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THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, THE SENATE AND THE CHEMICAL TREATY

John D. Isaacs

Legislative Director, Council for a Livable World

The Bush Administration has given strong signals that it intends to make the on-going Geneva negotiations to ban all chemical weapons one of its major foreign policy priorities. Clearly, this greatly increases the likelihood of an early conclusion to the Geneva talks on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In 1987, the treaty was moved a long way closer to reality by Soviet acceptance of the intrusive verification measures proposed in the US draft treaty presented in Geneva in 1984. In its last year, however, the Reagan Administration appeared to put the chemical negotiations on hold. In part, this was due to the Administration's focus on the INF Treaty ratification debate and the START negotiations, and also because it began concentrating on the approaching elections. In addition, some individuals within the Reagan Administration, who had fought a rearguard action against the INF treaty, began to attack as inadequate even the stringent verification provisions of the US draft chemical treaty.

President Bush can regenerate enthusiasm for the negotiations. As President Reagan demonstrated with the Strategic Defense Initiative and the INF Treaty, a chief executive's special concerns and interests can force a plodding or divided bureaucracy into action. George Bush is no stranger to chemical weapons issues. He voted three times as President of the Senate to break ties in favor of nerve gas weapons production. It was Bush who presented the US draft chemical treaty in Geneva in 1984. Ever since that time, within the government, he has made the Chemical Weapons Convention one of his special concerns. During the presidential campaign, he repeatedly stated his objective to ban chemical weapons, emphasizing the issue in his nomination acceptance address and in both of his debates with Michael Dukakis. Then, in his major foreign policy address in Toledo on October 21, Bush said:

I want to be known as the President who, working with our allies, the Soviets and others, led to the elimination of chemical warfare and chemical weapons We must develop the means for intrusive verification. [continued]

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On-site inspection on demand of suspicious facilities or plants must also be a part of this verification regime. This will be an enormously difficult task. But the alternative is far worse to contemplate I will, therefore, put a senior official in charge of overseeing our policies on missile and chemical weapon proliferation And if I'm elected President, if I'm remembered for anything, it would be this: a complete and total ban on chemical weapons. Their destruction forever. That's my solemn mission.

After the election, President-elect Bush reaffirmed his policy saying, "I really think world opinion is on the side of banishing chemical and biological weapons. [Otherwise] you face the concept of the 'poor man's atomic bomb,' where military considerations override these moral considerations in some cases. So what we have to do is keep emphasizing in whatever form possible the absolute essentiality of getting rid of these things ..." (*Newsweek*, 16 January).

With such strong public commitment from the White House, the new Administration is expected to give high priority to completing the negotiations in Geneva so as to submit the Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent within one to two years. At this early stage, there are only rather general indicators of Senate thinking on the chemical treaty. But if the treaty is properly prepared and presented, there are solid reasons for expecting it to gain broad approval.

First of all, the strong support of a Republican President, well versed in security matters, is obviously of the highest importance.

Second, the Senate was never enthusiastic about producing new chemical weapons, splitting evenly on Ronald Reagan's requests for money for binary production. Even then, the White House had to lobby hard for weapons production as a bargaining chip for securing a chemical treaty in Geneva.

Third, the chemical industry supports the projected treaty. In October 1987 the [continued]

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Co-editors: *Matthew Meselson*
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts *Julian Perry Robinson*
University of Sussex
Brighton, UK

Producers: *Gordon Burck*
FAS Staff Associate for
Chemical and Biological Warfare *Lora Lumpe*
FAS Research Assistant for
Chemical and Biological Warfare

**Chemical Weapons Convention
Bulletin Advisory Committee:** *Ambassador Jonathan Dean*
Ambassador Charles Flowerree
Ambassador James Leonard

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Board of Directors of the American Chemical Manufacturers Association endorsed the ban on chemical weapons. The ban has had the continued support of industry representatives since then.

Finally, an influential nucleus of supporters of the treaty has begun to take shape in the Senate. Years before the 1988 elections, Senator William Cohen (R-ME), together with Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), gathered 41 co-sponsors on both sides of the aisle for a resolution endorsing the Geneva negotiations. The resolution was turned into a Senate amendment adopted by voice vote in 1985 which supported the talks and urged the United States and the Soviet Union to resume bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban. Senator Cohen has also worked to fund a program to test and improve methods for verifying a chemical weapons ban.

Last year, the Senate voted 91-0 for a resolution introduced by the new Senate Majority Leader, George Mitchell (D-ME), condemning Iraqi use of chemical weapons and endorsing the Geneva negotiations. Later in the year, a number of key Senators took up the issue of chemical weapons proliferation and potential sanctions against nerve gas users and suppliers, including Senators Robert Dole (R-KS), John McCain (R-AZ), Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), and Cohen. While legislation to slap sanctions on Iraq died in the waning days of Congress last year, it is being revisited this year, as Senator Pell has again introduced legislation aimed at users of chemical weapons, and Senator Dole and Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) have offered separate legislation concerning sanctions against suppliers of chemical weapons capability.

Many Senators' support may well depend on the precise verification procedures written into the treaty and the specific safeguards that the Bush Administration presents along with the accord. Such safeguards could include the mandated continuation of the US Army Chemical Corps, a robust chemical defense program, and enhanced intelligence priority. If the Soviets really mean business, and if the Bush Administration makes its best effort, the prospects for Senate approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention are good.

CALENDAR OF RELEVANT EVENTS

* CD session in Geneva begins on 7 February

* Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearings on CW, 9-10 February [open]

* Symposium on "Agents of Biological Origin," sponsored by US Army Chemical Research & Engineering Center and supported by the American Defense Preparedness Association, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University, Laurel, Maryland, 21-23 March. For more information, contact Bruce Holt at (703) 522-1820. [Note: Introductory session will be classified; sessions 1-5 will be open.]

* The Working Group on International Surveillance and Verification is sponsoring "Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons - A Public Forum" at Ryerson Polytechnical Institute, Toronto, 4 April, contact Peter Brogden at (416) 979-5000. They are also sponsoring "Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons - Experts Workshop" at the University of Toronto, 5 April, contact Walter Dorn (416) 978-6568.

* Chemical industry conference on CWC verification and CW proliferation. Sponsored by the Chemical Manufacturers Association, in late April or early May. For more information, contact Kyle Olson, CMA, 2501 M Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037. [Note: conference participation will most likely be limited to those in the chemical industry.]

* Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, workshop on "Implications of Chemical Weapons Proliferation for Australia and the Region: Future Problems and Possible Arms Control solutions," mid-1989

* "Coming to Terms with the New Genetics: The Medical and Moral Implications of Recent Advances in Recombinant DNA Research," sponsored by Oxford University, and the American and British Associations for the Advancement of Science, Oxford University, 8-15 July. For more information, contact Carol L. Rogers at (202) 326-6440 in the US or Dr. John Durant, Oxford University, Department for External Studies, Rewley House, 1 Wellington Square, Oxford, England OX1 2JA.

From the Flight of the Iraqi Kurds to the Declaration of Paris

What follows is taken from the Sussex-Harvard rolling CBW chronology. The intervals covered in successive Bulletins have a one-month overlap in order to accommodate late-received information. The basic chronology, which is continuously updated, provides full citations of sources. For access to it, apply to Julian Perry Robinson at SPRU, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9RF, England.

28 August - 3 September 1988 Tens of thousands of Kurds, including hardened resistance fighters, are suddenly fleeing from northern Iraq {TZ 1 Sep, LAT 2 Sep, STel 4 Sep, TZ 6 Sep}. The Iraqi Kurdistan Front reports that chemical weapons are being used on a massive scale against villagers there; it estimates that 500 civilians have been killed and 3000 injured in the latest attacks, with tens of those injured by the poison gases dying daily due to lack of medical treatment {CARDRI press release 29 Aug}. Kurdish radio states that 5000 Iraqi Kurds have died from chemical bomb drops over the past four weeks {Ind 2 Sep}. Amnesty International, recounting similar reports, states its belief "that these killings are part of a systematic and deliberate policy on the part of the Government of Iraq to eliminate large numbers of Kurdish civilians, both as punishment for their imputed political sympathies and in retaliation for the activities of opposition forces" {AI index MDE 14/06/88 of 2 Sep}. Amnesty International shortly afterwards speaks of 120,000 Kurds having fled from Iraq to Turkey during the last week of August and the first week of September; and it recounts reports of Iraqi government forces entering gas-bombed villages on 28 August and rounding-up injured survivors whom they then killed and buried in mass graves {AIBS release of 7 Sep}. Refugees reaching Turkey say that 65 Kurdish villages have been attacked with chemical weapons {G 14 Sep}. There are many Assyrians among the refugees in Turkey, their villages too having been attacked with CW weapons, according to the *Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker* {TZ 3 Sep}. Turkish military doctors examining the sick among the refugees are reported as saying that many wounds are compatible with mustard-gas poisoning {TL 2 Sep; TZ 5 Sep}. Kurdish refugees are also arriving in Iran {Tehran domestic service 3 Sep in FBIS-NES 6 Sep}. The Iraqi news agency quotes an official source as "strongly denying the use of chemical weapons in northern Iraq" {Ind 3 Sep}.

