days had not succeeded in moving the process forward to any noticeable degree but that the group was ready to continue negotiations in an effort to arrive at the necessary consensus.

The week starting 3 August was devoted to meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, to the chairman's open-ended consultations on proposed amendments and to open-ended consultations of the Editing and Drafting Group chaired by Ambassador Serguei Batsanov of the Russian Federation.

At the Ad Hoc Committee meeting of 7 August, Ambassador von Wagner presented a series of amendments he had prepared for inclusion in his final draft, saying that this would be the last substantive meeting on the text that he would chair. Although practically no compromise proposals were accepted by the Ad Hoc Committee and according to the chairman's ruling could not be accommodated in the text, he put together what in his view would constitute an acceptable compromise, to be included in the new text.

On 19 August, the Ad Hoc Committee met to consider the chairman's final draft, WP.400/Rev.2, dated 10 August. Chairman von Wagner emphasized that the draft convention had to be looked upon as a whole and that only by doing so could the over-all balance of rights and obligations, of benefits and costs be evaluated and appreciated. He concluded by saying "we have to be proud of the results. Be proud of it. Protect it. Promote it. Convince others. It is the result of endeavors for many years. It was worth the effort."

Following this relatively short meeting, the Ad Hoc Committee met on 21 August to consider its report to the Conference on Disarmament. A number of delegations expressed their strong reservations and concerns regarding the draft text of the Convention but in the end nobody blocked the consensus for reporting it to the CD. The delegation of Mexico expressed the view that the real negotiations had been broken off with the introduction of 400/Rev.1, after which the Committee had begun to mark time in order to fit in with an artificially fixed deadline. One of the main reservations voiced by a number of delegations, including China, Egypt, Iran and Pakistan, concerned the lack of clarity in the definition of munitions, devices and equipment that are to be regarded as chemical weapons. Regret was expressed that the 13-nation proposal to remedy this deficiency by mandating the Preparatory Commission to further develop the definition had been rejected. It was pointed out that the definition would

have an important bearing on what States Parties have to declare in regard to the eventual destruction of chemical weapons and that the existing definition contains ambiguities that could provide a potential abuser the opportunity to use the verification procedure to the detriment of another State Party. Iran again emphasized that while prohibited toxic chemicals and their chemical precursors were clearly defined, the munitions, submunitions, devices and equipment to be regarded as chemical weapons lacked such elaboration.

Wide concern was also voiced regarding the provisions of Article XI on economic and technological development among States Parties. Pakistan expressed the view that the language of Article XI does not address the essential concern of developing countries that existing discriminatory export control mechanisms, such as the Australia Group, should be dismantled once the Convention comes into force. Egypt maintained that the developing countries have the legitimate right to obtain assurances that the implementation of the Convention shall not hamper their economic and technological development. China stressed that WP.400/Rev.2 did not expressly address the strong demand of the developing countries for removal of discriminatory restrictions on chemical trade and exchanges between States Parties. Referring to the lack of adequate provisions in this regard, Iran said that States Parties would have to rely on the faithful implementation of Article XI by chemically developed countries and on their commitment to remove restrictions.

The delegations of China, Pakistan, and Iran expressed concern over unnecessarily widening the scope of verification of the chemical industry to cover those segments of the industry posing little or no risk to the objectives of the Convention. China emphasized that such widening would create difficulties for the chemical industry of the developing countries and adversely affect the effective verification of the chemical facilities truly relevant to the Convention. Several members of the group of developing countries that had earlier put forth proposed amendments reiterated their concerns regarding the lack of automaticity in the provision of assistance and protection to States Parties attacked with, or threatened by, chemical weapons; the existence of certain privileged seats for some States Parties in the Executive Council; the possibility of abuse in challenge inspection; the lack of a clear limitation of the use of riot control agents to domestic use only; and the non-inclusion in Article I of a prohibition of use of herbicides as a method of warfare.

The Russian Federation at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of 24 August stated that while willing to overlook certain drawbacks of the draft convention, Russia required as a matter of economic necessity that the cost of verification of destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities should be shared by all States Parties, as on the basis of the UN scale of assessment, and that the definition of equipment to be destroyed be revised so as to allow conversion of certain facilities as an alternative

to destruction.

The last formal meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons took place on 26 August. Chairman von Wagner proposed that the Committee send its report to the Conference on Disarmament with a recommendation that the UN General Assembly approve the draft text of the Convention. While supported by the West and members of the Eastern European group, this was not acceptable to some delegations. As a compromise, the Ad Hoc Committee agreed simply to transmit its report, including the draft text, to the CD. With this, the Committee ended its more than two decades of discussions to draft a treaty banning chemical weapons.

On 3 September the Conference on Disarmament met for its last day of work in 1992. The session was devoted to adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the reports of its other subsidiary bodies, to be transmitted to the UN General Assembly. The morning was devoted to statements by individual delegations expressing satisfaction and certain reservations regarding the draft text of the Convention. The crucial period started at 7:00 in the evening. Paragraph 74 of the draft report of the CD had expressed the hope that the draft text of the Convention be commended by the General Assembly and opened for signature at an early date. This formulation was contested by some delegations including Egypt and Pakistan, arguing that the report should simply be transmitted to the UNGA for its consideration. In order to achieve consensus, it was agreed that the report would simply be transmitted to the General Assembly.

Before final adoption of the report, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran said his country could not accept the provisions of the draft CWC regarding the composition of the Executive Council because of unbalanced and discriminate allocation of seats. He asked for a suspension of the meeting to accommodate consultations among the Asian members of the CD. When the meeting was resumed, Ambassador Yoshimoto Tanaka of Japan, speaking on behalf of the Asian group, put forward a formula for arriving at a generally acceptable solution, based on sub-regional groups. In response, the representative of Iran acknowledged with thanks the efforts of Japan and, with the understanding that these efforts will continue until a definite result is achieved, agreed to the transmission of the report.

With this, at 9:00 p.m., it was agreed by consensus to transmit the CD report, CD/1170, containing the draft Chemical Weapons Convention, to the United Nations in New York. It is a fact that after the Rome meeting and particularly following the introduction WP.400 there were no genuine negotiations as such. Nevertheless, an impartial analysis might ask if there was any other way in which negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention could have been concluded. ■

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