1 September The leader of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party, Massoud Barzani, addresses an appeal to the UN Security Council, calling on it to "fulfill its recent resolution to take immediate action against any nation using chemical warfare." {CR 9 Sep, pp S12134-5} [see 26 Aug in CWCB 2]

6 September The representative of Egypt, Nabil Elaraby, states at the CD that his country "considers that the prohibition of chemical weapons has become a basic norm of international law ... which should be scrupulously observed." And, addressing the problem of attaining universality for the CWC, he supports the Yugoslav proposal [see 8 June in CWCB 2] for a UN conference open to all potential signatories because this would enable prior consultations on the largest scale possible; and he proposes that such a conference consider the insertion into the CWC of provisions for specific sanctions in the event of violation. What such provisions should comprise could be addressed during the forthcoming intersessional CD meetings. {CD/PV.480}

6 September The FRG makes detailed proposals to the CD Ad Hoc CW Committee on how its 'ad hoc checks' scheme for non-production-verification [see 25 Jan in CWCB 1] might operate in practice. The scheme would require each state party to establish a national register of its chemical industry, suitably defined, for

submission to the Technical Secretariat of the international organization; facilities to be subjected to ad hoc checks would be selected by the International Inspectorate at random but in accordance with a weighting factor. The sole purpose of the checks would be to ascertain whether any scheduled chemicals not reported for the facility were being produced there at the time of the inspection. {CD/869}

7 September Official sources in Turkey say that a special health team has been sent to the Iraqi border area to check on the use of chemical weapons. {Ind 8 Sep}

8 September The State Department announces: "The United States Government is convinced that Iraq has used chemical weapons in its military campaign against Kurdish guerrillas"; previously, US officials had said that the Government had no conclusive proof {NYT 9 Sep}. The British, Turkish and other West European governments are continuing to say that they have no definite evidence {DTel 9 Sep}. It is later stated in the press with attribution to unidentified US officials that the government had delayed its announcement for almost a month in order to secure additional verification {NYT 10 Sep}, and that the US evidence included intercepts of Iraqi military communications, as well as information gathered from Kurdish refugees in Turkey {NYT 16 Sep}. The press will continue to report statements by individual doctors and nurses that they are treating or seeing cases of CW injury {*Economist* 10 Sep, Ind 14 Sep, TL 15 Sep, TL 19 Sep, SZ 21 Sep, TZ 22 Sep, Obs 2 Oct}, though there will also be reports of doctors diagnosing natural causes for conditions attributed to CW {NYT 10 and 12 Sep}, and of refugees dead from illnesses attributed to poison gas showing no evidence of that at autopsy {NYT 11 Sep}.

9 September The Turkish Foreign Ministry announces that it has no evidence that there are people suffering from CW injuries among the refugees from Iraq. Its spokesman says: "The use of chemical weapons is a subject which Turkey follows sensitively. The information and findings obtained as a result of comprehensive examination and research conducted so far are not of a nature to confirm such allegations." {Ankara domestic radio in FBIS-WEU 9 Sep}

9 September The Senate votes for a bill, The Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988, to impose punitive sanctions upon Iraq following the Administration's condemnation of Baghdad's use of poison gas against the Kurds. If enacted into law, the bill would cut off \$800 million of US credits and credit guarantees and exports of sensitive US equipment to Iraq. It would also require US representatives to vote against all loans to heavily indebted Iraq and would bar US imports of Iraqi oil and petroleum products. {CR 9 Sep, pp S-12133-8}

The Senate action elicits expressions of outrage in Iraq, echoed in several other Arab countries, most commonly denouncing the Senate for unwarranted interference in internal Iraqi affairs. There are calls on Baghdad radio and television, and in the newspapers, for mass anti-US demonstrations. A vast march to post a "Baghdad masses protest memorandum" on the door of the US Embassy takes place on 11 September. The memorandum charac-

terizes the Senate's action as "shedding false tears over a handful of stray people who betrayed their homeland and threatened peace in the region." {FBIS-NES 12-16 Sep}

12 September The UK Foreign Office states that Britain now regards the evidence for CW having been used against the Kurds as "compelling," particularly that supplied from US sources, though not "conclusive" {FT 13 Sep}. Britain, Japan, the five Nordic countries, the United States, West Germany and Italy, joined by Belgium, China, France, the Netherlands and the USSR, urge the UN Secretary-General to initiate an investigation under Security Council Resolution 620 [see 26 Aug in CWCB 2]. {NYT 16 Sep}

12 September The German Democratic Republic reaffirms to the CD that it "does not possess any chemical weapons and has no such weapons from other states stationed on its territory"; also that it "is neither engaged in the development of chemical weapons nor has it facilities to produce them." It declares, further, the number of facilities it has which produce Schedule [2] or Schedule [3] chemicals. {CD/871}

12 September The CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons adopts a new "rolling text" {CD/874}. The principle that chemical weapons production facilities, now defined (in a notably restrictive manner) for the first time, are actually to be destroyed, not converted to some other use, is now firmly established. Other major developments over the previous rolling text [see 20 Apr in CWCB 1] are limited to additional language on challenge-inspection modalities, both in the rolling text proper and in the appended material on which consensus is still developing. The latter includes a report on the role of instrumental monitoring in nonproduction verification, as well as expanded language on the final clauses. There is much evidence in the text of the discord engendered by the French insistence hitherto on the option of maintaining production facilities in support of a "security stock" even during the destruction period.

13 September Finland describes to the CD the prototype database which has been developed in the Finnish CW Disarmament Verification Research Project for computerized storage and handling of CWC verification data, such as might serve the day-to-day needs of the future Technical Secretariat. The system, which runs on a MicroVax II and is documented in a new Finnish Blue Book, is of-

ferred for international experimentation and evaluation, applications for user passwords into the system being invited. {CD/PV.481}

13-16 September The UN Secretary-General asks Iraq to admit a team of experts to investigate the reports of poison-gas use against Kurdish guerrillas; if access is denied, the team, which is still being assembled, may instead seek to inspect Kurdish camps in Turkey. A joint UNHCR/ International Red Cross team that had visited Kurdish refugees in north-west Iran says it has found no evidence of the CW attacks which the refugees had reported. {SZ 1 Sep} On the following day the Turkish Foreign Ministry states that that any request for a UN investigating team to enter Turkey would be refused, for it would "create a wrong impression that Turkish medical experts are inadequate to make related research." The government would, however, continue to admit journalists and humanitarian groups (such as the UNHCR and the Red Cross) to the refugee camps. {G, DTel, NYT 15 Sep} Iraq refuses the UN request two days later {NYT 17 Sep}.

14 September The State Department announces: "The US now believes that Libya has developed a chemical weapons production capability and is on the verge of full production of these weapons" {WP 18 Sep}. [There had been US press reports last winter, attributed to US government officials {NYT 24 Dec 87} and to the Chadian Ambassador to the USA {CSM 5 Jan} of Libyan construction of CW-weapons factories.] NBC Television reports that a plant 50 miles from Tripoli will soon be able to produce large amounts of mustard gas {Reuter 14 Sep}; the factory is said to be a desalination plant, also intended for nerve-gas production {DTel 17 Sep}. Responding to information received from the US Government, the Japanese Government states that it had found no evidence that a private Japanese machine-tool company had been involved in Libyan chemical-weapons production {Kyodo in FBIS-EAS 16 Sep, FT 17 Sep}.

Purported details of the Libyan plant, including reference to involvement of Belgian, French and West German firms also, would be published in the press over the next several days, with attribution to unidentified US officials. {NYT 18 Sep, DN 22 Sep, NYC Tribune 27 Sep}

15 September The European Parliament adopts a resolution accusing Iraq of using CW to "exterminate the Kurdish population"

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS FOR NEWS CHRONOLOGY

ACR	Arms Control Reporter	DefNat	Defense Nationale (Paris)	JANA	Jamahiriya News Agency (Tripoli)
AI	Amnesty International	DieW	Die Welt	JP	Jerusalem Post
AIBS	Amnesty International, British section	DN	Detroit News	LAT	Los Angeles Times
AN	Atlantic News (Brussels)	FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information (Washington)	LeM	Le Monde (Paris)
CARDRI	Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq, London	FR	Frankfurter Rundschau	Lib	Liberation (Paris)
CBW	Chemical/biological warfare	FT	Financial Times (London)	NYT	New York Times
CD	Conference on Disarmament	G	Guardian (London)	Obs	Observer (London)
CD/	CD document series	HansC	Hansard (Commons)	PreV	Die Presse (Vienna)
CN	Current News (US Dept of Def.)	HASC	House Armed Services Committee	Sci	Science
CR	Congressional Record	HR	House of Representatives, US Congress	ST	Sunday Times (London)
CSM	Christian Science Monitor	IHT	International Herald Tribune	STel	Sunday Telegraph (London)
CurPol	Current Policy (US Dept. of State)	Ind	Independent (London)	SZ	Suddeutsche Zeitung
CW	Chemical warfare	INA	Iraq News Agency (Baghdad)	TL	Times (London)
CWC	Projected Chemical Weapons Convention	IRNA	Islamic Republic News Agency (Tehran)	TS	Tagesspiegel (West Berlin)
DTel	Daily Telegraph (London)			TZ	Tageszeitung (West Berlin)
				UN	United Nations
				WiB	Woche im Bundestag
				WP	Washington Post
				WT	Washington Times

and calling upon the 12 member states of the European Community to suspend immediately all deliveries of weapons to Iraq, as well as the export of material usable for the manufacture of chemical weapons. {TL 16 Sep, FT 19 Sep}

15 September US CD ambassador Max Friedersdorf, in a plenary statement reviewing the summer session's work, says that "the tempo of progress has slowed down" and specifies three issues "central to the success of the [CWC] negotiations": (a) the problem of ensuring undiminished security during the transitional period while chemical weapons and their production facilities are being destroyed; (b) the provisions needed in the CWC for dealing with the possible emergence of new CW agents; and (c) the proper approach on challenge inspection. In this last regard he commends a recent GDR proposal. {CD/PV.482}

16 September The Prime Minister of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, says that the International Committee of the Red Cross had been invited to investigate the refugees' claims that Iraq had used poison gas against them; he repeated that Turkish doctors had not found "one case to verify the charges." {FT 17 Sep}

16 September The British Foreign Secretary declines to condemn Iraq for using CW against the Kurds, saying Britain would await a UN investigation into the allegations. {G 17 Sep}

17 September Meeting in Pisa, the Foreign Ministers of Italy and FR Germany have the CW-weapons ban on their agenda. {TZ 19 Sep}

17 September Iraq News Agency reports that a statement issued by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, "reaffirmed that Iraq respects and abides by all the provisions of international law and international agreements accepted by the international community, including the Geneva Protocol of 1925" on CW weapons {INA 17 Sep in FBIS-NES 19 Sep, WSJ 19 Sep, WP 20 Sep}. The US Government announces three days later that it understands the statement to mean that Iraq forswears use of the weapons in internal as well as international conflicts {WP, Reuter in G 21 Sep}.

19 September The Director of US Central Intelligence, William Webster, during a public speech in California, states that "at least 10 countries are working to produce biological weapons," and that "as many as 20 countries may be developing chemical weapons" {prepared text, Reuter 19 Sep in CN 20 Sep}. The Director of Naval Intelligence, William O Studeman, had told the Congress in March: "Worldwide, some 10 countries possess a chemical warfare capability. As many are known or thought to be actively seeking it Five Asian states developing chemical warfare capability are: PRC, Taiwan, North Korea, Vietnam and Burma. PRC, Taiwan and North Korea are also involved in biological warfare programs" {HASC subcommittee hearing 1 Mar}.

19 September The Governor of Utah announces that the US Army has changed its plans about building a maximal-containment biological aerosol test facility at Dugway Proving Ground; the plan now is to build a BL3 rather than a BL4 facility. {Science 30 Sep}

20 September Japan announces that its list of chemicals whose export to Iran and Iraq is banned is to be increased from 6 to 9, and restrictions will be placed on their export to other countries. The three additional chemicals are phosphorus trichloride, dimethyl phosphite and trimethyl phosphite. {Tokyo Kyodo 20 Sep and Reuter, both in CN 21 Sep, ACR 704.B.307}

20 September In Geneva the summer session of the CD ends.

21 September In Turkey, Foreign Ministry spokesman Inal Batu says at his weekly news conference that no statement had been

made by Turkey denying the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against its own citizens in the northern region; what had been said was that no such evidence had been found by Turkey in examinations carried out among refugees. {Ankara domestic radio in FBIS-WEU 21 Sep}

21 September In the FRG, the Bundestag condemns the use of CW weapons by Iraq against the Kurds {FR 22 Sep}, an action which, on the following day, Arab ambassadors in Bonn condemn as part of an "anti-Iraq campaign" {SZ 23 Sep}.

21 September The Senate Foreign Relations Committee receives a staff report based on visits to Kurdish refugee camps in Turkey during 12-15 September. The report concludes that "overwhelming evidence exists that Iraq used chemical weapons on Kurdish civilians in a major offensive in northern Iraq that began August 25, 1988." Refugee accounts are the principal evidence cited.

22 September In the Senate a bill is introduced which would impose economic sanctions against firms, US or foreign, "involved in the transfer of chemical agents or their related production equipment or technical assistance to Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria" {CR 22 Sep, pp S13093-5, WT 23 Sep}. The bill does not mention Japan but it is modelled on the legislation passed earlier in the year directed against Toshiba Machine Co {DN 22 Sep}.

23 September The joint US-Soviet statement from the Shultz-Shevardnadze talks contains the following:

"The two sides reaffirmed the objective of concluding as soon as possible a global convention on the comprehensive prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, encompassing all CW-capable states.

"In reviewing progress toward this goal, the sides exchanged views on such issues as laboratory synthesis of super-toxic chemicals for medical and research purposes, bilateral data exchanges and other confidence-building measures

"They agreed that the tenth round of Soviet-US bilateral consultations on chemical weapons will take place in Geneva from November 29 to December 15.

"The sides expressed deep concern about the recurrent use of chemical weapons, in particular against civilian populations.

"They shared the view that the expanding proliferation and use of chemical weapons continue to impart a sense of urgency to their discussions and highlight the absolute necessity of negotiating an effective and verifiable CW ban.

"They reaffirmed their support for the role of the UN Secretary-General in carrying out prompt investigations in order to ascertain the facts of such use.

"They further agreed that Soviet and US experts would meet on December 16, 1988, for a new round of talks on measures to halt the proliferation of chemical weapons." {Izvestiya 25 Sep in FBIS-SOV 26 Sep}

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze tells an end-of-talks press conference that the USSR was willing to disclose the locations of Soviet production facilities for CW weapons if the USA was prepared to reveal the size of its CW arsenal {WP 24 Sep}. He spoke of the CWC negotiations thus: "It is a question of how to exclude the development and production of chemical weapons without disrupting the normal development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, and of exchanging data on military chemical potentials before the signing of a convention" {Pravda 25 Sep in FBIS-SOV 26 Sep}.

25 September FRG CD Ambassador Paul Joachim von Stulpnagel, in a prerecorded broadcast, says that US START negotiator Max Kampelman, when briefing a private meeting of Western CD ambassadors about START on 30 August, had "stated, as his personal view, that when he considered the problems he has had with INF and START he could hardly imagine that this type of

treaty for chemical weapons was verifiable" {Norddeutscher Rundfunk 25 Sep}. This statement, which seemed to echo attacks from some US quarters on the CWC negotiations, had earlier leaked in the West-German press {TZ 13 Sep, SZ 16 Sep}; in the Bundestag three days previously Foreign Minister Genscher had stated that, although he doubted whether Ambassador Kampelman had been speaking officially, his remarks had still to be taken seriously {WIB 28 Sep}.

26 September President Reagan says to the UN General Assembly: "The use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war ... jeopardizes the moral and legal strictures that have held these weapons in check since World War I. Let this tragedy spark reaffirmation of the Geneva Protocol outlawing the use of chemical weapons. I call upon the signatories to that protocol, as well as other concerned states, to convene a conference to consider actions that we can take together to reverse the serious erosion of this treaty" {CurPol no 1109}. State Department officials had, on 20 September, told journalists that the US had begun "sounding out other major nations about convening an international conference to roll back the growing use and threat of poison gas attacks" {WP 21 Sep}. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze describes the conference proposal as "a very good idea" {NYT 27 Sep}.

27 September The House of Representatives votes 388-16 to impose sanctions against Iraq, declaring that "Iraq's use of chemical weapons is a gross violation of international law" {CR 27 Sep, pp H8427-8}. The bill, which had been reported out by the Foreign Affairs Committee on 22 September {WP 22 Sep}, would bar the export of weapons and sensitive technology to Iraq, but would not go as far as the Senate sanctions bill [see 9 Sep] (which would in addition halt US credit and ban US imports of Iraqi oil) unless the President was unable to assure Congress that the Iraqi Government had renounced chemical weapons and was willing to admit a UN investigatory mission {NYT 28 Sep}. The administration has been opposing both bills on the grounds, for example, that they would undercut international efforts to curb the spread of chemical weapons {WP 23 Sep}. This, and the shortage of parliamentary time remaining to the Congress, would later cause supporters of the sanctions legislation to introduce House-Senate compromise language as an amendment to a tax bill {CR 30 Sep, pp S13802-7}.

29 September President Mitterrand of France, addressing the UN General Assembly, states that France is ready, "as of this moment, to renounce any possibility of producing chemical weapons" as soon as the CWC enters into force. He believes that production facilities as well as stockpiles should be "subjected to international surveillance before they are dismantled."

In addition to announcing this major shift in the French position, the President also declares that France, as depositary of the Geneva Protocol, favors the proposed meeting of states parties [see 26 Sep]. He says that the meeting "will aim at making a solemn reaffirmation to the commitment of the non-use of chemical weapons, at preventing their proliferation, at encouraging new accessions to the Protocol, at improving investigative procedures -- in short, at indicating a common desire for the success of the work currently being carried out at Geneva within the context of the Conference on Disarmament" {French UN Mission text}. Later, he states that France is prepared to host the conference in Paris {NYT 30 Sep, LeM 1 Oct}.

He puts forward a third proposal, also betokening a major shift in French policy, for an increased UN role "in the struggle against the proliferation and the use of chemical weapons": "Let us create a situation which would make it impossible for any State to use chemical weapons with impunity to settle its external or internal problems. If any State does use them, I think it would become necessary, among other measures, to impose an embargo on all deliveries of products, technologies and, more generally, weapons to that State. France is ready, after consultation with

its partners, to submit a draft resolution to this effect."

He states that France "has no chemical weapons." This is said to have surprised "several US officials" {WP 30 Sep}.

30 September The Congress passes a new FY 1989 Defense Authorization Act [see 3 Aug in CWCB 2]. Its main CW provisions are the same as those of its vetoed predecessor [see 13 July in CWCB 2]. {HR report 100-989}

30 September The Foreign Minister of Austria, in a speech at the UN General Assembly, speaks of the urgency of a verifiable elimination of all chemical weapons and states that Austria would be willing to act as host country for the requisite control organization "in accordance with the example of the IAEA." {PreV 1-2 Oct}

5 October The Foreign Minister of Bahrain announces at the UN General Assembly that his country will accede to the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention. {WAKH from Manama 5 Oct in FBIS-NES 6 Oct}

9 October A Defense Department official, Thomas Welch, is quoted as saying that 22 countries now have chemical weapons, as compared with 20 in 1987. {LAT 9 Oct}

10 October FRG Foreign Office State-Secretary Helmut Schäfer, responding to a parliamentary question, states that the "chemical weapons stockpile deployed on the soil of the Federal Republic will be removed at the end of 1992. Destruction in the FRG is not intended."

11 October The President of France, in a public address in Paris, says: "I would ... like to reaffirm my principle: We will not deprive ourselves of any type of weapon held by other powers if we have the technological and financial means of producing it." And later, addressing CW weapons explicitly: "The Soviet Union has large stockpiles. The United States is rapidly trying to make up its lag. We in France are a long way behind. Having said that, I do not think it reasonable to push France into an untenable position in which it would continue to produce chemical weapons when the others had stopped doing so." He reaffirms the substance of his New York proposals [see 29 Sep]. {DefNat Nov}

11 October Iraqi aircraft attack a Kurdish village in the Kirkuk region with chemical bombs according to Jallal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, speaking in Paris the following week, stating that a second such attack had taken place near Sulaymaniyah three days later; a total of 141 people had been injured, he said {Lib 25 Oct in FBIS-NES 1 Nov}. Kurdish officials say that an attempt was being made to prove this renewed use of CW by getting civilian casualties out to Iran {G and Ind 19 Oct}.

12 October Led by the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia, Arab-League diplomats in London protest, to the UK Foreign Office, "Britain's campaign against Iraq," concerning the alleged use of CW weapons against Iraqi Kurds. Foreign-Office Minister William Waldegrave, receiving the delegation, states to it that the British Government still considers the evidence "compelling" and is surprised that, in view of the Iraqi denials, Baghdad was not allowing an international commission into the country to investigate. {Ind and TL 12 Oct}

13 October A bipartisan group of 59 Senators states in a letter to the UN Secretary-General that it "is critical that we move as a body of nations to rebuild the barrier to chemical weapons use and reassert the principle that chemical warfare is unacceptable." The letter proposes a broadening of export controls, a system for easier UN investigation of CW-use complaints, and adoption by the UN of a policy of international sanctions against any country using CW weapons. {AP in CN 14 Oct}

13 October House and Senate conferees agree that a compromise version of their respective Iraqi-sanctions bills [see 9 and 27 Sep] should go forward as an amendment to a tax bill. {WP 12 Oct, IHT 14 Oct}

13 October Vice President George Bush speaks as follows during the second televised presidential debate: "I'd love to be able to tell my grandchildren four years after my first term, I'd like to say, 'Your grandfather, working with the leaders of the Soviet Union, working with the leaders of Europe, was able to ban chemical biological weapons from the face of the earth.'" {NYT 15 Oct}

16 October In Ankara a team of American doctors, under the auspices of Physicians for Human Rights, states that it had found overwhelming evidence of CW weapons having been used in attacks on Iraqi Kurdish villages on 25 August. Since arriving in Turkey on 7 October, the team had interviewed refugees in camps located near Diyarbakir and Mardin. {WT and G 17 Oct}

In the team's preliminary written report, released on 22 October, the finding is stated in these terms: "The team could not determine the number of weapons used, the scale of the attacks, or the exact chemical composition of the chemical agents in the August 25 attacks. The pattern and timing of the symptoms, and findings on physical examination, however, are consistent with observations made on victims of Iraqi chemical weapon attacks by previous missions sent by the United Nations. In particular, history and physical signs are most consistent with either a combination of a vesicant (blistering agent) and a more rapidly acting lethal agent (such as nerve gas), or a single vesicant agent that rapidly causes death."

The team's observations are summarized in the report as follows: "The physicians conducted in-depth videotaped interviews, examined alleged victims, and administered a systematic fourteen-page questionnaire prepared in English and Kurdish. Reliable testimony which confirmed the use of chemical weapons included: (1) bombing runs by low-flying jets were followed by the appearance of dark yellow clouds from the bomb-bursts; (2) death came suddenly to birds and domestic fowl, followed by sheep, goats, cows, and mules. Humans also died within minutes, without evidence of physical trauma; (3) refugees who had been within 75 to 500 meters of bomb-bursts described skin blistering which began within 30 minutes of exposure, and a characteristic pattern of severe irritation of the nose, mouth, skin and respiratory passages, nausea and/or vomiting, diarrhea, headache, and painful urination. Detailed analysis of the in-depth accounts and questionnaire responses revealed consistency internally and between individuals. On physical examination, the physicians also documented characteristic healing skin burns." {Text of report}

Iraq News Agency the following day quotes a "responsible Iraqi source" as saying that the team's report is "part of the deceptive, tendentious campaign to discount the decisive Iraqi victory over the Iranian invaders." {INA from Baghdad in FBIS-NES 18 Oct}

19 October Speaking as acting Commander-in-Chief of Iranian armed forces, Hojjat ol-Eslam Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Speaker of the Majlis, refers to Iranian military weakness in the area of CW weapons. He says: "Chemical and biological weapons are poor man's atomic bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defence Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only drops of ink on paper." {IRNA from Tehran in FBIS-NES 19 Oct}

20 October The French CD Ambassador, Pierre Morel, speaks as follows to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in New York: "The President of the French Republic has approved President Reagan's ideas of an international conference devoted to the interdiction of use of chemical weapons. France invites today, as depositary of the Geneva Protocol ..., all states parties and the

other interested states, participating in the work of the United Nations, as members or observers, to take part in an ad hoc conference which will be held in Paris during 7-11 January 1989. The first aim of the conference is, of course, the solemn confirmation by all parties of their full adherence to the Geneva Protocol We are at a crossroads: either we do not take action when faced with the risks of banalization of the use of chemical weapons, which will ruin in advance [the projected Chemical Weapons Convention]; or we fully restore the authority of the Protocol, and this will give the indispensable political momentum in order to bring to its end the negotiation of a universal, credible and durable convention. The Paris conference offers to all states the possibilities to make such a choice in full clarity We propose that the conference, organized at a high political level and therefore brief, ends with a short but substantial document and does not linger in negotiations of a technical character." Consultations with other governments will continue. {Official text}

21 October The White House issues a statement which summarizes the French announcement about the projected Paris conference [see 20 Oct], calling it the "Conference on Chemical Weapons Use": "We hope that nations attending the conference will reaffirm their political commitment to comply with existing prohibitions on chemical weapons use. We also invite those nations which have not done so to adhere to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The purpose of the conference is neither to change the Geneva Protocol in any way nor to single out any country for its previous actions" {Official text}. The White House indicates that George Shultz is to lead the US delegation to the conference {AN 26 Oct}.

21 October Vice-President George Bush makes the most detailed of his several Presidential-campaign statements thus far on the subject of CBW, speaking of the dangers of proliferation and the consequent need for an intrusively verified global ban on chemical weapons. Among the "six elements" of his program for curbing CBW is the creation of "a more formal suppliers' group to control the transfer of chemical technology and weapons." Another is that "the nations guilty of chemical warfare must pay a price Any government that resorts to such an outrage must face the censure of all nations. The United States, working with our allies, will take the lead." On the CWC, he says: "We must outlaw these weapons, once and for all! Nothing less is acceptable." {Prepared text of speech at the University of Toledo}

22 October In the last hours of the 100th US Congress, the sanctions legislation against Iraq [see 13 Oct] finally fails. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Claiborne Pell, announces his intention of re-introducing it in January. {Obs 23 Oct}

25 October The Director of Central Intelligence, William Webster, responding to reporters' questions after a speech in Washington, says that Libya is "developing the largest chemical plant that I know of for chemical warfare" [see 14 Sep] {WP 26 Oct}. In speaking of the challenges facing the US intelligence community in the coming decade, he had placed emphasis on CBW proliferation {Official text}.

26 October In a speech broadcast on Libyan radio and television, Moammar Qaddafi states that what the CIA had said was a chemical-weapons factory [see 14 Sep and 25 Oct] was actually a "plant for medicines -- which will be opened to the world"; journalists and diplomats based in Tripoli would be invited to the inauguration of the plant to "see for themselves." {IHT 28 Oct}

The Libyan People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison states that Libya "has no intention whatsoever of producing this type of weapon." {Tripoli domestic radio in FBIS-NES 27 Oct}

27 October In the FRG, the Bundestag adopts the following resolution, worked out jointly by all government and opposition parties: "The German Bundestag is considering allying itself with the US Senate decision to institute targeted and graded measures against Iraq if its Armed Forces continue to use chemical weapons in violation of international law. In the view of the German Bundestag, each use of poisonous gas must meet with the decisive resistance of the community of states on the way toward a worldwide outlawing of chemical weapons." {DPA from Bonn in FBIS-WEU 28 Oct}

28 October Secretary of State George Shultz, speaking in San Francisco, says that the US goal at the Paris conference [see 21 Oct] will be to "reverse the erosion of respect for the norms which have held the line against the use of such hideous weapons." And he says: "The worst nightmare of all would be the eventual combination of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons in the hands of governments with terrorist histories." {WP 30 Oct}

3 November The UN Secretary-General publishes the report of his group of experts on procedures for investigating CBW-use allegations [see 15-19 Aug in CWCB 2], together with comments by governments. {TASS from Moscow in FBIS-SOV 4 Nov}

4 November Asked whether the Iraqi use of CW weapons would influence its decision on the proposed increase in the export credit granted to Iraq, the British Government writes to Parliament as follows: "We have ... made clear to the Iraqi Government our condemnation of the use of chemical weapons. We will continue to do so. At the same time, we should not lose sight of the importance of developing political and economic relations with Iraq, and the provision of export credit is a major contribution to this" {HansC 4 Nov}. The United States was now granting Iraq one billion dollars in export credits {SZ 8 Nov}.

8 November George Bush is elected President of the United States.

12 November An Australian governmental delegation concludes a 4-day visit to Hanoi to discuss, as the official Vietnamese news-agency put it, "measures to be taken by countries in the region to check the proliferation of chemical weapons." {VNA from Hanoi in FBIS-SEA 12 Nov} [This was presumably in furtherance of the Hawke initiative: see 20 Jun in CWCB 2]

15 November FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl meets in Washington with President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz. The involvement of private West German industry in the construction of an alleged CW-weapons plant in Libya [see 25 Oct], is raised with him, so it is reported six weeks later in the US press {NYT 1 Jan 89, WP 10 Jan 89}, and subsequently confirmed by a federal government spokesman {DPA in FBIS-WEU 3 Jan}.

17 November President-elect George Bush and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reportedly agree in Washington that the NATO arms-control agenda should remain unchanged, including the high priority accorded to a CWC. {ST 20 Nov}

23 November A documentary film, "Winds of Death," presenting new evidence of Iraqi CW in Kurdistan is screened on British independent television {Ind and FT 22 Nov, G 24 Nov, IRNA from Tehran in FBIS-NES 24 Nov}. In addition to accounts of a CW air attack on thousands of fleeing Kurds sheltering in a gorge 20 miles from the Turkish border on 28 August, the film presents findings from chemical analyses of environmental samples. The film-maker had himself collected the samples from an attack site during a clandestine visit to Iraqi Kurdistan earlier in November. A mustard-gas degradation product, 1,4-dithiane, had been positively identified; so had others {NYT 4 Dec}, namely 1,4-oxathiane and 1,1-thio-bis-ethene.

29 November UNRWA releases figures showing that, of the 309 Palestinians killed since the start of the uprising in the Gaza Strip, 12 had died from tear gas, most of them babies; 31 people had been treated for tear-gas injuries during the previous fortnight. {JP in FBIS-NES 30 Nov}

29 November The 10th round of US-USSR consultations on the CWC begins in Geneva {TASS from Moscow in FBIS-SOV 30 Nov}, and the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons reassembles there for "open-ended consultations." Both are due to end on 15 December.

2 December President Reagan transmits to Congress his latest report on "Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements" in accordance with PL 99-145. Like the 1987 report, it states that "the Soviet Union maintains an active offensive biological warfare program and capability" in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. It "seriously questions the accuracy" of the 50,000 agent-metric-ton figure given by the USSR for the size of its CW stockpile [see 26 Dec 87 in CWCB 1]. On the CD site visit to Shikhany [see 3-4 Oct 87 in CWCB 1] it states that the Soviet "display of chemical munitions was neither totally accurate nor complete; most notable was the absence of modern chemical munitions." {Official text}

5 December The Assembly of the Western European Union votes to "ask the [WEU] Agency for the Control of Armaments for a report on the means of verifying that chemical weapons are not produced or stockpiled." {A/WEU (34) PV 7}

5 December Filing suit in a Federal District Court, the Foundation on Economic Trends seeks a halt to all US CW-weapons research and production, claiming that the programs violate the National Environmental Policy Act. {NYT 6 Dec}

7 December In Geneva, within the framework of the open-ended consultations of the CD Ad Hoc Committee [see 29 Nov], a meeting is convened to review progress in the national trial inspections [see 16 Aug in CWCB 2]. The delegations of Australia, Belgium, Finland, the FRG, the GDR, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA report either that they had already conducted their trials or -- the majority -- that they were engaged in preparing their trials.

7 December The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution calling upon the Secretary-General to continue his efforts [see 3 Nov] "to develop further technical guidelines and procedures" for investigating CBW-use reports. {A/RES/43/74A}

7 December CW arms control is reportedly prominent during the lunchtime discussion between President Reagan, President Gorbachev and President-elect Bush in New York. Secretary of State George Shultz says later that Vice-President Bush had been "very active in the discussion about chemical weapons." {Press conference transcript}

16 December The fourth round of US-Soviet consultations on preventing the spread of chemical weapons is held in Bern. The Soviet delegation is headed by CD Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin; the US delegation by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State J A Schlossberg. {TASS from Moscow in FBIS-SOV 19 Dec}

16 December Senator John Tower, Defense Secretary designate, asked at a Washington press conference whether the CWC was feasible given the verification problems, says: "There are enormous verification problems but there is also virtually universal support for constraints on chemical weapons. And I think, again, we have to try." {NYT 17 Dec}

21 December In a television interview broadcast the following day, President Reagan responds as follows when asked if military action might be taken against the reported CW-weapons factory at Rabta in Libya [see 25 Oct]: "Well, let me say that's a decision that has not been made yet, we're in communication with our allies and with NATO forces and all, and we're watching very closely that situation but even if I had made a decision I couldn't ... [sentence uncompleted]." {WP 22 Dec}

The possibility of a US attack on the factory was then being aired in the US press {WP 17 Dec}, where there was speculation that Libya might supply CW weapons to terrorists. {WP 19 Dec}

25 December The official Iraqi news agency issues a denial of a recent Egyptian report that Sudanese armed forces had acquired CW weapons from Iraq to use against separatist forces in southern Sudan. {INA in FBIS-NES 27 Dec}

26 December An interview is published in Tunisia in which the Libyan Ambassador says that press and experts could visit the factory at Rabta at its opening within the next three months {Ind 27 Dec}. The factory is visited on this day by the Algerian Minister of Public Health, who was later reported to have "familiarized himself there with the ... production lines which will produce 50 medical drugs" {Voice of Greater Arab Homeland in FBIS-NES 28 Dec}. The Syrian Minister of Health and the Secretary-General of the Association of Arab Pharmacists visit the factory six days later {JANA in FBIS-NES 5 Jan 89}.

26 December At the request of Libya, an extraordinary session of the Council of the Arab League convenes in Tunis to discuss the threat of US attacks on the Rabta chemical plant [see 21 Dec] and to "adopt a united Arab stance thereon." {INA in FBIS-NES 27 Dec}

27 December The Soviet national trial inspection [see 7 Dec] takes place at the Sintez Production Amalgamation chemical plant in Dzherzhinsk, Gorky region. {TASS in FBIS-SOV 29 Dec}

28 December An interview is published in which USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov comments at length on the CW armament and disarmament policies of the USSR. On Soviet stocks, he confirms the 50,000 agent-metric-ton figure published by the USSR Foreign Ministry one year previously [see 26 Dec 87 in CWCB 1], and states that Soviet production had "continued until the spring of last year." {Izvestiya 28 Dec in FBIS-SOV 3 Jan 89}

30 December The Defense Ministry of South Korea, in an overview report on South and North Korean military forces, states that North Korea has six storage sites for the chemical weapons which it is producing in eight plants. {IHT 31 Dec}

30 December The US Government rejects a Libyan offer conveyed by the Italian Government during the preceding week to allow international inspection of the Rabta factory; State Department deputy spokesman Phyllis Oakley says that "a one-time inspection could not be conclusive." {NYT 31 Dec}

1 January 1989 In what proves to be the start of a new series of leaks from unidentified US Government sources [see 14 Sep] about the Libyan factory at Rabta, the West-German firm Imhausen-Chemie GmbH of Lahr (Baden) is named by the *New York Times* as having played a central role in the design of the alleged CW weapons plant, starting in 1985. The firm is said to have provided technical advisers as well, and to have contracted with other concerns for the requisite construction materials and services. Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates had reportedly stated earlier that the plant had been built with the help of "nearly a dozen nations, East and West," which, however, he had not identified. Described as "poised to begin fullscale produc-

tion," the plant is said to have a potential output of 10-40 metric tons of chemical per day, about half mustard gas and half sarin nerve gas. The report states further that, since August 1988, there had been intense US "diplomatic activity aimed at forcing the Western companies out of the project" {NYT 1 Jan}. At the beginning of December, what appeared to be a press leak of a secret State Department report on the project had said that "West German pharmaceutical companies [unidentified] had provided hundreds of tons of chemical precursors to allow production to begin at Rabta" {STel 4 Dec}.

1-3 January Federal German authorities, responding to the *New York Times* report on Rabta [see 1 Jan], say that Imhausen-Chemie is already under investigation, as are other, unidentified, West-German firms {DPA 1 Jan in FBIS-WEU 3 Jan, NYT 3 Jan 89}; assisted by Customs authorities, regional offices of the Finance and Economics Ministries were auditing Imhausen for possible violation of the Foreign Trade and Payments Law {SZ, FR and FT 3 Jan 89}. But there was no evidence of violation, according to the cognizant Public Prosecutor; and on 5 Jan the Freiburg Finance Directorate would announce that the results of its investigation "have yielded no reason for suspicion of a criminal act through illegal exports" {IHT and FR 6 Jan}.

Federal Government spokesman Norbert Schäfer says that, following Cabinet discussion on 20 December, Chancellor Kohl had ordered the establishment of a commission to study the possible tightening of Federal export laws {SZ and NYT 3 Jan}. An interim report to the Bundestag is published in which the Federal Government explains why, for legal reasons, the investigation of those West-German firms implicated in the export to Iraq of CW-weapons production equipment [see 1 Dec 87 in CWCB 1] had been taking so long {DPA in FBIS-WEU 4 Jan}.

The absence of any apparent action by the Federal Government against the alleged Libyan exports despite the evidence reportedly provided by both US and Federal intelligence agencies {WP 4 Jan, DTel 7 Jan, WP 10 Jan, DieW 14 Jan, NYT 17 Jan} receives much adverse comment in the US press, and an acrimonious phase in US-German relations sets in.

3 January Speculation about an imminent air raid or missile attack by US or Israeli forces on the Rabta chemical plant has by now become widespread and intense.

4 January Two Libyan fighter aircraft are shot down by aircraft from a US carrier in international waters off the Libyan coast.

4 January An unattributed report in the West-German press states that the building of the Rabta plant had been organized from London, by an Iraqi, Ishan Barbouti, and that in addition to West German firms, firms from Austria, East Germany, Japan, South Korea and Switzerland had also participated in the construction. The report gives no source for its information. {DieW 4 Jan 89}

4 January Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, speaking in a Knesset debate, says that the "chemical weapons epidemic" must be stopped by a powerful drive made up of political and other measures. "The State of Israel is about to take a series of measures. I will not specify the steps that will be taken by the defence establishment, which is following these developments very closely. The Foreign Minister's meetings will include talks with the foreign ministers of some states which, according to reports that we are now examining, are allegedly supplying the raw materials." {IDF radio in FBIS-NES 4 Jan}

4 January Swiss authorities say they have no reason to take action against the two companies identified to them by US officials in December as involved in the Rabta project, for there was no applicable Swiss law. One of the companies was an Imhausen subsidiary; the other was named as Ishan Barbouti International. {Deutschlandfunk in FBIS-WEU 5 Jan}

4 January Secretary of State George Shultz is asked during a press interview whether it would be a matter of weeks or months before Libyan CW-weapons production could start at Rabta. He responds: "If we can be successful in shutting off from them the expertise they need, it will take them quite a bit longer. That's why we're making such a big stew about it." {WP 5 Jan}

4 January A Foreign Office statement says that the British government has "independent information" that Libya has a "very large" plant and that "there can be no doubt that it is intended for chemical weapons production." {Press Association in FBIS-WEU 5 Jan, DTel 5 Jan}

7 January In Libya, more than a hundred journalists are taken to visit, at dusk, the outside of the chemical factory at Rabta. {WP 8 Jan, WT, Ind and G 9 Jan}

7 January Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Netanyahu is asked in London by a British television reporter whether Israel possesses chemical weapons. He responds: "No, we do not. We ourselves are very, very strict about the non-use of this weapon and not allowing it to proliferate into our area" {Jerusalem radio in FBIS-NES 9 Jan}. When asked the same question two days later at the Paris Conference, Foreign Minister Arens replies: "It is essential to focus on countries which have used chemical weaponry. Israel will take the necessary steps to defend itself" {WT 10 Jan}.

7 January The Paris Conference begins [see 21 Oct].

7 January Meeting during the Paris Conference, FRG Foreign Minister Genscher and Secretary of State George Shultz agree to a bilateral meeting of experts on the problem of CW proliferation. There is to be a session in Washington next week. {DPA in FBIS-WEU 9 Jan}

7 January In the course of his speech at the Paris Conference, Secretary of State George Shultz says: "When Vice President Bush, on behalf of President Reagan, tabled the 1984 draft treaty in Geneva, he said that a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons cannot work unless states are prepared to 'commit themselves to a new but absolutely necessary degree of openness' -- 'a new way of doing business.' But however formidable the challenge, the world community should not underestimate the United States' determination to overcome those problems and put an effective treaty into force. Recently, President-elect Bush has declared that one of his highest priorities will be to deal with what he appropriately calls 'this terrible scourge'." {Official text from US Embassy, London}

8 January Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze says at the Paris Conference that the USSR will "soon complete the construction of a CW elimination facility at which we shall proceed immediately to the elimination of our chemical weapons stockpiles." {prepared text, NYT 9 Jan}. The destruction is to commence on an experimental basis, the chief Soviet disarmament official, Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov, says later; how fast it proceeds is to depend on progress towards a worldwide ban on production {FT 11 Jan}. During his speech the Foreign Minister develops a theme which he had first stated in public the previous July [see Vestnik MID SSSR no 15, 15 Aug 88]: "Over the past two years, our position has evolved in a radical way from manufacturing chemical weapons to abandoning their production altogether, from hushing up data on the existing stockpiles to publishing such data, from seeking to protect chemical production and storage facilities from the eyes of others to recognising the concept of comprehensive verification and inviting foreign observers to watch the elimination of chemical weapons. And should anyone say to us that we waited too long before stopping the production of chemical weapons and imposing other prohibitions on them, we would say: yes, we did wait too long" {NYT 9 Jan}. "But having taken the politi-

cal decision, having made the choice, we follow it unswervingly, quickly making up for time lost over the years and reaching unprecedented levels of openness Openness is the main prerequisite of a real and verifiable process of disarmament" {Official text, Soviet Embassy in Washington}.

8 January The Foreign Minister of Libya, Jadalla Azouz Ettalhi, interviewed on the CBS News program Face the Nation, says: "I don't think our know-how will enable us, even if we decided to do so, to produce chemical weapons in the very near future. We have never had a plan to produce chemical weapons We have not the intention. We have no plan for the time being." {NYT 9 Jan}

8 January In the public, plenary session of the Paris Conference, the representatives of Iraq and other Arab states say that a call for a comprehensive ban on CW weapons should be linked to a similar stand on nuclear weapons in view of the reported Israeli possession of nuclear weapons {NYT 9 Jan}. Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmet Abdel Maguid, for example, says: "Any progress on banning chemical weapons is tied to the conclusion of a parallel ban on nuclear arms" {WT 9 Jan}. It remains to be seen how exactly this "linkage" issue will be reflected in the Final Declaration.

9 January In Bonn, unidentified West German officials make public the names of four other West-German firms identified by the US Government as participants in the Rabta project. They are, in addition to Imhausen-Chemie GmbH, Preussag AG of Hanover, Pilot Plant GmbH of Dreieich, Pen Tsao Materia Medica Center Ltd of Hamburg and Ihsan Barbouti International of Frankfurt. The officials say the names of the five companies had been disclosed to Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 15 November [q.v.], during his visit to Washington. {WP 10 Jan, TL 11 Jan}

9 January Released today, the President's Budget for FY 1990 seeks \$85.4 million for research and development and munitions procurement for the binary CW munitions modernization program.

9 January Newsweek publishes excerpts from an interview with President-elect George Bush. On banning CW weapons, he had said: "It's going to take a full-court press. It's going to take principled, moral leadership from not only the major powers, but from a lot of the Third World countries. But I really think world opinion is on the side of banishing chemical and biological weapons. [Otherwise] you face the concept of the 'poor man's atomic bomb,' where military considerations override these moral considerations in some cases. So what we have to do is keep emphasizing in whatever form possible the absolute essentiality of getting rid of these things" {Newsweek 16 Jan}

10 January In the United States, a spokesman for rebel forces in southern Sudan says that intervening Libyan forces had used chemical weapons against them in the past six months. This is denied by the Sudanese Embassy {NYT 11 Jan}. A few days later the Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker in West Germany would claim that, on 5 January, 1200 people had succumbed to poison gas, apparently mustard, near Nasir in Upper Nile province {TS 15 Jan}.

11 January In the FRG, Chancellor Kohl states that the US allegations about the involvement of West German firms at Rabta [see 1 Jan] were not groundless {DTel, WP and NYT 12 Jan}. His Cabinet had the previous day decided to tighten controls of exports to sensitive areas and to order several companies to stop current deals with Libya. A criminal investigation of IBI Engineering GmbH of Frankfurt had now been launched {IHT 11 Jan}.

11 January The Paris Conference [see 7 Jan] ends with adoption by consensus of a declaration that had been negotiated in a Com-

mittee of the Whole chaired by Finnish Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa. 149 states had participated, half of them represented by their most senior foreign ministers. The text of the declaration is printed below.

Many of the participating governments took the opportunity publicly to declare, clarify or reaffirm their CW policies. From what was reported of the 109 plenary-session speeches, the following may be recorded here: (a) the total number of states to have declared nonpossession of CW weapons [see Review, below] had risen, by the end of the conference, to 43; (b) South Korea was one of the new nonpossession declarers, but not North Korea -- which did, however, propose the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in its region; (c) Israel and South Africa also proposed local chemical-weapon-free zones; and (d) to the 129 states which, according to the French Foreign Minister, were parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, another 12 were added during the conference, with two more announcing their intention of joining. {TL and FT 10 Jan, FT and WT 12 Jan}

The text of the declaration is as follows:

"The representatives of States participating in the Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, bringing together States Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and other interested States in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, solemnly declare the following:

"1. The participating States are determined to promote international peace and security throughout the world in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and to pursue effective disarmament measures. In this context, they are determined to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them. They solemnly affirm their commitments not to use chemical weapons and condemn such use. They recall their serious concern at recent violations as established and condemned by the competent organs of the United Nations. They support the humanitarian assistance given to the victims affected by chemical weapons.

"2. The participating States recognize the importance and continuing validity of the Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare, signed on 17 June 1925 in Geneva. States Parties to the Protocol solemnly reaffirm the prohibition as established in it. They call upon all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol.

"3. The participating States stress the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a Convention on the prohibition of the devel-

opment, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. This Convention shall be global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable. It should be of unlimited duration. To this end, they call on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the Convention at the earliest date. All States are requested to make, in an appropriate way, a significant contribution to the negotiations in Geneva by undertaking efforts in the relevant fields. The participating States therefore believe that any State wishing to contribute to these negotiations should be able to do so. In addition, in order to achieve as soon as possible the indispensable universal character of the Convention, they call upon all States to become parties thereto as soon as it is concluded.

"4. The participating States are gravely concerned by the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons remain and are spread. In this context, they stress the need for the early conclusion and entry into force of the Convention, which will be established on a non-discriminatory basis. They deem it necessary, in the meantime, for each State to exercise restraint and to act responsibly in accordance with the purpose of the present declaration.

"5. The participating States confirm their full support for the United Nations in the discharge of its indispensable role, in conformity with its Charter. They affirm that the United Nations provides a framework and an instrument enabling the international community to exercise vigilance with respect to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. They confirm their support for appropriate and effective steps taken by the United Nations in this respect in conformity with its Charter. They further reaffirm their full support for the Secretary-General in carrying out his responsibilities for investigations in the event of alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol. They express their wish for early completion of the work undertaken to strengthen the efficiency of existing procedures and call for the co-operation of all States, in order to facilitate the action of the Secretary-General.

"6. The participating States, recalling the final document of the first Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament in 1978, underline the need to pursue with determination their efforts to secure general and complete disarmament under effective international control, so as to ensure the right of all States to peace and security." {Reuter from Paris 11 Jan, NYT 12 Jan}



THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Peter Herby
Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva

For the first time since the First World War, chemical weapons (CW) were the focus of global political debate at the "Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons," 7-11 January. This unprecedented gathering brought together 149 states, nearly as many as the UN General Assembly, for the sole purpose of ensuring that chemical weapons are never again used and that negotiations to ban them entirely are concluded in the near future.

The initial impetus for the Paris Conference came in September 1988 from Presidents Reagan and Mitterand, who called on states to meet as a matter of urgency to reaffirm their commitment to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. This was a long-delayed response to their use in the Middle East during the past five years and fears of global proliferation of such arms.

The simultaneous participation of nearly half (80) the world's foreign ministers in a conference devoted entirely to chemical weapons and the resulting attention by international media should heighten awareness of the issue among governments and the public. It is hoped that such focussed attention will assist in resolving the few remaining obstacles in the Geneva negotiations on a global convention banning the possession of chemical weapons and their production facilities, and requiring their destruction.

The Paris Conference succeeded in forging a consensus condemning the use of chemical weapons, solemnly reaffirming the Geneva Protocol prohibition on their use, supporting the early conclusion of a CW ban in Geneva, and strengthening the role of the UN Secretary-General in investigating allegations of CW use.

This reassertion of a rapidly eroding international norm, which involved states having used or been accused of using CW, was an important political event. Though it is only an indirect and partial response to the fact of recent CW use, it could encourage restraint by would-be users by providing the basis for rapid mobilization of states should future use occur.

However, some previously submerged differences came to the fore in Paris and were unresolvable. At least one of these poses a significant challenge to the achievement of a global CW ban.

The United States and some western countries had hoped to gain commitments in Paris to international controls on the spread of materials which can be used for the production of chemical weapons. This was strongly resisted by non-aligned states, which saw such efforts as discriminating in favor of states already possessing CW. Some feared such arrangements would also reduce the commitment of possessor states to a total ban.

Thus, the Paris declaration gives equal weight to the "risk of the use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons *remain and are spread*." The declaration asserts that the best way to prevent recourse to chemical arms is by completely eliminating them, and calls on "each State to exercise restraint" – which can be interpreted as applying equally to proliferation and existing CW production programs.

Arab states united firmly around a call for linking the elimination of chemical weapons with the elimination of nuclear weapons, and in particular to the nuclear capabilities of Israel. In the words of Egypt's Foreign Minister, "It would not be logical for the international community to permit to some countries in the most sensitive regions of the world the nuclear option without the least international control, while the same international community demands the total prohibition of chemical weapons. We consider that progress in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons ... is linked to the realization of a parallel prohibition on the level of nuclear weapons."

Although this linkage was not allowed to prevent agreement in Paris, it could prove fatal to efforts to achieve a globally acceptable chemical weapons convention. While one may question the need for a balance of mass destruction weapons as a means to security in the Middle East, the Arab stance in Paris highlights certain problems to be addressed urgently. Ways must be found to increase consultation with non-negotiating states in the Geneva CW negotiations. At the same time, progress in the budding Middle East peace process will become more urgent than ever.

Despite the difficulties which the nuclear linkage presents, its emergence in Paris served to clarify the security perceptions of states in a region crucial to the success of a CW Convention. In this sense, Paris provided an opportunity for early consideration of issues which would be much more difficult to handle if raised near the date of conclusion of a CW agreement.

The Paris Conference also served as the occasion for twelve additional states to formally adhere to the Geneva Protocol or announce their intention to do so -- thus further universalizing the norm it contains. (Antigua & Barbuda, St. Lucia, North Korea, South Korea, Bahrain, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Grenada, and Bangladesh signed. Cameroon, Haiti, and Zaire announced.)

The Soviet Union used the occasion to announce that it would complete construction of a CW destruction facility and begin destroying its CW stockpile in 1989. Although widely reported in a manner which implied the unilateral destruction of the Soviet stockpile, Soviet officials later clarified their intention to link the rate of destruction to progress in the Geneva negotiations. While welcoming the Soviet move, US officials indicated that they had been destroying old stocks for some years at a site in Utah.

The Paris Conference could mark the turning point at which nations decisively rejected the option of poison gas as a means of warfare and tipped the scales towards the destruction of all such weapons. The meeting was clearly of historic significance. Yet history will also judge whether what was said was meant. The first indications will appear in the pace, intensity and level of participation at the 1989 round of CW negotiations in Geneva's Conference on Disarmament, which began 7 February. In this regard, it is encouraging that Syria, Libya, Tunisia and Iraq have, since Paris, requested observer status at the CD. Equally important will be signs of restraint in the spread and production of new chemical armaments and production facilities.

Although the last fifteen years of negotiations on a global CW ban have been predominantly east-west in orientation, the Paris Conference has made clear that the next, conclusive phase will also be negotiated between north and south. Although certain difficulties remain, an agreement is clearly within reach in the next two years, with the alternative to success being in no one's interest. Paris, in the year of the French bicentenary, has presented CW negotiators with both an important opportunity and a major challenge.

REVIEW: WORLD CW ARMAMENT

Part I of this survey, on the United States, was published in the last issue; part II, on the Soviet Union, is being held over. In the meanwhile, here is a listing of countries whose governments have made public declarations about their CW-weapon-possessor status. Representative documentation of these declarations is also noted. Of the two states that have declared possession at the CD, the US, in contrast to the Soviet Union, had previously made no particular secret of its possessor status. The cut-off date is the end of 1988. An updated version will be published in due course.

COUNTRIES THAT HAVE DECLARED POSSESSION OF CW WEAPONS

Soviet Union	CD/PV.400, 14 Apr 87
United States	CD/711, 9 Jul 86

COUNTRIES THAT HAVE DECLARED NONPOSSESSION OF CW WEAPONS

Argentina	A/S-15/PV.2, 1 Jun 88
Austria	CD/PV.471, 4 Aug 88
Bulgaria	CD/PV.457, 14 Apr 88
China	CD/PV.453, 31 Mar 88
Czechoslovakia	A/C.1/43/PV, 21 Oct 88
Egypt	CD/PV.459, 21 Apr 88
Federal Republic of Germany	CD/PV.437, 4 Feb 88
German Democratic Republic	CD/871, 12 Sep 88
Indonesia	CD/PV.437, 4 Feb 88
Italy	CD/PV.437, 4 Feb 88
Mexico	CD/PV.421, 14 Jul 87
New Zealand	CD/PV.445, 3 Mar 88
Norway	CD/PV.448, 15 Mar 88
Peru	CD/PV.472, 9 Aug 88
Romania	CD/PV.440, 16 Feb 88
Sweden	CD/PV.481, 13 Sep 88
Switzerland	CD/PV.270, 5 Jul 84
Thailand	official statement broadcast on Voice of Free Asia, 8 Jan 88
United Kingdom	CD/PV.474, 16 Aug 88

COUNTRIES THAT HAVE DECLARED NONPOSSESSION OF CW WEAPONS AND DISAVOWED INTENT TO POSSESS THEM

Belgium	CD/PV.424, 23 Jul 87
Brazil	CD/PV.460, 26 Apr 88
Canada	CD/PV.433, 25 Aug 87
Denmark	A/43/PV.7, 28 Sep 88
Malaysia	A/S-15/PV.13, 14 Jun 88
Mongolia	CD/PV.442, 23 Feb 88
Netherlands	CD/PV.309, 18 Apr 85
Pakistan	CD/PV.339, 13 Feb 86
Poland	CD/PV.419, 7 Jul 87
Spain	CD/PV.422, 16 Jul 87
[Sweden	CCD/PV.480, 21 Jul 70]
Venezuela	A/S-15/PV.3, 2 Jun 88

COUNTRIES THAT HAVE DECLARED NONPOSSESSION OF CW WEAPONS AND EXCLUDED FUTURE POSSESSION

Australia	A/S-15/PV.3, 2 Jun 88
[Austria	Austrian State Treaty, 15 May 55]
Burma	CD/PV.452, 29 Mar 88
Finland	CD/PV.441, 18 Feb 88
[Federal Republic of Germany	Paris Agreements, 23 Oct 54]
Hungary	CD/PV.437, 4 Feb 88
India	CD/PV.459, 21 Apr 88
Japan	CD/PV.424, 23 Jul 87
Morocco	CD/PV.367, 3 Jul 86

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- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare*, New York: Humanities Press, 6 vols, 1971-75; also see documented annual reviews of developments in the CBW field are to be found each year back to 1982 in the *SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford University Press
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